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Abstract
This dissertation proposes a novel way to consistently model policy-based voting
behavior across multiple electoral levels. Building on the multidimensional model
of spatial competition, change in electoral turnout and party vote choice across
elections may result from voters reweighing diﬀerent policy dimension at diﬀerent
levels of government. An estimation strategy that implements the spatial model
in the panel conditional logit ﬁxed-eﬀects framework and allows for the modeling
of non-separable preferences is developed. This framework is brought to bear on
the long-standing debate on the role of voter EU integration preferences in
explaining diﬀerences in voting behavior between national-level and European
Parliamentary elections. Leveraging a uniquely suited voter panel survey from
the German state of Bavaria, evidence of voters recalibrating their policy
priorities across electoral levels is established.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Theories of multi-level voting behavior 8
2.1 The second-order national elections model and its critiques . . . . . 8
2.2 The Europe Matters perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 A general model of multi-level spatial voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3 Methodological challenges and the promises of panel data 32
3.1 Causal inference in multi-level voting research . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2 Making the most of panel data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3 Case Selection: Multi-level elections in Bavaria 2013-2014 . . . . . . 44
3.4 The MEDW Bavaria Voter Panel study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4 Legitimacy or Alienation? EU integration preferences and differ-
ential turnout 54
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.2 Theoretical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.3 Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.4 Operationalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.5 Bivariate analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.6 Results of the panel ﬁxed eﬀects analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5 Transfer or recalibration? EU integration preferences and vote
choice 78
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.2 Spatial voting with relative dimensional weights . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.3 Estimating the dimensional weights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.4 Operationalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
i
CONTENTS
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.7 Appendix to Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6 Spatial voting with non-separable preferences 101
6.1 Multidimensional Spatial Voting with Non-separable Preferences
(with Lukas F. Stoetzer, published in Political Analysis 23(3)) . . . 101
6.2 Non-separability of Left-Right and EU preferences . . . . . . . . . . 116
7 EU integration preferences and vote switching in EP elections 120
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
7.2 Descriptive Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
7.3 Modeling transition probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
7.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
7.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
8 Conclusion 139
8.1 Summary and discussion of ﬁndings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
8.2 Broader Research Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
8.3 Implications for future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
ii
List of Figures
2.1 Illustration: First Preference for a diﬀerent party in FOE (left) and
EP election (right) due to changing dimensional weights . . . . . . 23
2.2 Policy alienation heat map: Weight of EU integration distances 5%
in FOE, 50% EU in SOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3 Policy alienation heat map: Diﬀerence between FOE and SOE alien-
ation due to change in weight from 5% EU to 50% EU. . . . . . . . 27
2.4 Illustration: Heat map of spatial vote switching probabilities given
previous vote for Social Democrats (left) or Conservatives (right) . 29
3.1 Observed and Unobserved potential outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2 Potential eﬀects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.3 Confounding due to Unobserved Heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4 Party positions in 2013 Federal and 2014 EP election . . . . . . . . 52
3.5 Voter Left-Right self-placements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.6 Voter EU integration self-placements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.1 Proportion of voters per EU integration score . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2 Proportion of voters per EU integration score and Left-Right pref-
erence grouping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.3 Legitimacy model: Density of ﬁrst diﬀerence in election-speciﬁc EU
preference coeﬃcients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.4 Policy alientation model: Density of ﬁrst diﬀerence in election-
speciﬁc EU preference coeﬃcients for Left-Right centrist voter . . . 73
4.5 Policy alienation model: Marginal eﬀect of EU preferences on the
linear predictor function for turnout in EP election. . . . . . . . . . 74
4.6 Policy alienation model: First diﬀerence in marginal eﬀects of EU
preferences on the linear predictor function for turnout. . . . . . . . 74
5.1 Monte Carlo Experiments: Spatial eﬀect parameters . . . . . . . . . 85
5.2 Monte Carlo Experiments: Relative weights . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.3 Density of Relative weight estimate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
iii
LIST OF FIGURES
5.4 Simulated ﬁrst diﬀerence of relative weight and p-values . . . . . . . 94
5.5 Utility indiﬀerence contours: Observed Choice model point estimates 96
6.1 Exemplary choice scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.2 Monte Carlo Experiment: Bias in salience parameter estimates due
to omitted non-separability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
6.3 Indiﬀerence contours for A matrix point estimates . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.4 Utility indiﬀerence contours: Observed Choice model point estimates 119
7.1 EP Switching rates, conditional on EU integration preferences at
the point of the EP election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7.2 Probability of destination given a switch, conditional on EU inte-
gration preferences at the point of the EP election . . . . . . . . . . 124
7.3 EP Switching rates, conditional on EU integration preferences at
the point of the Federal election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.4 Probability of destination given a switch, conditional on EU inte-
gration preferences at the point of the Federal election . . . . . . . 126
7.5 Simulated Model Predictions: EP switching rates . . . . . . . . . . 135
7.6 Simulated Model Predictions: Probability of EP destination given
a switch. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
iv
List of Tables
3.1 Oﬃcial Election Results: Party vote shares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2 Comparison of sample turnout and party choice rates with oﬃcial
election results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.1 Dependent variable: Frequency of individual-level turnout sequences
in State, Federal and EP election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2 Panel conditional logit model estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.1 Spatial parameter estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.2 Parameter estimates Model 1: Observed Choice . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.3 Parameter estimates Model 2: Full Turnout (hyp.) . . . . . . . . . . 100
6.1 Empirical applications: Parameter estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.2 Non-separability model: Spatial parameter estimates . . . . . . . . 117
7.1 MEDW Bavaria panel: Vote choice frequency table . . . . . . . . . 122
7.2 MEDW Bavaria panel: Sample Transition matrix . . . . . . . . . . 122
7.3 Dynamic discrete choice model estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
7.4 Robustness Test: Spatial weight estimates from separate models for
subset of respondents with same party of origin. . . . . . . . . . . . 133
v

Chapter 1
Introduction
Most modern democratic polities are organized in a multi-level structure, where
citizens are asked to choose representatives and leaders at diﬀerent levels of govern-
ment, be it in mayoral, regional or national or transnational elections. Following
normative democratic theory, separate elections at each level of government are
necessary to legitimize policy making at the speciﬁc level. Elections are not only
necessary to represent the particular composition of the electorate at the respec-
tive geographical unit, but because policy making at diﬀerent levels ostensibly
concerns diﬀerent aspects of the political, or political issues - while a local legisla-
tive may decide on a local building project, a national legislative may decide over
unemployment insurance, for example. As political issues vary across the levels, so
might partisan alignment: A citizen might agree more with the policy position of
one party on local issues, and with the position of a diﬀerent party on national is-
sues. Only multi-level elections allow citizens to express these level-speciﬁc policy,
party or candidate preferences. While this reasoning forms the basis for normative
democratic theory, it is not clear whether this is actually the case empirically. Do
voters diﬀerentiate between the diﬀerent levels of government by factoring in the
speciﬁc political issues that are at stake at the diﬀerent levels?
We know relatively little about how level-speciﬁc issues inﬂuence level-speciﬁc
voting behavior because this question is located at a traditional blind spot of polit-
ical science research. Since its early days, political science has been predominantly
interested in explaining inter-individual diﬀerences in voting behavior in singular
elections. Only a minority of studies seeks to explain changes in intra-individual
voting behavior, and many of these studies are typically concerned with multiple
elections held at the same level at diﬀerent points in time, normally the most
important elections, presidential or national legislative elections. An analytical
perspective that focuses on the consequences of change in the level of government
on individual voting behavior has so far only taken academic center stage in the
ﬁeld of European studies. This is because the European Union (EU) and its mem-
ber states are the prime example of a multi-level polity, and a natural laboratory
for the study of multi-level electoral democracy.
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On the surface, the story of European democracy is one of success. From a con-
sultatory body of delegates sent out by the national parliaments of the member
states, the European Parliament (EP) has developed into a directly elected parlia-
ment that exerts considerable inﬂuence over how the European Union conducts its
aﬀairs. Over the years, the Union has successively updated its institutional design
with the intent to increase input legitimacy through democratic elections and by
tilting the power distribution within the EU institutional framework towards the
directly elected body. Article 10 of the Treaty on the European Union declares
that the “functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy”
and that “citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parlia-
ment”. This has lead many to conclude that procedural input legitimacy of EU
policy-making has largely been realized and that the Union is not “so far [. . . ] from
transnational democracy” in its institutional form (Habermas, 2012, ix).
More skeptical voices have focused on the particular challenges that legitimation
by democratic elections at the European level faces. It has been argued that the
EU lacks a “demos” that shares a “Gemeinschaftsglauben” (Max Weber), which is
a necessary prerequisite for the universal acceptance of majority decisions (e.g.,
Majone, 2005). Moreover, European democracy continues to lack the intermediary
structure that helps generate a common political sphere. Media, political parties
and societal organizations have a predominantly national frame of reference, and
therefore fail to aggregate the heterogeneous social, economic, cultural and political
realities across member states. Particularly the lack of a competitive European
party system that deﬁnes “the alternatives of public policy in such a way that
the public can participate in the decision-making process” (Schattschneider, 1960,
138) has been identiﬁed as a key obstacle for EP elections to generate substantive
input legitimacy. Unlike public policy at the national level, EU policies are to a
substantial degree about genuinely European issues, ﬁrst and foremost the conﬂict
over the degree of European integration, i.e., to which extent national sovereignty
is transfered to the supra-national EU level. Rather than formulating competitive
EU policy alternatives, the main political parties have locked down competition on
the EU integration issue dimension by forming a pro-integration cartel (Katz and
Mair, 1995). The missing party competition and complicated EU decision-making
processes mean that EU policy making is not transparent to European citizens.
No transparency ultimately means that citizens are unable to elect representatives
based on the issues that are at stake, or to attribute responsibility for EU policy
outputs. The democratic quality of EP elections is therefore at odds with both
the populist conception of democratic elections as the representation of people’s
preferences (Dahl, 1971), and the less demanding liberal conception of holding the
elected accountable (Riker, 1982).
These particular problems of organizing democratic elections at the European
level have lastingly shaped political theory. After the ﬁrst EP elections in 1979,
Reif and Schmitt (1980) proposed a theoretical framework that understands EP
elections as second-order national elections. A deﬁning characteristic of EP elec-
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tions is its low importance, which makes it subordinate to the ﬁrst-order election,
the general national election. Moreover, according to second-order theory, voting
behavior in EP elections is not based on factors that are speciﬁc to the Euro-
pean political arena, but is primarily inﬂuenced by factors that originate from
the national arena. Instead of representing citizen’s views on genuinely European
aﬀairs, voters use EP elections for base motives: to punish national governments
for national policy output. Apart from that, voters simply transfer their national-
ized decision-making calculus to the European level. Empirically, the second-order
elections model has been very successful, and has henceforth become the predom-
inant theoretical lens through which EP elections, and also all other sub-national
elections, are understood and analyzed. Apart from academia, the second-order
paradigm has also deeply inﬂuenced how EP elections are interpreted by political
actors and commentators and perceived by the public.
The second-order elections model takes a somewhat cynical view on the feasi-
bility and merit of not only transnational democracy at the European level, but
democratic elections at multiple levels of government in general. According to the
theory, EP elections cannot fulﬁll their intended role of legitimizing EU policy
making as voters are seen as lacking the mental capacity, or simply not willing, to
diﬀerentiate between levels of government, the speciﬁc issues that are at stake at
the diﬀerent levels or whom to hold responsible. In its extreme form, the second-
order model implies that all elections, apart from the ﬁrst-order election, do not
work as intended. Since citizens do not vote based on the speciﬁc issues that are
at stake at the respective level of government, but merely on the issues at stake
at the national level, there is no democratic beneﬁt derived from holding these
elections (other than holding the national government accountable throughout the
national electoral cycle). Not much would be lost if these elections were abol-
ished, and lower-level representatives apportioned according to party vote shares
in the national legislature. Although this is of course not what second-order theo-
rists suggest to be done, it highlights the pessimistic and arguably anti-democratic
implications of the model.
In the last two decades, increasingly vocal academic opposition to the second-
order interpretation of EP elections has formed. Opposition has rallied behind the
proposition that some of the key premises of second-order theory may no longer be
valid. The institutional design of the EU has changed substantially since the ﬁrst
EP election in 1979, the range and impact of EU policies has increased, and the in-
termediary structure has become more Europeanized. Thereby, EP elections have
gained importance and have become more “European”, in the sense that genuinely
European aﬀairs increasingly structure voting behavior in EP elections. Accord-
ingly, this line of literature has been labeled the “Europe Matters” argument. Its
proponents do not challenge that EP elections are by far less important to voters
than general national elections. However, they challenge the proposition that EP
elections necessarily follow a nationalized logic that crowds out all considerations
that are speciﬁc to the European arena. Over the years, a considerable body of
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research has accumulated that suggests that attitudes towards the EU and voter
preferences over the extent of European integration are associated with voting be-
havior in EP elections: European citizens vote for diﬀerent parties in EP elections,
or abstain from voting altogether, because they want to voice their disagreement
with the course of the European project and the positions that the parties they
usually vote for in national elections take on European aﬀairs. If the Europe Mat-
ters argument was correct, the prospect of transnational democracy may be viewed
in a much more optimistic light. By increasingly factoring in the speciﬁc issues that
EP elections are supposed to be about, European citizens might assure that their
views on EU policy are represented and that the elected are held accountable. Of
course, additional obstacles still stand in the way of full transnational democracy,
such as the absence of an executive that is legitimized by the parliament. However,
it would suggest that the necessary prerequisites at the level of the electorate are
in place for EP elections to potentially fulﬁll their intended function of generating
(or withdrawing) substantive input legitimacy.
Despite its far-reaching implications for the democratic quality of transnational
democracy at the European level, the question whether citizens ﬁne-tune their
voting behavior to the European context of the EP election or whether they pur-
sue a one-size-ﬁts-all approach to voting by applying their nationalized ﬁrst-order
voting behavior calculus to EP elections has not been adequately resolved by po-
litical science research. I argue that part of the reason is that second-order theory
has for a long time been the only game in town, and due to its initial success,
has monopolized theoretical development not only in EP election research but in
multi-level elections research in general. However, since second-order theory as-
sumes a priori that voters follow a one-size-ﬁts-all, nationalized logic of voting,
it has understandably not been interested in developing a positive theory of how
level-speciﬁc political issues shape level-speciﬁc voting behavior. While some no-
table advances towards a model of level-speciﬁc issue voting have been made by
the Europe Matters literature that has formed in opposition to the second-order
literature, these attempts have been piecemeal. As it stands, political science re-
search lacks a general theoretical model to compare policy-based voting behavior
across multiple elections, particularly if these elections take place at diﬀerent lev-
els of government. This dissertation aims to ﬁll this theoretical gap. I propose
a generalization of the multidimensional model of spatial competition to multiple
elections taking place at diﬀerent levels of government. The key feature of the
model is that it allows for the ﬂexible modeling of variation in the weights that
voters assign to multiple relevant policy dimensions. Variation in weights encapsu-
lates the idea that voters might care more about speciﬁc political issues at speciﬁc
levels of government, which in turn might lead them to alter their voting behavior
across elections. The model suggests that in multi-party systems, electoral par-
ticipation and party vote choice not only vary according to the degree to which
the relative weight of policy dimensions varies across the electoral levels, but also
depends on the multidimensional policy preferences of individual voters, and the
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multidimensional spatial conﬁguration of the parties’ policy positions. Although
the model is developed particularly with regards to a comparison of voting behav-
ior in FOE and EP elections, it is general in nature and applicable to all settings
of multi-level democracy.
Another, very much practical reason why political science research has failed to
develop a general theoretical model of individual voting behavior across multi-level
elections is the preeminence of cross-sectional data structures in empirical voting
behavior research. Traditional voter surveys cover only one election - a theory
that explains intra-individual changes across multi-level elections simply was not
developed since there was no data. In the recent decade, a number of panel study
projects have been launched. However many of these panel studies do not allow
to compare electoral behavior vertically, since they exclusively focus on elections
held at the national level. This dissertation employs new data from a panel study
particularly designed for the study of multi-level elections, the Making Electoral
Democracy Work (MEDW) Bavaria Voter Panel study. The panel study covers
three legislative elections that were held in the years 2013 and 2014 in the German
state of Bavaria - a subnational State, a Federal and an EP election - and provides a
unique opportunity for a three-way comparison of individual-level voting behavior
across levels of government. Moreover, the case of Bavaria constitutes a close to
ideal laboratory to study the role of issues in multi-level election behavior since
it allows to keep various potentially intervening factors such as institutional and
party-level diﬀerences across the elections constant.
The discipline’s traditional focus on cross-sectional data structures also means
that the existing methodologies of comparing individual voting behavior across
elections are woefully underdeveloped when compared to other disciplines such as
economics and sociology. Even in applications for which new panel data has be-
come available in recent years, voting behavior research, and large parts of political
science in general, has been reluctant to adopt statistical techniques appropriate
for the analysis of panel data structures. As is well known, panel data can oﬀer
unique opportunities to move beyond purely correlational interpretation of ﬁndings
and come closer to the identiﬁcation of causal relationships. However, all too often
the discipline continues to stick to established cross-sectional techniques that fail
to unlock the full potential of panel data. In the ﬁeld of voting behavior research,
these shortcomings may be at least partially explained by the particular challenges
that longitudinal analyses here face. Panel attrition rates, and the high monetary
costs of keeping them low, mean that most panel data studies can at best include
a small number of elections. Statistically speaking, a low number of panel waves
limits analytical leverage considerably. Moreover, the phenomena voting behavior
research is concerned with, such as vote choice and electoral participation, are dis-
crete in nature. The non-linear models required to study discrete phenomena are
ultimately more challenging than linear models on which much of the development
and teaching of statistical techniques has traditionally focused. Accordingly, a sec-
ond goal of this dissertation is the development of a methodology for the empirical
5
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analysis of multi-level voting behavior based upon panel data. My empirical ap-
proach seeks to improve the validity of inferences by controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity, and at the same time addresses the particular challenges arising
from voter survey panel data. I do so by rediscovering the conditional likelihood
approach to panel ﬁxed eﬀect discrete choice models which was already developed
in the 1980s, but somehow did not ﬁnd its way into the statistical toolkit of po-
litical scientists. As it turns out, the approach is particularly well suited for the
short panel studies students of voting behavior are likely to encounter.
The dissertation seeks to answer four speciﬁc subquestions: 1) Do voter prefer-
ences on EU integration explain diﬀerential turnout in EP elections? 2) Do voters
care more about EU integration issues when choosing parties in EP elections than
in other elections? 3) Does the vital assumption of non-separability of prefer-
ences that the multidimensional model of spatial competition relies on, hold? 4)
Can vote switching between national and EP elections be explained by the EU
integration preferences of voters?
The dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 discusses the relevant literature. Firstly, I introduce the second-order
elections model (Reif and Schmitt, 1980) and critically reﬂect on one of its pil-
lars in particular, the transfer hypothesis. Secondly, I discuss the Europe Matters
literature, which may be understood primarily as a challenge to the transfer hy-
pothesis. Of particular interest to this dissertation is a strand of this literature
that argues based on the spatial theory of politics. In the third part, I address
important theoretical gaps in these spatial models. I sketch out a consistent two-
dimensional spatial voting model that explains multi-level voting behavior as the
consequence of variation in the dimensional weights across electoral arenas. I call
this the recalibration hypothesis. I discuss how recalibration can explain diﬀeren-
tial abstention in EP elections and how it can motivate vote switching across FOE
and EP elections.
Chapter 3 critically reﬂects on the state of methodology in the ﬁeld of multi-level
voting behavior research. After clarifying the key obstacle to causal identiﬁcation
in this ﬁeld of research, I outline how panel data can help make our inferences
more reliable. To account for unobserved heterogeneity, I propose the use of the
conditional likelihood approach to ﬁxed eﬀects models for discrete choice data.
After discussing the ramiﬁcation of the proposed research designs, I introduce the
speciﬁc empirical case, panel data set and operationalizations that this dissertation
employs.
Chapter 4 investigates the research question whether diﬀerential abstention in
EP elections can be explained by the EU integration preferences of voters. Two
theoretical arguments are tested: Abstention as a consequence of EU legitimacy
attributions, or as a consequence of increased policy alienation due to recalibra-
tion. The employed ﬁxed eﬀect research design models unobserved heterogeneity,
which allows to eliminate various kinds of biases that plague electoral participation
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research. I ﬁnd evidence that diﬀerential abstention in EP elections is likely the
consequence of increased policy alienation on EU integration preferences in the
recalibrated policy space, rather than the consequence of Euroskepticism per se.
Chapter 5 outlines how the recalibration hypothesis can be precisely formulated
and directly tested in the multidimensional spatial voting framework. In a Monte
Carlo study, I show that a reliable answer will ultimately require taking unobserved
heterogeneity into account. This is accomplished by transposing the conditional
likelihood approach to a model of multi-party vote choice, the ﬁrst of its kind
in political science research. The empirical evidence is largely consistent with
voters assigning a larger relative weight to policy distances on EU integration
preferences in EP elections than in FOE or other second-order elections, rather
than voters assigning the same relative weight in all elections as implied by the
transfer hypothesis.
Chapter 6 primarily consists of a published article (Stoetzer and Zittlau, 2015),
that tests a far-reaching assumption commonly made in multidimensional mod-
els of spatial competition - that preferences on multiple dimensions are separable.
The statistical consequences of violations of the separability assumption are dis-
cussed, and a statistical model for the consistent estimation of non-separability
is developed. In the second part of the Chapter, I implement the non-separable
model speciﬁcation in the conditional likelihood framework. My ﬁndings indi-
cate that voter preferences on Left-Right and EU integration issues are separable,
strengthening conﬁdence in the results obtained in Chapter 5.
Chapter 7 investigates the consequences of the larger emphasis that voters put
on EU integration issues for diﬀerential vote choice at EP elections. The two-
dimensional spatial model of voting predicts that whether voters switch support
to a diﬀerent party in EP elections than in FOE is a function of their ideal point
on EU integration relative to the party’s position they previously voted for, and
the position that available party alternatives take on EU integration. I model
vote choice at the FOE and EP election as a Markov process, and investigate the
transition probabilities in a simulation study. I ﬁnd that the complex patterns of
vote switching predicted by my simple spatial model explain the patterns observed
in the data surprisingly well.
Chapter 8 summarizes my ﬁndings and highlights the theoretical, methodolog-
ical and empirical contributions of this dissertation. The implications for future
research into multi-level voting behavior and voting behavior research in general
are discussed.
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Chapter 2
Theories of multi-level voting
behavior
2.1 The second-order national elections model and
its critiques
After the ﬁrst European parliamentary (EP) elections in 1979, Reif and Schmitt
(1980) proposed an analytical framework to interpret the election results that has
strongly inﬂuenced the academic understanding of, and public discourse about EP
elections ever since. Their theory analyzes EP elections not in their own right,
but by setting them in contrast to national general elections (or in presidential
systems, the national presidential election), to which Reif and Schmitt refer as ﬁrst-
order elections (FOE). First-order elections are the “decisive elections”, in which
national governments are elected (p. 8). Elections which do not serve the function
of electing the national government, and a national Head of Government, are
second-order national elections (SOE). In his later work, Reif (1997, 117) further
clariﬁed the term: “All elections (except the one that ﬁlls the most important
political oﬃce of the entire system and therefore is the FOE) are national second
order elections, irrespective of whether they take place in the entire, or only in a
part of, the country.” The term therefore includes all subnational elections such
as local, regional and state elections, as well as EP elections. These SOE are
characterized by their subordinate role to the ﬁrst-order electoral arena.
The second-order argument is fundamentally built on saliency. It rests on the
observation that there is less at stake in SOE compared to FOE due to the preemi-
nent policy making power of the national government. As Reif and Schmitt (1980,
12) point out, there is even less at stake in EP elections since there is no “European
government that is elected, which decreases the relative importance of EP elections
even more than in other second-order elections, which at least produce a Head of
Government at the local or regional level.” Therefore Reif (1997, 121) argued that
EP elections might even be called third-order elections. But as this terminology is
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not coherently established in the literature, and rather obfuscates the important
theoretical points, I shall not use the term throughout this dissertation.
Turnout A number of empirical predictions about the election results in SOE,
relative to FOE, follow directly from the less-at-stake proposition. First of all, SOE
turnout is substantially lower than FOE turnout. The primary mechanism is that
since there is less at stake, fewer voters will participate in the SOE than in the FOE
due to the decreased beneﬁts of voting. Moreover, the lack of politicization of the
SOE and lacking mobilization eﬀorts by the parties further depress turnout. The
prediction is unequivocally supported by analyses of turnout rates throughout EU
member states (except those with compulsory voting, or where FOE and EP elec-
tions are held concurrently) (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Schmitt, 2005; Schmitt and
Mannheimer, 1991; van der Eijk and Schmitt, 2008). It is also supported by anal-
yses based on individual-level observational data. Franklin (2004) and Franklin
and Hobolt (2011) show that the likelihood to turn out is strongly aﬀected by how
voters perceive the relative importance of EP elections. Schmitt (2005) ﬁnds the
same pattern for the 2004 EP election. The most methodologically persuasive evi-
dence comes from an interesting case study by Orford et al. (2009), who show that
perceived costs of voting, like travel distance to the nearest polling station, have
a larger eﬀect in lower saliency elections such as EP and local elections, compared
to national general elections. A modiﬁcation to the less-at-stake mechanism that
focuses not on individual perceptions, but on the role of party mobilization and
media attention has been proposed (Blondel et al., 1997). Here it is the “agencies
of mobilization” (Marsh and Mikhaylov, 2010, 11) that perceive to be less at stake
in EP elections and devote fewer resources to these campaigns. However, this de-
bate is only over the causal chain that links lower importance to lower turnout,
and not the more general mechanism originally proposed.
Winners and losers Next to the less-at-stake implication of lower turnout in
SOE, second-order theory also predicts that small parties do better in SOE than
in FOE. The mechanism proposed by Reif and Schmitt (1980) centers on the in-
centives to vote sincerely or strategically. In FOE, voters that prefer a smaller
party often choose to cast their vote for a larger party that is more likely to par-
ticipate in government formation, or in order to avoid wasting their vote, i.e., they
vote strategically. In EP elections, the incentives to vote strategically are dimin-
ished. As voters perceive that there is less at stake in EP elections, wasting one’s
vote is less costly, and since there is no government to be elected, government
formation aspects are irrelevant. Therefore more sincere voting is to be expected
in SOE, of which small parties are the chief beneﬁciary. What is disregarded by
the classical argument is the role of electoral institutions, which in many member
states vary substantially between FOE and SOE. EP elections are oftentimes more
proportional, and higher thresholds tend to disadvantage smaller parties in FOE
(Kousser, 2004; Prosser, 2016). Accordingly, the relevance of the sincere vs. strate-
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gic mechanism should be thought to vary dependent on the degree to which FOE
electoral institutions generate incentives to vote strategically and the degree that
these incentives are absent in SOE.
A second implication about the winners and losers in EP elections is that gov-
ernment parties tend to do worse than in FOE. Apart from not beneﬁting from
strategic votes, there are two additional mechanisms. Firstly, a voter might simply
become disenchanted with the government parties for which he has cast a sincere
vote in the FOE due to its performance, and vote sincerely for a diﬀerent party
in SOE (or abstain from voting in SOE altogether). Secondly, a voter might use
SOE to signal discontent to the parties in power by temporarily withdrawing sup-
port. In such a “protest vote”, the desertion is insincere in the sense that the
voter remains a long-term supporter of the party, and returns to the party in the
following FOE. Protest can also be voiced by strategic abstention of government
supporters in SOE, which also increases the vote shares of opposition parties. The
temporary withdrawal of support has been also referred to a as instrumental voting
(Heath et al., 1999) or voting with the boot (Oppenhuis et al., 1996). Substan-
tively speaking, the SOE takes the character of a referendum on the government
rather than being an election in its own right, if the protest motive becomes pre-
dominant. These mechanisms indicate that government parties loose support in
SOE, dependent on government popularity at the time of the SOE.
An integral part of Reif & Schmitt’s framework is that government popularity,
and therefore party losses, follow a cyclical pattern. Taking their cues from the
US surge-and-decline literature on midterm-elections in the US (Campbell et al.,
1960; Tufte, 1975) and similar studies of polling data in the UK (Miller and Mackie,
1973), or the notion of a political business cycle (Nordhaus, 1975), they see gov-
ernment popularity cycles arise somewhat mechanistically. After a short increase
of popularity during a “honeymoon period” right after taking oﬃce, popularity de-
clines. Popularity reaches its minimum around the midpoint of the electoral cycle,
followed by a leveling-out or resurgence as parties ready for the next FOE (see
also Marsh, 1998). The magnitude of government party losses then is a function
of at which point in time in the national electoral cycle the EP elections are held.
While the mechanism that generates the popularity cycle remains debated (Marsh
and Mikhaylov, 2010, 12; Weber, 2007), the cyclical pattern of government party
losses has been conﬁrmed empirically. The most extensive and convincing empir-
ical investigation of the “winners and losers” argument is Hix and Marsh (2007)
and, in a follow-up article, Hix and Marsh (2011). They ﬁnd strong evidence that
smaller parties tend to do better, and large parties to do worse in EP elections
than in previous FOE. Government parties tend to do even worse, dependent on
the point in the electoral cycle at which EP elections take place.
The transfer hypothesis In his 1997 clariﬁcation, Reif (1997, 117) highlighted
the adjective “national” in the original formulation of the second-order national
elections argument. The term national represents the reasoning that “the campaign
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and results of each and every type of SOE are more or less inﬂuenced by the
political constellation of the dominant political arena within the system, the ﬁrst
order political arena”. Although Reif does not rule out that factors speciﬁc to the
second-order electoral arena might play a role, he suggests that these arena-speciﬁc
factors fade into the background. The substantive content of SOE, the “campaign
and results are more or less heavily inﬂuenced by the political constellation of the
dominant political arena within the system, the ﬁrst order political arena (FOPA)”
(Reif, 1997, 117). This means that the only deﬁning feature of SOE is that there
is less-at-stake. Apart from that, the election is just a copy of the FOE.
Clark and Rohrschneider (2009) call this the transfer hypothesis, a term which
I shall use throughout this dissertation. Putting it in the perspective of the indi-
vidual voter, the transfer hypothesis suggests that voters “apply their evaluations
of national-level phenomena to the EU level when voting in EU elections” (Clark
and Rohrschneider, 2009, 645), or for that matter to all kinds of SOE. In practical
terms, this means that when voters make up their mind how to vote in SOE, they
think about the national economy, the national government and the issues that
are relevant at the national level, and not the politics and policies that are at stake
in the SOE.
This perspective on multi-level democracy is provocative and has normative
implications. If voters treat all SOE only as less important national elections,
what’s the use of holding these elections? And are the representatives elected in
SOE fully democratically legitimized? The interesting and puzzling implications of
the transfer hypothesis have contributed much to the popularization of the second-
order model and its reception in public discourse. Although maybe not intended by
Reif & Schmitt from the outset, the transfer hypothesis has become to be viewed
as the central component of the second-order model. In their extensive review
of the literature on EP elections, Marsh and Mikhaylov (2010, 13) suggest that
the transfer hypothesis, meaning that the issues remain the same in the ﬁrst- and
second-order arena, is indeed “the essence of second-order interpretation”.
The insufficient micro-foundations of SOE theory Since the early days of
SOE theory, its aggregate-level predictions have been broadly conﬁrmed empiri-
cally. Indeed it might be argued that its very success has stiﬂed further theoretical
development and critical reﬂection. Only in the recent decade, mainly coinciding
with forthcoming individual-level voter survey data on EP elections, have scholars
voiced concerns over the theoretical micro-foundations upon which SOE theory
rests. Marsh and Mikhaylov (2010, 10) in their review of the SOE literature
point out that “Reif and Schmitt do not oﬀer an explicit theory of a European
voter. Their work is essentially an aggregate-level one.” In the same vein, Hobolt
and Wittrock (2011) have criticized the lack of theoretical micro-foundations and
empirical micro-level evidence, that leave ample room for alternative explanations
and may invite ecological fallacies. In response to Marsh and Mikhaylov’s critique,
Schmitt et al. (2008) have defended the mechanisms developed in the original arti-
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cle. While Schmitt et al. have helped to clarify the proposed mechanisms, I doubt
their defense addresses the fundamental points of the critique. Second-order the-
ory centrally relies on an aggregate-level concept - that there is less at stake in
SOE. In a causal language, the diﬀerence in importance between FOE and SOE
is considered to be the treatment that leads to diﬀerent outcomes across the elec-
tions.1 That lower importance causes voters to be less likely to turn out is hardly
controversial. However, for voters who still turn out in both elections, second-order
theory can make conﬂicting predictions. On the one hand, voters are said to be
more likely to vote sincerely in SOE, but on the other hand are expected to vote
more strategically, i.e, insincerely. SOE theory does not make a prediction which
option prevails in such a situation. This was noted by Hobolt and Wittrock (2011,
31), who laconically point out that “a voter cannot simultaneously vote sincerely
and strategically”. Moreover, according to SOE theory, both options should be un-
derstood as dynamic in the sense that which of the two is more relevant depends
on the point in time in the electoral cycle where the SOE is held (Reif, 1997).
These aspects have not been systematically explored and can lead to conﬂicting
predictions (Marsh and Mikhaylov, 2010, 13).
It is evident that the theoretical micro-foundations of classical SOE are not as
solid as they should be. Though it oﬀers a collection of mechanisms, it remains
unclear how the diﬀerent mechanism interact. To be fair, Reif and Schmitt never
claimed that the framework developed in their original contribution encompasses
a complete theory of individual voting behavior. SOE theory at its outset rather
attempted to put the aggregate-level results of EP elections into a coherent frame-
work. The speciﬁed mechanisms were seen as giving rise to the aggregate-level
patterns. For this purpose, they worked well in their “auxiliary role” to explain
macro-level phenomena. But the mechanisms can hardly form the theoretical basis
for a model of individual voting behavior in multi-level elections.
A case of methodological nationalism? In a stimulating historiographical
review, Schakel and Jeﬀery (2013) trace back the origins of SOE theory. As Reif
and Schmitt readily admitted, the general idea of subordination in importance
between elections originates from the work of Reiner Dinkel (1977), who analyzed
German Länder elections and found disproportionate losses for parties who were
part of the federal government coalition, and that these losses were highest in Land
elections that took place around the midpoint of the federal election cycle (the so
called “Dinkel-Kurve”). Dinkel (1977, 348) also already stated that Land elections
are “subordinate elections [. . . ] systematically inﬂuenced by the superordinate
constellation in the Bundestag”. In turn, the origins of Dinkel’s reasoning can
be found in the “surge and decline” literature on midterm-elections in the US
(Campbell et al., 1960; Tufte, 1975) and similar studies in the UK (Miller and
1Clearly, individuals might vary in their perception of importance differentials, which then
varies the treatment intensity.
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Mackie, 1973).
Schakel & Jeﬀery note that the forefathers of the SOE argument had real na-
tional elections in mind, in the sense that these elections followed a “nationalized
logic of voting behavior” (p. 326). Indeed, midterm elections are clearly real na-
tional elections, and Länder elections are also linked to the national arena via
the federal state system (Bundesrat). However, regional or European elections do
not have this institutional or electoral connection to the ﬁrst-order national arena.
Therefore, the transfer of theory from SOE in which such a electoral connection
to the ﬁrst-order arena is present, to SOE without such a connection may not
be valid. From this perspective, it is not a foregone conclusion that all SOE are
alike and take on a national character. Schakel & Jeﬀerey do not contest that
there is less at stake in SOE. However, “what appears less credible is that what
is at stake nationally necessarily crowds out distinct judgments about the issues
that might be at stake in regional elections.” (Schakel and Jeﬀery, 2013, 327).
Although Schakel & Jeﬀerey make their point primarily with respect to regional
elections, their argument points to an interesting analytical distinction which has
remained rather opaque in the SOE literature: is “how much is a stake” and “what
is at stake” the same question? In other words, what is the relation between the
concept of second-orderedness, i.e., diﬀerence in importance, and the concept of
nationalness, i.e. the degree to which the “situation”, to use Reif’s words (1985, 8),
in the second-order arena mirrors the situation in the ﬁrst-order arena“?
Taking a step back, Reif & Schmitt’s original contribution wasn’t primarily in-
tended to focus on the question of the nationalization of the European arena.
They have never stated that SOE are an exact mirror image of the ﬁrst-order
arena. In his 1997 look-back at the original article, Reif (1997, 16) noted that
“[t]he most crucial mistake in the 1980 article was not to have elaborated in suﬃ-
cient detail how the adjective national in the term ‘second order national elections’
was meant to be understood.” Reif goes on to clarify that “SOE are more or less
heavily inﬂuenced by the political constellation of the dominant political arena
within the system, the ﬁrst order political arena (FOE).” However, he does not
preclude per se the possibility that “arena-speciﬁc factors” play a role in deter-
mining the outcome of elections in the second-order arena. “[T]he extent to which
arena speciﬁc factors determine campaign and outcome of SOE varies with inter
alia with[sic!] the relative importance attributed by citizens, parties and media
and with the degree of nationalization of politics”. Reif refers to Caramani (1996;
see also Caramani, 2004), who analytically diﬀerentiates between two processes of
nationalization: horizontal and vertical. While horizontal nationalization means
the process of increasing territorial homogeneity, vertical nationalization refers to
the process of increasing orientation of voters away from the local and subnational
level towards the national level, the ﬁrst-order political arena.2 Although Reif has
2The literature on nationalization has so far not been adequately integrated into the SOE
literature. Caramani (2011, 3) points out, while institutional and cleavages aspects of Euro-
peanization have been widely studied, “the formation of a European-wide electorate and party
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clearly alluded to (vertical) nationalization, the degree to which voters use the
ﬁrst-order arena as their frame of reference to make up their minds in SOE, in
his later writing, the original argument is built on the proposition that all SOE
follow a nationalized logic. After all, it is right there in the title of the original
contribution - “Nine second-order national elections”. Moreover, the nationalized
logic of SOE has over the years become the central tenet of second-order theo-
rists. Although the process of European integration has advanced since the early
days of second-order theory, the transfer hypothesis is maintained by adherents of
second-order theory.
Using the terminology of the Lakatosian research program (Lakatos, 1978), the
question is whether the transfer hypothesis belongs to the hard core of theoretical
assumptions upon which second-order theory rests, or constitutes an auxiliary hy-
pothesis that can be modiﬁed. I would argue that the transfer hypothesis should
be treated as the auxiliary hypothesis that it is. Originally, it was introduced
as a ceteris paribus assumption that allowed the model-builders to focus on the
consequences of the diﬀerence in importance between the elections, and to ignore
other aspects. This was without doubt a legitimate research strategy. However,
in the wake of the overwhelming empirical and academic success of the second-
order model, the transfer hypothesis became the hallmark of second-order theory.
Its counterintuitive and somewhat pessimistic view on voter motives in EP elec-
tions - that the issues remain the same even though the EP elections are about
something else - contributed much to its intellectual appeal among academia and
political commentators. What may also have helped is that the narrative aligns
with the preferences of political parties and national governments that seek to
avoid a politicization of EP elections (Hix, 1999).
It seems that second-order theorists have unnecessarily tied themselves down to
the transfer hypothesis. On theoretical grounds, the transfer hypothesis can not
be upheld. In the absence of a direct institutional electoral link to the ﬁrst-order
arena, it simply does not follow that ‘what is at stake’ is crowded out by that there
is ‘less at stake’ in EP elections.
2.2 The Europe Matters perspective
Over the years, an alternative strand of research has developed that has been
labeled the “Europe Matters” argument (Hix and Marsh, 2007). The research
system remains an under-researched aspect”. Indeed, this strand of research could potentially
provide additional theoretical and analytic leverage for the study of voting behavior in European
and national elections, but still fails to be integrated in the wider research of EP elections and
their relation to national elections. Caramani (2011, 3) argues that the dominance of SOE theory
is partly responsible for that, since it “addressed the national character of European elections”,
leading the focus of research away from the “commonalities in behavior throughout Europe”. An
exception is Hix and Lord (1997), who have transposed theories of nationalization to describe
and explain the process of Europeanization.
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program commonly subsumed under this label is highly unstructured and patchy.
Many contributions speak only about speciﬁc phenomena, party families, member
states or EP elections. Furthermore, there is no common theoretical framework
that guides the research program. What the contributions however all have in
common is that they suggest that “European” factors increasingly play a role in
explaining voting behavior. This proposition is seen as being at odds with the
second-order model’s transfer hypothesis that sees all SOEs following a nation-
alized logic. Europe matters scholars do not reject the less-at-stake explanation
of second-order theory. What they reject is the singularity of the less-at-stake
mechanism as the only mechanism that generates diﬀerent voting behavior in EP
elections. So rather than proposing an alternative approach, the Europe matters
argument proposes a modiﬁcation of the transfer hypothesis, and an extension
of the second-order model by a second mechanism. The second mechanism they
advocate for focuses on factors that are speciﬁc to the EP election policy arena.
These factors are conceptually independent of the less-at-stake considerations of
voters. The common analytical starting point of the Europe Matters argument
is the institutional and political context of EP elections, which has substantially
changed since the ﬁrst EP election in 1979. EU treaty amendments have succes-
sively increased the powers of the European Parliament and the economic, institu-
tional and political integration of the European Union. Proponents of the Europe
Matters perspective argue that this has led to an increase in the importance of
EP elections relative to FOE, which has altered the fundamentals upon which the
early second-order model was built. Moreover, political discourse, although largely
conﬁned to the elite level, and changes in EU member state political opinion and
party systems have successively integrated European aspects. Therefore EP elec-
tions are said to not only have become more important, but to increasingly take on
European character. The European character expresses itself as such that factors
that are speciﬁc to the European policy arena play a role in explaining EP election
voting behavior.
The European policy space The Europe Matters argument is to be seen
against a broader analytical background. On the level of party competition, polit-
ical conﬂict in the national arena of EU member states is primarily structured by
a general left-right dimension. The left-right dimension is the ideological super-
issue for parties and voters (Downs, 1957). While its concrete meaning may vary
between countries and over time (Benoit and Laver, 2006; de Vries and Marks,
2012), its deﬁning property is that a large number of speciﬁc policy issues are
subsumed under this super-issue (Pierce, 1999, 30). As is generally accepted, the
major parties are traditionally geared towards, and indeed built for, competition
along this left-right dimension (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). However, the process of
European integration gave rise to a new dimension of political conﬂict. EU policy
making is not only structured by the traditional left-right dimension, but contains
a strong element of competition over the degree of integration. That is the degree
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to which policy making powers are transfered from the national level to the Euro-
pean level, or vice versa. This new dimension that captures the conﬂict over more
national independence versus more integration is generally referred to as the na-
tional sovereignty or European Integration dimension. On a tangent, the Europe
Matters argument here implicitly refers to models of a European policy space that
have been proposed in the literature (see for an overview Steenbergen and Marks,
2004). The Hix-Lord model (Hix and Lord, 1997) sees EU policy preferences as
structured by a left-right dimension and a national sovereignty dimension. These
dimensions are orthogonal to each other, as parties are unable to incorporate polit-
ical conﬂict on EU policy in the left-right, domestic dimension of contestation. The
major parties and social classes are internally split, since the question of national
sovereignty cuts across the cleavage between functional groups that describes the
left-right dimension of domestic contestation. The Hooghe-Marks model (Hooghe
and Marks, 2001) argues that parties are only to some degree able to integrate EU
policy issues into the contestation along the left-right dimension. Some aspects
of EU policy can be absorbed into the left-right dimension, while other aspects
which touch conﬂict over nationalism or supranationalism remain distinct from the
left-right dimension. This leads to a conﬁguration of the political space in which
the two dimensions remain distinguishable, but are not orthogonal to each other.3
Party competition tends to be structured by two political camps, Regulated cap-
italism and Neoliberalism. Center-left parties tend to favor increased European
integration for the sake of economic market regulation, while the political right
wants to limit regulation of markets on the European level.4
3Ray (2004) proposes a variant of the Hooghe-Marks model that allows for variation of the
policy space across EU countries. Following Ray, the way in which left-right and EU integration
dimension are related to each other depends on policy expectations. The basic idea is quite simple
and convincing: If parties and citizens can expect the EU level to implement a policy that is
closer to their ideal point than the policy expectation at the national level, these forces should
support the transfer of policy decision-making power to the European level, i.e. be in favor of
deeper integration of the European Union. In turn, social groups that can expect better policy
returns if policy is implemented on the national level should take on Europskeptic positions.
Ray’s contribution therefore suggests that the configuration of the policy space varies between
countries, to the degree that policy expectations also vary across countries.
4The two-dimensional model is not uncontested. The international relations (IR) model
(Steenbergen and Marks, 2004) sees political conflict about EU policy as structured along a
single dimension that ranges from preferences for less integration to preferences for more in-
tegration. This dimension is independent of domestic concerns, that are structured along a
traditional left-right dimension. The IR model regards preferences on EU policy from a purely
foreign policy perspective, and focuses o the preferences of national governments in pursuit of
national interests, not so much the preferences of domestic audiences, i.e. the European citizens
or political parties. Alternatively, the so called regulation model of Tsebelis and Garrett (2000)
sees preferences on EU policy-making as structured vis-a-vis the extent of economic regulation
in EU policy. This corresponds to the domestic left-right dimension, with leftist parties pursuing
more economic regulation across Europe, and rightist parties favoring less regulation. Instead
of remaining separate, preferences over national sovereignty are successively subsumed into the
domestic dimension of conflict - left-right. Given the two-dimensional structure of the European
policy space, the general consensus is that traditional parties follow their natural inclination
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European issues The early years of European integration were marked by a pro-
integration consensus among centrist parties, particularly in the economic sphere.
This “permissive consensus” has also been pointedly described, following the anal-
ogy of the political market, as a cartel (Sitter, 2001, 36). By forming such a cartel,
the major parties eﬀectively eliminated competition on the European integration
dimension. However it also meant that the supply side, the parties, failed to
accommodate for the demands of centrist voters that oppose deeper integration.
This insight has also been discussed as the “sleeping giant” thesis (van der Eijk
and Franklin, 2004). While voters have increasingly meaningful and consequential
preferences about the degree of EU integration, the relevance of these preferences
lays dormant because the structure of domestic inter-party competition does not
allow voters to express their preferences on EU issues at the ballot box. This gives
room for political issue entrepreneurs to challenge the core parties by inserting
EU issues into political competition (van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004, 48).5 The
period since 1991 has been described by Marks and Hooghe (2009, 5) as one of
“constraining dissensus”, with political elites increasingly in need to look “over their
shoulders when negotiating European issues”.
There is a vast literature on public support for, and opposition to European
integration (for a review see de Vries and Hobolt, 2016). Even though there are
disagreements over conceptualization and measurement, there is a lot of empirical
evidence that suggests that the debate over the degree of European integration in-
creasingly structures the political thinking of Europeans. It seems that European
voters have developed relatively stable and well-deﬁned preferences over the degree
to European integration. E.g., Boomgaarden et al. (2011) ﬁnd that mass attitudes
towards the EU and European integration are structured by ﬁve attitudinal com-
ponents: aﬀective attitudes, European identity, evaluation of EU performance,
utilitarian attitudes and attitudes towards the strengthening of EU integration.
The correlation between the factors is fairly high, which might indicate that these
factors are sub-dimensions of a latent ideological EU issue dimension. van Spanje
and de Vreese (2011) have largely replicated these attitudinal components and ﬁnd
that opposition to deeper EU integration and negative evaluations of the EU’s util-
ity have a particular eﬀect on anti-EU voting behavior in EP elections. Maier et al.
(2015) come to similar conclusions using an implicit measure of EU attitudes. In a
conﬁrmatory factor analysis of mass attitudes towards speciﬁc EU policies, Gabel
and Anderson (2004) ﬁnd that citizens preferences are structured by both a left-
and try to integrate national sovereignty aspects as much as possible in terms of the left-right
dimension. However, traditional parties are internally split on national sovereignty and the cross-
cutting nature of territorial and functional coalitions means that traditional parties must fail to
fully integrate cross-cutting European issues into the left-right dimension (Bakker et al., 2012,
224).
5Building on the literature on issue evolution (Carmines and Stimson, 1989), a small but rich
literature has developed that describes and analyzes the process by which political entrepreneurs
insert European integration issues into domestic party competition (Hobolt, 2015; van de Wardt
et al., 2014; de Vries and Hobolt, 2012).
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right and a supranational component. Studies that have investigated the role of
European issues at the level of political elites have come to similar conclusions. In
a study on expert survey data Bakker et al. (2012) ﬁnd an EU integration dimen-
sion to structure the political space in European countries. Proksch and Lo (2012)
oﬀer a word of caution as they ﬁnd estimates of party positions on European in-
tegration as only weakly continuous (see also Marks et al., 2012, for a response).
Analyzing EP election party manifestos, Spoon (2012) ﬁnds that parties strategi-
cally communicate their stances on European integration (see also Braun et al.,
2016).
European issues and EP election turnout Against this broader background,
a strand of literature has developed that advocates for European issues as factors
explaining turnout in EP elections. This is a challenge to the second-order inter-
pretation of EP elections, since the transfer hypothesis suggests that issues that are
speciﬁc to the arena play an increased role. The literature can be separated into
two lines of research (see Schäfer and Debus, 2015, for this helpful typology). The
ﬁrst line of research remains largely agnostic to the theoretical mechanism that
connects EU issues to voting behavior. Rather implicitly it is argued that prefer-
ences and attitudes towards the EU capture the degree to which the EU institutions
and the European project is seen as legitimate or worthy of support. Analogous
to the Voice-Exit literature (Hirschman, 1970), EP election voting behavior then
is a way to show or withhold support for the political system. Empirically, the
research program relies heavily on the analysis of correlations between EU related
factors and aggregate turnout rates. EP election turnout is shown to be higher in
countries or regions where support for the EU is greater or which are net receivers
of EU subsidies (Stockemer, 2012; Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmaier, 2008; Flickinger
and Studlar, 2007; Mattila, 2003; Studlar et al., 2003; Blondel et al., 1997). The
reliance of many studies on aggregate data that leaves them prone to ecological
fallacy is certainly problematic. Much needed evidence from individual-level data
is still scarce. Based on open-ended interviews, Blondel et al. (1998) showed that
a substantial amount of voters at least rationalize abstention in EP elections by
negative evaluations of the EU and the EP. Stockemer (2012) corroborates his
aggregate level ﬁndings with 2009 European Election Study individual-level data
and ﬁnds a positive eﬀect of EU membership approval on the likelihood to par-
ticipate in the EP elections. Boomgaarden et al. (2016) report that EU support
increased turnout at the 2014 EP election in Austria. These positive empirical
ﬁndings are however not unchallenged, as evidence to the contrary is also on the
record (SchmittEijk2007; Schmitt, 2005; van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Schmitt
and Mannheimer, 1991). While the majority of the studies suggest that EU related
factors might play a role in explaining EP election voting behavior, the ﬁndings
seem far from robust. Moreover, both empirical analyses based on aggregate-
and individual-level data run into severe methodological problems, which will be
discussed at a later point in this dissertation.
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The second line of research has come closer to developing a coherent theoretical
framework to study the connection between EU preferences and electoral partic-
ipation. A few studies have suggested that abstention in EP elections might be
explained by the policy distance between voters and parties on EU integration
issue (Hobolt et al., 2009; Hobolt and Spoon, 2012). Building on a multidimen-
sional model of spatial competition, these studies have argued that abstention in
EP election is not due to the preferences that voters hold on European issues per
se, but rather due to not being represented on these issues by the parties they usu-
ally vote for. Particularly, the studies ﬁnd that voters who voted for a government
party in the FOE are more likely to abstain in the EP election if they hold anti-
EU integration positions, which the commonly pro-EU integration government
parties do not represent. Although the authors fail to make the connection, the
notion of lacking representation on policy grounds as a cause for abstention ties in
with the literature on policy alienation (Hinich and Ordeshook, 1969; Enelow and
Hinich, 1984b). This policy alienation argument was further developed by Schäfer
and Debus (2015), however they ﬁnd no convincing evidence that EU integration
preferences play a notable role for abstention via the route of policy alienation.
European issues and vote switching in EP elections Apart from electoral
participation in EP elections, the switching of votes from one party in the FOE to
another party in the EP election has always been at the heart of the second-order
argument. Yet, in a number of studies it has been argued that voter preferences
on European issues provide an alternative explanation why voters choose diﬀerent
parties in EP elections than in FOEs. Of course, this is also at odds with the
interpretation of the second-order transfer hypothesis.
Various aggregate-level studies have tried to study vote switching by comparing
the diﬀerences in aggregated election results between FOE and the following EP
election. The general verdict of aggregate studies seems to be that Europe-related
factors play, if at all, only a minor role in explaining the parties’ losses and gains
across FOE and EP elections. van der Eijk and Franklin (1991) ﬁnd that par-
ties primarily acquire votes on the basis of national political concerns also in EP
elections. Ferrara and Weishaupt (2004) hypothesize that parties whose platforms
give greater salience to European issues and parties that are strongly opposed to
European integration do better in European elections than in national elections.
In their study of aggregate election results, they do not ﬁnd empirical support for
either, but ﬁnd that parties that are internally split on European issues do worse
in EP elections. In a more extensive study, Hix and Marsh (2007) ﬁnd that parties
that hold Euroskeptic positions did slightly better than average, but only up to
the 2004 election. In a follow-up study they ﬁnd that these parties did relatively
worse in the the 2009 EP election (Hix and Marsh, 2011).
As has been widely acknowledged throughout this literature, analyses of aggregate-
level election results do not tell much about the motivations of individual voters
and run the risk of ecological fallacy. Therefore the literature has converged on
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analyses of individual-level survey data. Marsh (2003) and Marsh (2007) showed
that voters who think that European integration moves too fast are more likely
to desert government parties in EP elections. However, they also ﬁnd that the
party that was switched to in EP elections does not necessarily better represent
the switcher’s preference on EU issues. Carrubba and Timpone (2005) have ar-
gued that voters have diﬀerent policy preferences at diﬀerent levels of government.
They suggest that individuals who perceive the EP as more powerful are less likely
to treat the elections diﬀerently. Using Eurobarometer data, they ﬁnd that vot-
ers who are most concerned about environmental issues and perceive the EP as
a powerful institution are more likely to vote for a Green party in EP elections.
As environmental issues are among the policy issues primarily dealt with at the
EU level, they count this as “strong support that individuals actively want dif-
ferent preferences represented at diﬀerent levels of government” (Carrubba and
Timpone, 2005, 279). Analyzing European Election Study survey data, Schmitt
(2005) found European factors to play a negligible role in explaining vote switching
in EP elections. Sanz (2008) and van Aelst and Lefevere (2011) study concurrent
national and EP elections in Spain and Belgium and ﬁnd that ticket-splitting is
at least partially motivated by factors that are speciﬁc to the European electoral
arena. Clark and Rohrschneider (2009) suggests that electoral choice in EU elec-
tion is inﬂuenced to a considerable extent by how voters evaluate the performance
of EU institutions. They ﬁnd vote switching between FOE and EP elections to
be explained by how voters evaluate the EU on its own performance terms, rather
than by how voters evaluate the performance of national government.
In a number of studies the role of European issues based on a multi-dimensional
model of spatial competition has been investigated. Hobolt et al. (2009) analyzed
vote switching of FOE government supporters to diﬀerent parties in the 1999 and
2004 EP elections as a function of policy distance between voters and the previ-
ously chosen party on the Left-Right dimension and EU integration dimension.
They ﬁnd that increasing policy distance on the EU integration increases the like-
lihood of vote switching. In a similar analysis on the 2009 EP election, Hobolt and
Spoon (2012) replicate this ﬁnding, and also suggest that the eﬀect is moderated
by campaign tone. Hobolt and Wittrock (2011) provide experimental evidence
that policy distances on EU integration play a notable role for EP election vote
choice, that is however subordinate to policy distances on left-right issues. More-
over, the role of EU integration varies with political information about Europe:
When participants are given more information about the party positions on the
EU dimension, they put larger the emphasis on this dimension in their decision
rationale. de Vries et al. (2011) employs a similar spatial voting model to study
EU issue voting in the 2009 EP election. They ﬁnd that policy distance on EU
integration issues predicts EP election vote choice in most EU member countries,
and the eﬀect is particularly strong among the politically sophisticated. de Vries
and Tillman (2011) and de Vries (2010) use a similar research design to study
diﬀerences in EU issue voting between Eastern and Western member states, and
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the incidence of EU issue voting in FOE respectively. All of the above cited contri-
butions have used cross-sectional data, mainly from the European Election Study
(EES). In the more recent past, two studies that use panel data have become avail-
able. Giebler and Wagner (2015) compare the vote choice functions of German
voters in the 2009 EP and Federal election, and ﬁnd no evidence that EU inte-
gration issues play a diﬀerent role in the EP election than in the Federal election.
Boomgaarden et al. (2016) report that switching of votes from Anti-EU to Pro-EU
and vice versa is partially explained by how voters assess EU integration.
2.3 Towards a general model of multi-level spatial
voting
In the above, we have seen that there is a growing body of research that suggests
that EP elections are somehow (also) about “Europe”. However, it is a collection
of patchy evidence rather than a concerted research program. So far the literature
has not uniﬁed behind a common theoretical framework. A substantial part of the
literature is not theory-driven and rather advances ad-hoc hypotheses, in which
the supposed causal relationships remain opaque. Insofar as theoretical arguments
are developed, they are often too speciﬁc and fail to be integrated into the wider
literature on voting behavior (see also Marsh and Mikhaylov, 2010, 18). As has
been observed by Marsh and Mikhaylov (2010, 13), the most promising option to
integrate European issues into a coherent theoretical framework of voting behavior
is the spatial model of voting. The (Neo-)Downsian framework, and especially the
multidimensional model of spatial competition (Davis et al., 1970; Enelow and
Hinich, 1984b; Hinich and Munger, 1997), provide ample opportunities to model
changing issue dimensions or changing issue saliency between elections.
Substantial advances have been made in this direction: The line of literature
arguing from a EU issue voting perspective (Hobolt et al., 2009; de Vries, 2010;
de Vries et al., 2011; Hobolt and Wittrock, 2011; Hobolt and Spoon, 2012) has
developed a spatial model for the European policy space that allows to analyze
the role of European issues for voting behavior in EP elections, and diﬀerential
voting behavior across FOE and EP elections. The model of spatial competition
builds on the idea that voters choose parties with the intent of maximizing utility
derived from electoral outcomes. Voters maximize utility by choosing the party
whose position minimizes the spatial distance to their ideal point, i.e., they choose
the closest match on the relevant ideological preference dimensions. The EU issue
voting model starts from the proposition that the relevant issues for European
voters can be described in the European policy space. The European policy space
consists of a Left-Right dimension, that captures policy considerations related to
the traditional line of political contestation, and a EU integration dimension, that
captures considerations related to the conﬂict over more national independence
versus more EU integration.
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The EU issue voting model is an excellent basis for the integration of the Europe
Matters argument into a coherent framework, however I ﬁnd that this potential
has not been fully realized. There are important implicit assumptions, theoretical
gaps and fallacious simpliﬁcations in previous contributions that I will point out
in the following. By addressing these concerns, a complete model of spatial voting
over multiple electoral arenas and dimensions will arise that allows for a clear
formulation of the theoretical points of contention and how these can be empirically
tested. Instead of relying on a mathematical exposition, I shall try to formulate
the theoretical points of contention verbally and graphically.
In a two-dimensional policy space such as the European, a key factor that de-
termines spatial utility is the saliency or weight that voters assign to each of the
dimensions (Davis et al., 1970; Feld et al., 2014). Applications of the EU issue
voting model have so far used estimates of the weight parameters somewhat prag-
matically to draw inferences about voting behavior. While it is correct that if
voters assign a positive weight to policy distances on the European integration
dimension in an election (indicated by a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient), one can
conclude that voting behavior is inﬂuenced by European considerations in this
election, other more far-reaching conclusion do not automatically follow. As I will
show in the following, it can not be inferred from a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient that the
transfer hypothesis does not hold, or that diﬀerential abstention or vote switching
between the FOE and EP election is motivated by EU integration considerations.
The recalibration hypothesis
In order to pose a challenge to the second-order model’s transfer hypothesis, the
research question that the Europe matters argument constitutes, needs to be clar-
iﬁed ﬁrst. First of all, the transfer hypothesis does not preclude a role of European
issues in EP elections. It only suggests that issues remain the same across FOEs
and SOEs. So if European issues drive voting behavior in EP elections, this would
be fully consistent with the second-order model - if European issues play an equal
role in FOE as well. Therefore, the “more pertinent question is whether Euro-
pean issues play a greater role in European Parliament elections than in national
elections”(Marsh and Mikhaylov, 2010, 13).
Accordingly, it is not suﬃcient to show that European issues play a role in EP
elections (or for vote switching in EP elections). Arguing from the spatial model,
voter ideal points and party positions should be thought of as independent of the
electoral arena. This is also how the EU issue voting literature has conceptualized
preferences.6 If voter ideal points and party positions are ﬁxed across elections,
changes in voting behavior across elections can only be caused by changes in the
weight that voters assign to the two dimensions (Feld et al., 2014). So to explain
6An exception is Carrubba and Timpone (2005), where voters have different preferences at
different levels of government. However, their argument is built on a balancing model, not a
spatial model.
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European polity and policy indeed provides ample reasons to think that the process
of Europeanization has also permeated domestic political competition. As “gov-
ernment oﬃcials elected through national elections participate in the EU Council
of Ministers [and] elected government leaders directly represent the interests of
their member states and their citizens in the European Council” (de Vries, 2010,
92), policy-motivated voters that hold relevant opinions on European issues should
take these into account when they vote in national elections.
In Chapter 5, I will show how the recalibration hypothesis can be precisely
formulated and tested in the multidimensional spatial voting framework. Voters
can be said to put a higher emphasis on EU issues in EP elections if the relative
dimensional weight of European issues is larger than in national elections. I ﬁnd
evidence that this is likely to be the case in the data under investigation. By
transforming the recalibration hypothesis from an implicit a priori assumption
into an empirically testable hypothesis, the EU issue voting framework is put on
on a solid theoretical and empirical footing to explain diﬀerential voting patterns
across FOE and EP elections.
EU issues and differential turnout
The EU issue voting argument also entails a clear implication about diﬀerential
voter turnout in EP elections that has not been fully recognized.7 The spatial
theory of voting identiﬁes two policy-related reasons for voters to abstain from
voting: Alienation and indiﬀerence (Hinich and Ordeshook, 1969; Enelow and
Hinich, 1984b). “Voters abstain from alienation if their utility for their favorite
candidate fails to exceed what they consider a minimum level. [. . . ] A voter
abstains from indiﬀerence if the utility diﬀerence between the two candidates fails
to exceed some minimal amount.” (Enelow and Hinich, 1984a, 464). In other
words, voters are more likely to abstain if they do not feel represented by any of
the available parties, or if they are located at equal policy distance to two parties.
Some contributions have implicitly argued that abstention in EP elections may
arise from voters not being represented by their traditional parties on European
issues (Hobolt et al., 2009; Hobolt and Spoon, 2012).8 More precisely, govern-
ment supporters that disagree with the usually pro-European integration positions
their parties take, are more likely to abstain in EP elections, after having turned
out in the FOE. So the argument is about the switch from participation to non-
participation, to which I will refer as diﬀerential abstention in the latter. How can
alienation explain diﬀerential abstention between elections? First of all, if voter
ideal points, party positions and the dimensional weights remain ﬁxed across the
7An exception is Schäfer and Debus (2015), however they are not interested in explaining
differential turnout, but EP election turnout.
8There also might be an argument based on indifference, as centrist parties take on similar
positions on European integration issues, but this argument seems less relevant and shall not be
pursued in the following.
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elections, there is no policy-related reason to expect diﬀerences in turnout across
elections. Voters would be just as alienated from parties in FOE as in EP elec-
tions. Again, an explanation for diﬀerential abstention based on the spatial model
necessarily requires that voters recalibrate: The relative weight of the policy di-
mensions needs to change across elections in order to motivate diﬀerent voting
behavior across election.
If EU integration issues indeed play a larger role in the spatial calculus of voters in
EP elections than in national elections, i.e., the recalibration hypothesis is fulﬁlled,
a mismatch between party positions and voter preferences on EU integration issues
can lead to a representational gap that is larger in EP elections than in FOE. This
gap can then motivate more abstention due to increased policy alienation in the
recalibrated space. The “policy alienation due to recalibration” argument implies
that which voters feel more alienated fundamentally depends on the distribution
of parties in the European policy space. Voters can only feel alienated if the party
system does not oﬀer political alternatives that represent the recalibrated voter
policy preferences. Ultimately this means that the relation between European issue
disagreement and diﬀerential turnout might vary a great deal between diﬀerent
party systems and electoral contexts. While empirical research clearly needs to
carefully account for the features of party systems, this does not absolve me from
proposing a general theoretical model.
The most widely accepted model of party-competition in the two-dimensional
European policy space among European election scholars is the inverted U curve
(Hooghe et al., 2002; Rohrschneider and Whiteﬁeld, 2016). It states that left-right
centrist catch-all parties generally adopt similarly pro-European positions, while
left-wing and right-wing parties, even if for diﬀerent reasons, take more anti-EU
positions. Given such a constellation of party positions in the European policy
space, the voters with high policy alienation in EP elections can be identiﬁed.
Firstly, these are left-right centrist voters with anti-EU preferences. As centrist
parties are also pro-European, these voters would have to sacriﬁce too much policy
closeness on the left-right dimension to ﬁnd a matching anti-EU party. Secondly,
pro-European voters that hold extreme positions on the left-right dimension. These
voters do not feel represented by the anti-EU left- and right-wing parties on Eu-
ropean issues and would have to give up too much on left-right closeness in order
to get to their preferred position on European issues, which are all located in the
center.
To illustrate how changes in dimensional weights - EU integration issues becom-
ing more important relative to Left-Right issues in the EP election than in the FOE
- can lead to increased policy alienation in EP elections, I simulate party utilities
as a function of EU integration and Left-Right distances for possible voter ideal
points in the European policy space. Policy alienation then is proportional to the
minimum party utility (among the available parties). I generate four parties that
are aligned along an inverted U-curve: an anti-EU Left party, a pro-EU center-
left Social Democratic Party, a pro-EU center-right Conservative Party, and an
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Figure 2.2: Policy alienation heat map: Weight of EU integration distances 5% in
FOE, 50% EU in SOE
anti-EU Right party.9 In the FOE, EU integration distances are assumed to play
a subordinate role to Left-Right distances (weighted 5% and Left-Right distances
95%), in the SOE both dimensions are weighted equally (50%/50%). Figure 2.2
plots the policy alienation that a voter located at a particular point in the Eu-
ropean policy space is exposed to, in the FOE scenario (left panel) and the SOE
scenario (right panel). Darker colors indicate more policy alienation.
Since party utility is mainly about Left-Right distance in the FOE, most vot-
ers feel well represented on these issues because the available parties are evenly
distributed along the Left-Right dimension. Lacking representation on EU inte-
gration is largely inconsequential due to the low weight that voters assign to the
dimension in FOE. As the weight of the EU integration dimension increases in the
EP election, representational gaps occur since the particular constellation of the
parties in the two-dimensional space do not represent certain voter groups. These
9Spatial utility of voting for party j in the FOE is calculated by Uij = −.1(pjeu − vieu)2 −
1.9(pjlr − vilr )2, and utilities in the SOE by Uij = −1(pjeu − vieu)2 − 1(pjlr − vilr )2.
26
2.3. A GENERAL MODEL OF MULTI-LEVEL SPATIAL VOTING
●
●
●
●
Left
Social Democrats
Conservatives
Right
Difference in Policy alienation
Left−Right
−
 
EU
 In
te
gr
a
tio
n 
+
Difference in Policy Alienation Low High
Figure 2.3: Policy alienation heat map: Diﬀerence between FOE and SOE alien-
ation due to change in weight from 5% EU to 50% EU.
will be less likely to turn out in the EP election due to policy alienation. However,
in order to explain diﬀerential abstention, i.e. voting in the FOE and not voting in
the EP election, the diﬀerence in policy alienation between the elections is decisive.
This is plotted in Figure 2.3. The voter groups most aﬀected by increasing policy
alienation due to the change in weights are voters with Left-Right centrist anti-EU
integration preferences and left- and right-wing pro-EU voters. In this scenario,
one should therefore ﬁnd that being more in favor of EU integration should have
a negative eﬀect on diﬀerential turnout among left-wing voters, a positive eﬀect
among centrist voters, and again a negative eﬀect among right-wing voters.
To summarize: A spatial explanation for diﬀerential abstention due to policy
alienation requires that voters recalibrate their issue space across elections. If
voters recalibrate, not all voters are equally aﬀected by an increase in weight of
the EU integration dimension in EP elections. Policy-related alienation increases
conditionally on the left-right preferences of a voter, and the distribution of parties
in the European policy space. The inverted U-shape model of party competition
posits that there may be a typical representational gap in many member states.
Following the left-right continuum, pro-EU leftist voters, anti-EU centrist voters
and pro-EU rightist voters should be more likely to abstain in EP election due to
increased policy alienation.
In Chapter 4, I empirically test the argument that diﬀerential abstention in
EP elections can be explained by increased policy alienation as a consequence
of a recalibration of the issue space. Rather than modeling the diﬀerences in
policy alienation directly, I choose an indirect route. As I have shown here, each
party system will generate speciﬁc representational gaps if dimensional weights
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are recalibrated. The increased policy alienation that these representational gaps
create imply a speciﬁc pattern, or functional form, in which speciﬁc combinations of
EU integration and Left-Right will lead to diﬀerential abstention. From the party
system under investigation I draw observable implications about the trivariate
relationship between EU integration and Left-Right voter ideal points and test to
which this supposed relationship is consistent with the data.
Policy-motivated vote switching
As noted above, if voters recalibrate their issue space between elections, this might
lead to diﬀerent vote choices in the FOE and EP election. However, this is in-
herently contingent upon the “supply side”, the policy positions that alternative
parties oﬀer to the voter who is at risk of switching away from her previous party.
Only if there is a party that better matches the reweighted multidimensional pol-
icy preferences in the EP election will a voter switch to a diﬀerent party. This
vital part of the switching process, that there is not only a party from which a
voter switches away, but also a party a voter switches towards, has been woefully
omitted in previous studies that try to explain vote switching as a function of EU
integration preferences (e.g. Clark and Rohrschneider, 2009; Hobolt et al., 2009;
Hobolt and Spoon, 2012; Hobolt, 2014; Boomgaarden et al., 2016).
The problem is not only of theoretical nature, but casts doubt on a popular kind
of research design that is commonly employed to study diﬀerential voting behavior
across FOE and SOE. I ﬁnd that, although the EU issue vote switching literature
has developed its theory based on a spatial model, their research hypotheses do
not necessarily follow from the spatial model. How can this be? First of all,
the spatial theory of voting is a theory of choice among diﬀerent alternatives,
i.e. vote choice is the dependent variable. Most EU issue voting contributions
however seek to explain vote switching, that is the change of party vote choice
between FOE and EP elections. The hypothesis to be tested in vote switching
studies is often formulated as follows. “The greater the distance on the issue of
European integration between voters and the party they previously supported,
the greater the chance of defection [. . . ] at EP elections.” (Hobolt et al., 2009,
97). Unfortunately, this hypothesis is only a valid deduction from spatial theory if
speciﬁc circumstances are met. This is because in the spatial model, the probability
to vote for a diﬀerent party is inherently conditional on the positions all available
party alternatives take. Simply put, if the party a voter has voted for in the FOE
is the most anti/pro-European party there is, being more anti/pro-European than
this party will not increase the chances of defection in the EP election. In fact,
spatial theory would suggest the opposite - that it will make a vote for that same
party more likely.
Figure 2.4 illustrates that modeling the likelihood of vote switching as increasing
with increasing ideological distance to the previously supported party is inconsis-
tent with the theoretical predictions of a complete spatial model. I calculated
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Figure 2.4: Illustration: Heat map of spatial vote switching probabilities given
previous vote for Social Democrats (left) or Conservatives (right)
the switching probability for all possible voter ideal points in the policy space ac-
cording to a standard spatial voting model. The scenario entails four parties in
the constellation encountered in the previous section.10 One can clearly see that
the probability of vote switching does not symmetrically increase with increasing
distance from the previously chosen party. It is even decreasing with distance in a
direction where there is no competition from other parties. E.g., a former Social
Democratic voter (left panel) is predicted to be more loyal to his party if he is
more pro-EU and leftist than his party. This is because there is no alternative
party in this direction that would better match his preferences. The Conservative
Party (right panel) is able to hold voters that are centrist on both dimensions be-
cause there is no other party that is located closer to the multidimensional center.
However, the Conservative party is more vulnerable to competition from the the
Populist Right on EU integration issues.
As this illustration shows, it is not true that the probability to switch increases
monotonically with distance to the previously chosen party’s position. Vote switch-
ing probabilities are inherently dependent on the constellation of parties in the
policy space (and the relative weight voters assign to the dimensions). Relatively
complex spatial patterns can evolve from simple models of party competition. To
10Spatial utility of voting for party j is Uij = −1(pjeu − vieu)2 − 1(pjlr − vilr )2 i.e., voters
assign equal weights to left-right and EU integration distances. Party choice probabilities are
calculated from a conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974). The probability to switch then is
1 minus the probability of voting for the same party again.
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be fair, this is certainly known to all the authors and was partially acknowledged in
the original contributions. E.g., Hobolt et al. (2009, 98) point out that “defection
on the basis of issue voting requires that another party oﬀers a position closer to
the voter’s ideal point”. Given this “confession”, the authors limited their analysis
to government party voters, whose parties are usually the most pro-European, and
additionally reformulate their hypothesis as directional, in the sense that “Voters
are more likely to defect [. . . ] if they are less supportive than their party of Eu-
ropean integration. While these simpliﬁcations might have saved the theoretical
integrity of the original hypothesis, they inevitably reduce the scope of the theory
to a speciﬁc partisan subset of the electorate. This limitation means at the same
time that this modiﬁed theory is ill-suited as a general model of EU issue voting.
Taking a step back, the core theoretical problem of many studies of EP vote
switching is the mismatch between theory, hypotheses and models. As was laid
out above, this becomes clearly visible in the invalid blending of vote choice and
vote switching.11 Rather than addressing this fundamental problem, the literature
that seeks to explain changes in voting behavior across FOE and SOE elections
has converged on the development of more elaborate, or on a more critical note,
convoluted classiﬁcation schemes for voting patterns in recent years (e.g., Weber,
2011; Hobolt and de Vries, 2016). While classiﬁcations can be theory-driven, they
tend to invite arbitrary classiﬁcation choices and ad-hoc hypothesizing about spe-
ciﬁc groups. On a more general note, classifying voting behavior across multiple
elections and using the classiﬁcations as the dependent variable stands in stark
contrast to the methodological approaches pursued in other ﬁelds of political sci-
ence research that describe and model change over time. Political science has since
its early days understood change in nominal variables as Markov processes (e.g.,
Converse, 1964; Dobson and Meeter, 1974), where the state at one point in time
is conditional on the preceding state, and the probability of change in states over
time is expressed in terms of transition probabilities. Although the second-order
model and the Europe Matters argument is intrinsically concerned with changes
in voting behavior between FOE and SOE, there exists no contribution that has
conceptualized this as a Markov process. This means that the methodology of the
literature on EP elections is disconnected from the academic mainstream, and fails
to proﬁt from the vast literature on dynamic discrete choice and Markov models.
To point this out very clearly: This is not primarily a statistical issue (although
there are very good statistical reasons not to classify). The problem I see is that
theorizing on the basis of classiﬁcations is fallacious. Individual voters choose
which party to vote for among a set of parties, once in the FOE and once in the
11A number of exceptions to this patterns can be identified, but these are mostly confined to
studies of voting in a single policy arena. Hobolt and Wittrock (2011) analyze multi-party vote
choices in an experimental situation as the dependent variable, de Vries (2010) and de Vries et al.
(2011) analyze multi-party vote choice in national, respectively EP elections. As an exception
to the exception, Carrubba and Timpone (2005) analyze the vote for the Green or government
party as binary choices across FOE and EP elections.
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EP election.12 ‘Switching’ is not on the ballot paper. It is only the researcher
who classiﬁes the voting sequence as ‘switching’. Therefore theories that work on
the level of classiﬁcations (e.g., vote switching vs. partisan voting), will inevitably
come into conﬂict with any general theory of the individual voter. While there
might have been reasons to classify because of data limitations in the past, I ﬁnd
that this is not the way forwards. In my opinion, the classiﬁcation approach is a
methodological dead end that should be abandoned.
In Chapter 7, I develop an alternative approach that allows for the study of vote
switching based on a coherent framework of spatial voting. Instead of relying on
classiﬁcation schemes, I model changes in party vote choice across elections as a
Markov process. The eﬀect of distances on EU integration issues on transition
probabilities is then studied in a dynamic discrete choice framework.
12The EP election vote can of course be modeled as conditional on the FOE vote. This is what
second-order theory is about.
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Chapter 3
Methodological challenges and the
promises of panel data
The debate between second-order theorists and Europe matters proponents, which
has structured the entire ﬁeld of research over the last decades centers on the ques-
tion whether electoral outcome, or diﬀerences between electoral outcomes in FOE
and EP elections, are explained by EU related factors. On both sides of the argu-
ment, the goal of empirical research has so far been to establish either the absence
or presence of correlational patterns between electorals outcome and EU related
factors in observational aggregate-level and cross-sectional individual-level data.
A remarkable feature of this important debate is that, unlike in other ﬁelds of
research, it has not been a debate over methodology. Proponents of both sides of
the argument have used similar research designs, however tend to come up with
diﬀerent answers. The discrepancy in results then tends to be explained using
largely ad-hoc arguments about the reasons why a coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant for this
country/election/year/party, or by proposing additional moderating factors. Con-
sequently, a cottage industry of academic papers which ask each electoral cycle
whether a particular EP election is “still second-order” or “ﬁnally about Europe”
has developed. In my opinion, this is not the way forward. If anything, the state
of methodology in the ﬁeld of EP election research needs critical reﬂection. I ﬁnd
that both strands of the literature have displayed little care for methodological
issues that are prone to undermine the validity of the drawn inferences. Moreover,
there is remarkably little cross-pollination of methodology from other ﬁelds of re-
search. Some of the methodological problems are certainly grounded in paramount
data limitations. However, better data, multi-election panel data in particular, is
beginning to become available. Unfortunately, the state of methodology in EP
election research indicates that the ﬁeld is unlikely to be going to make the best
of this new data.
Rather than subjecting the relevant contributions to a systematic methodological
strip-search, what I want to oﬀer in this Chapter is a fresh start. Second-order
theorists and Europe matters proponents alike have remained largely oblivious,
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or at least silent in their contributions, about causal identiﬁcation. So I think
there is some beneﬁt in clarifying the fundamental inferential problem ﬁrst that
arises in the analysis of voting behavior between FOE and EP elections, or for that
matter, multi-level voting behavior in general. In a second step, I point out how
panel data can help not only by providing better measures, but also by allowing
to control for unobserved heterogeneity, the most likely danger to the validity of
inferences in voting behavior research. Eliminating potential heterogeneity bias
however requires the employment of more powerful statistical techniques such as
ﬁxed eﬀect models. These come with their own set of challenges for discrete
voting behavior data. An attractive option is the conditional likelihood approach
to panel data, which not only the ﬁeld of voting behavior research, but political
science research in general has so far woefully overlooked. I discuss conditional
ﬁxed eﬀect logit models for choice data, and how they can be employed to exploit
the advantages of political panel data to the fullest. Following, I sketch out the
research designs that I will employ in Chapters 4-7 and discuss their properties.
Finally, I discuss case selection and introduce the Making Electoral Democracy
Work (MEDW) Bavaria panel data set and explain the measures that I will use in
the empirical part of this dissertation.
3.1 The fundamental problem of causal inference
in multi-level voting research
All research that seeks to compare voting behavior across elections at diﬀerent
levels of government faces a common inferential problem. Changes in the level of
government at which the elections take place are in most instances accompanied by
changes in time. Simply put, EP elections usually take place at a diﬀerent point in
time than FOE. This means that it is practically impossible to credibly distinguish
whether diﬀerences in voting behavior between elections are caused by the change
in the electoral arena, or by the change in time. Clearly, this problem applies
to data on individual as well as aggregated voting behavior. Using the language
of causal inference, the treatment that is applied to voters is that the electoral
arena changes. Deﬁning the FOE as the control group, and the EP election as the
treatment, all voters are either in the control group or in the treatment group at
one point in time.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the problem. In a typical situation, voting behavior is only
observed in the FOE at time point t = 1 and the EP election at t = 2. The potential
outcomes (Rubin, 1978) of an EP election at t = 1 and of a FOE at t = 2 (YEP 1 and
YFOE2) are not observed. This problem is unlikely to be solved in the ﬁeld of multi-
level voting behavior research. A substantial proportion of the causal inference
toolbox is simply not available. Controlled randomization of real-world elections
is obviously impossible. Laboratory experiments can provide valuable insights
into EP election voting (Hobolt and Wittrock, 2011; Blais et al., 2016). However,
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t=1 t=2
FOE
EP
YFOE1 YFOE2
YEP1 YEP2
Figure 3.1: Observed (solid line) and Unobserved (dashed) potential outcomes
external validity is often reasonably doubted due to the diﬃculty to recreate a
realistic electoral context in the lab (Lupia, 2002; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998;
McDermott, 2002). Natural experiments1 exist in the form of concurrent elections,
cases in which multiple elections at diﬀerent levels of government are held at the
same point in time. While they can be employed to great eﬀect to provide causal
answers to important research questions (e.g., Leininger et al., 2016; Fauvelle-
Aymar and François, 2015), they are available only in special situations where
only a subset of the population is treated and treatment assignment is plausibly
as-if random. Natural experiments are by design not available for a comparison
of FOE and EP election voting behavior, since both elections are applied at the
national level at minimum. Therefore, the entire electorate is either treated or
not. Concurrent FOE and EP elections are not a solution. If the FOE and the
EP election are held on the same day, all subjects belong to the treatment and the
control group at the same time.2 It can not be made plausible that the FOE and
EP election outcomes, generated by a concurrent election, are viable substitutes
for the missing potential outcomes if they are regarded in isolation. EP voting
behavior given a concurrent FOE election is unlikely to be the same as EP voting
behavior in a (counterfactual) single EP election, because votes tend to be sticky
across ballots. This has been discussed in the context of cross-ballot and cross-
election contamination or interaction eﬀects (Herron and Nishikawa, 2001; Ferrara
et al., 2005). Theoretically, contamination in both directions is possible. However,
it seems plausible that EP election behavior is contaminated more by the more
important FOE than the other way around. The election campaign should also
1I use the term here in its widest sense (Dunning, 2008, 2012). For recent uses of natural
experiments in voting behavior research see e.g., Persson et al. (2013) and Ferwerda (2014). For
a critical note on the term and usage see Sekhon and Titiunik (2012).
2Expatriates that are only allowed to vote in the EP but not in the FOE are an exception that
could potentially be leveraged in a Difference-in-Difference design. However, expatriates clearly
do not constitute a randomized or balanced control group, and parallel trend assumptions might
be dubious at best.
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Figure 3.2: Potential eﬀects
be thought to be dominated by domestic politics, crowding out European aspects.
An EP election attached to another election should therefore diﬀer substantially
from a single EP election. While important in their own right, the eﬀects reported
by studies of ticked-spliting in concurrent EP elections (van Aelst and Lefevere,
2011; Sanz, 2008) are likely minimal eﬀects.
Although the above discussion does not explore the causal inference toolbox
exhaustively, it should become clear that one is unlikely to ﬁnd a good-enough
replacement for the missing potential outcomes when studying changes in voting
behavior in multi-level elections. Thereby we need to give up hopes of “clean and
simple” causal identiﬁcation strategies. Observational data, on which the relevant
literature has so far almost exclusively relied on and to which this dissertation
makes no exception, oﬀers little leverage on the fundamental problem of causal
inference. To even come closer to solving the problems, the data requirements are
prohibitive. Intuitively speaking, to even somewhat plausibly disentangle change
in electoral arenas and change in time, one would need to observe voting behavior
of the same voters across multiple FOE-EP elections sequences. Such data is
simply not available so far. In that light, a causal interpretation of estimates can
only be saved by making untestable assumptions.
To see what the assumptions are that I need to make to allow for a causal inter-
pretation, I further develop Figure 3.1 to incorporate the independent variable of
interest in this dissertation, EU-related policy preferences, in Figure 3.2. Loosely
borrowing from the method of directed acyclic graph (DAG) (Pearl, 2009), ob-
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served variables are indicated by a solid circle, solid arrows represent a possible
existence of a causal relationship. Dashed line indicate unobservables. Clearly,
preferences may vary over time, so let x1 represent policy preferences at the time
of the FOE, and x2 at the time of the EP election.3 Let βFOE denote the causal
eﬀect of policy preferences x1 of FOE voting behavior, and βEP of x2 on EP voting
behavior. β∗EP denotes the causal eﬀect of policy preferences x1 on the unobserved
potential outcome EP voting behavior at time point 1, and β∗FOE of x2 on potential
FOE voting behavior at time point 2. Clearly, β∗EP and β
∗
FOE cannot be estimated.
To reiterate, the central research question this dissertation seeks to answer is
whether the eﬀect of policy preferences on EU-related issues on EP election voting
behavior is diﬀerent from their eﬀect in FOE elections. Looking at Figure 3.2,
this translates into estimating β∗EP − βFOE, or βEP − β∗FOE. However, one can
only observe βFOE and βEP . Under which circumstances does βEP −βFOE capture
the true quantity of interest? Clearly, if β∗EP = βEP and β
∗
FOE = βFOE, meaning
if the potential eﬀects do not vary over time. This seems a strong assumption
to make. However, it closely resembles an assumption that is generally implic-
itly in analyses of panel data or time-series: That the regression coeﬃcients of
time-varying variables are constant over time (Harvey, 1978). In this light, the
assumption seems less problematic. Furthermore, case selection can help to make
this assumption more trustworthy. Ideally, one would want to study a case where
the time period between FOE and EP election is small and politically uneventful.
This would make it more plausible to believe that the causal relation to the un-
observed potential outcome remains stable. However, as suggested in the initial
discussion, there should be at least some time between the elections in order to
prevent possible contamination.
Based on Figure 3.2, one can also clarify a research design that has been used
to study diﬀerences in FOE and EP voting behavior so far. While the limitations
of cross-sectional data are one issue, as will be discussed below, I think there are
more fundamental problems with the research design. The research design can
be written up as ∆(YEP , Y ∗FOE) ∼ f(βx2), where Y ∗ indicates Y as recalled by
the respondent at time point 2, and f() is some function, usually the logit. I see
two main problems with such a research design. First of all, the research design
uses a measure of change directly as the dependent variable (indicated by ∆).
E.g., recalled participation in the FOE and non-participation in the EP election
is coded as 1 and participation in both elections as 0, or recalled vote choice in
the FOE and EP vote choice for a diﬀerent party is coded as 1 etc. At least to
me, it remains completely opaque what this “ﬁrst-diﬀerence approach to discrete
3I assume that preferences are a characteristic that is intrinsic to the voter, and independent
of electoral arena. This means that, a specific point in time, a voter has only one ideal point,
and not one FOE ideal point and a different EP election ideal point. While this understanding of
preferences is consistent with how preferences are defined in the spatial voting literature, it may
conflict with theories of vertical policy balancing (Fiorina, 1996; Kedar, 2006; see also Carrubba
and Timpone, 2005, for policy balancing in EP elections).
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voting behavior” shall accomplish in terms of identiﬁcation. None of the many
contributions pursuing this approach has provided any reason for doing so. Since
there is no ﬁrst-diﬀerence design for limited dependent variables (unlike in the
linear model), I conclude that it does not serve any purpose. It seems this is
merely done because that is the way it was previously done in the ﬁeld of research
of EP election voting behavior. However, this is generally not done in virtually
all other ﬁelds of empirical research that are concerned with discrete change. My
second issue with this research design concerns β. It is not clear to me what β
really is. Sure, β relates x2 to the probability of the dependent variable being
one. But is this what we are interested in? I would suggest not. Again, the
research question I (and the Europe matters literature in general) seek to answer
is whether EU-related issues play a more pronounced role in EP elections than in
other elections. I.e. whether there is a diﬀerence in eﬀect sizes between electoral
arenas. Estimating the eﬀect of policy preferences on the change in voting behavior
is of little help.4
3.2 Making the most of panel data
One reason why answering the research question ultimately requires panel data
can be seen in Figure 3.2. If policy preferences are understood as time-varying as
I believe they should, policy preferences need to be measured ideally at the point
in time the diﬀerent elections take place. Otherwise one does not stand a chance
to distinguish the quantity of interest, change in the effect of policy preferences
and voting behavior across electoral arenas, from temporal change in policy pref-
erences between elections. The vast majority of previous individual-level studies
have used cross-sectional survey data, usually from the European Election Survey
(EES). The ability of cross-sectional studies to measure the relevant concepts is
limited. Studies taking place at the time of the EP election have to infer voting
behavior in the preceding FOE elections using so called vote recall items. Vote
recalls record FOE voting behavior as remembered by the respondent, often mul-
tiple years after the FOE has taken place. Unfortunately, voters are surprisingly
bad a remembering previous voting behavior correctly (e.g., Weir, 1975; Waldahl
and Aardal, 2000; van der Eijk and Niemöller, 1979). This may have consequences
for the integrity of causal inference about the role of preferences for voting behav-
ior. If the likelihood of misreporting is associated with policy preferences, this will
confound the β estimates. However, there is not much one can do about this with
cross-sectional data. Moreover, past policy preferences can hardly be inferred
4I think a better design for cross-sectional individual-level data would be to pool the obser-
vations and determine the difference in β using an interaction effect. Y ∼ f(β1x + β2D × x),
where D is a dummy indicator signifying whether an observation stems from the EP or not. β2
then expresses the difference in the effect of x given D. Alternatively, a bivariate probit setup,
where choice in both elections are predicted jointly like in Carrubba and Timpone (2005) is an
attractive option, as it allows for errors to be correlated between the elections.
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in cross-sectional survey studies. The only information on preferences therefore
stems from measures conducted at the point in time the survey took place, usually
a couple of days before the EP election. This means that in order to answer the
research question, one has to assume that measures of present policy preferences
reﬂect past preferences, i.e., to assume that policy preferences are time-invariant.
Although this might be a workable assumption, it is an inconvenient one from the
standpoint of causal inference. With cross-sectional data, the alternative expla-
nation that observed changes in voting behavior are the consequence of changing
voter characteristics and not the consequence of changing the electoral arena can
never be conﬁdently excluded.
Unobserved heterogeneity That the ﬁeld of EP election research is in dire
need of panel data that includes more than EP elections is widely undisputed.
Only one indication is that the ﬂag ship of the research community, the European
Election Studies project launched an initiative to extend its 2014 EP election Voter
Survey by an online panel component that will survey respondents from eight coun-
tries again in the subsequent FOE. This certainly bodes well for the future. But
some studies that use panel data have already become available recently. Lefevere
and van Aelst (2014) use the Dutch LISS Panel, and Boomgaarden et al. (2016)
use the Austrian National Election Study to study changes in voting behavior be-
tween the respective FOE and the 2014 EP election, while Giebler and Wagner
(2015) employed the German Longitudinal Election Study to study voting in the
2009 EP and 2009 FOE in Germany. However, I ﬁnd that these studies have not
exploited the full potential of panel data as they used the panel data only insofar
as it provides more timely measures of voting behavior and voter characteristics.
Panel data oﬀers much more than better measures. A key motivation for using
panel data is the ability to control for all time-invariant factors without the need
of observing it. Individual-speciﬁc time-invariant factors, which may be under-
stood as individuals’ permanent innate ability or inclination to produce a certain
outcome, are commonly referred to as unobserved heterogeneity.5 Social science re-
search, belonging to the population sciences, cannot aﬀord to ignore the paramount
variation between individuals (Xie, 2013). Therefore, unobserved heterogeneity is
generally considered the most relevant factor undermining causal inferences in the
social sciences. “The problem of causal inference is fundamentally one of unob-
servables” (Halaby, 2004, 508). Unobserved heterogeneity threatens the integrity
of causal inference if it acts as a confounding factor. A confounding factor is one
that is causally related to both the dependent and the independent variable. If
the confounder is not controlled for, a biased estimate of the causal eﬀect be-
tween independent and dependent variable is obtained. This is generally referred
to as heterogeneity, omitted variable or speciﬁcation bias. Figure 3.3 illustrates
5The adjective “unobserved” is somewhat misleading, as it conceptually includes, amongst the
factors that are not measurable a priori also all factors that remain unspecified or are omitted
from an analysis, irrespective whether they are measured or not.
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Figure 3.3: Confounding due to Unobserved Heterogeneity
the problem. Unobserved factor U is related to both X and Y in both elections.
Failure to control for U will lead to biased estimates of βFOE and βEP .
Three main strategies to deal with heterogeneity bias can be distinguished. The
traditional route is to ﬁnd a parametric approximation for the heterogeneity by
including control variables, to the degree that the remaining unexplained variance
is purely random error. While most researchers are generally aware of the futility
of such an undertaking given the state of social science theories and data (Andreß
et al., 2013, 242), in the absence of panel data it is often the only way to potentially
reduce bias. Even if researchers identify relevant control variables and specify the
functional form correctly, the possibility that there exist yet unobserved confound-
ing factors can never be excluded. By design, only factors that are observed can
be controlled for. From a viewpoint of causal inference, the “statistical control”
strategy is least likely to produce causal estimates. If panel data is available,
two superior strategies become available: Random eﬀect and ﬁxed eﬀect models.
They are superior to the statistical control strategy, and related techniques such as
propensity score matching, because they do not only control for observed, but un-
observed heterogeneity as well. The deﬁning diﬀerence between random and ﬁxed
eﬀect models are their assumptions about the relation between unobserved hetero-
geneity and observed independent variables (Mundlak, 1978; see also Wooldridge,
2002, 254). Random eﬀect models model heterogeneity as a random variable that
is assumed to be unrelated to the explanatory variables. Fixed eﬀect models, on
the contrary, allow observed explanatory variables to be related in any way to un-
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observed heterogeneity. Since unobserved time-invariant factors are allowed to be
correlated in any way with the independent variables, ﬁxed eﬀect models allow to
control for all potential confounding due to unobserved heterogeneity. This feature
makes ﬁxed eﬀect models generally preferable over random eﬀects, if estimation
of causal parameters from observational panel data is the goal (Halaby, 2004, 526;
Allison, 1994, 181; Nickell, 1981, 1418).6
Fixed effects for choice data: The conditional likelihood approach Elim-
inating or estimating ﬁxed eﬀects is fairly straightforward in the linear model.
Assume a simple linear model yit = Xitβ + αi + ǫit,7 where αi is the unobserved
heterogeneity. As is well known, given only two time periods (t ∈ (1, 2)), diﬀer-
encing across the two time periods eliminates the unobserved heterogeneity. This
is the Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence estimator, ∆yi = ∆Xiβ + ∆ǫi, that is free of αi,
and can be estimated with standard OLS. Alternatively, αi can be consistently
estimated for panel data with more time periods simply by including unit dummy
variables.
Voting behavior in the sense of electoral participation or party choice is generally
measured as nominal choice data. Unfortunately, these ﬁxed eﬀect approaches do
not work in non-linear models for discrete dependent variables such as logit or
probit (Greene, 2004). First of all, there is no simple Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence es-
timator for non-linear models. Furthermore, consistent estimation of the αi’s is
not possible if the number of time periods is small relative to the number of ob-
servation, as is commonly the case with social science panel data. This commonly
known as the incidental parameter problem (Neyman and Scott, 1948). It can
be shown that if αi’s are estimated with a dummy estimator, this leads to sub-
stantial bias in β estimates. β is estimated as 2β for two panel waves, and bias
becomes negligible only with more than 16 panel waves (Katz, 2001; Abrevaya,
1997; see also Andersen, 1970). However, Chamberlain (1980), building on Rasch
(1960) and Andersen (1973), showed that there is a method for logit models that
is analogous to ﬁrst-diﬀerencing in the linear model. The approach is generally
referred to the conditional likelihood, the resulting models are the (binary) con-
ditional logit8, often also called the panel conditional logit (PCL) or ﬁxed eﬀect
logit. The approach readily extends to ordered and multinomial choices as well -
the following exposition of the conditional likelihood approach shall however only
discuss the binary case.
Let yit be a binary outcome, where 1 indicates a success for individual i (i =
6If causal identification is of secondary importance, choosing between fixed and random effects
involves a bias-variance trade-off. See Clark and Linzer (2015) for a discussion and additional
references.
7Let the continuous variable y at time t be the function of time-varying independent variables
X with effect vector β, individual-specific time-constant parameters αi and error term epsilonit.
8Not to be confused with the closely related McFadden (1974) conditional logit, which is a
generalized form of the multinomial logit model to alternative-specific independent variables.
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1, ..., N) in time period t (t = 1, ..., T ), 0 otherwise. Starting from a pooled conven-
tional binary logit model where choice probabilities are a function of time-varying
explanatory variables xit and individual-speciﬁc time-constant “intercepts” αi, the
unobserved heterogeneity,
Pr(yit = 1) =
exp(xitβ + αi)
1 + exp(xitβ + αi)
, (3.1)
it can be shown that after conditioning on a suﬃcient statistic si =
∑
t yit, the
number of successes of individual i over all time-periods, the conditional proba-
bilities are free of unobserved heterogeneity (Chamberlain, 1980). The resulting
conditional probability of observing a particular choice sequence Yi = (yi1, ..., yiT )
given si is
Pr(Yi|si) = exp(yitxitβ)∑∑
t λt=
∑
t yit
exp(
∑
t λtxitβ)
. (3.2)
λt(λ1, ..., λT ) denotes the set of all possible combinations of 0’s and 1’s.
∑
∑
t λt=
∑
t yit
is then the sum over all combinations of 0’s and 1’s such that the sum of the 1’s in
the combination equal the suﬃcient statistic. An example might come in handy
here. Say T=3 and si = 1, i.e. one success was observed in three time-periods.
There are three possible combinations that satisfy si = 1: (1,0,0), (0,1,0) and
(0,0,1). Accordingly, the denominator becomes exp(xi1β)+ exp(xi2β)+ exp(xi3β).
The conditional probability of observing Yi = (1, 0, 0) is exp(xi1β) divided by the
denominator, Yi = (0, 1, 0) exp(xi2β) divided by the denominator etc.
The loglikelihood function is the sum of all realized choice sequences,
logL =
∑
n
exp(
∑
t yitxitβ)∑
∑
t λt=
∑
t yit
exp(
∑
t λtxitβ)
. (3.3)
Note that conditional probabilities and loglikelihood are free of unobserved het-
erogeneity. As the log-likelihood function can be maximized independent of the
αi’s, consistent estimation of β with unobserved heterogeneity being related in
any way to the included variables is possible. Panel conditional logit is straight-
forward to implement and estimate since the structure of the conditional prob-
abilities strongly resembles the conventional multinomial logit9, and can in fact
be estimated using a McFadden’s conditional logit, a generalized version of the
multinomial logit. The interpretation of coeﬃcients also remains the same as in
the multinomial logit model.
An important feature of the conditional likelihood approach needs to be pointed
out here explicitly. Only information from individuals that change their voting
9For larger T, the denominator becomes unwieldy to program and slow to evaluate. Krailo
and Pike (1984) noted that there is a recursive formula for the binary conditional logit that
quickly generates the denominator for all Ts.
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behavior between elections is used. If si = 0 or si = T , (for T=3, Yi = (0, 0, 0)
or Yi = (1, 1, 1)), there is only one combination that could have generated this
outcome, and nominator and denominator are the same - the loglikelihood con-
tribution of i is ln(1) = 0. This means that individuals with no variation on the
dependent variable do not contribute to the estimation of β. The aggregate choice
pattern is determined solely by the time-constant factors, β is only identiﬁed by
the variation within individuals.
That only some of the available information is used is a frequent point of crit-
icism of ﬁxed-eﬀect models in general. Fixed-eﬀect models are ineﬃcient in the
sense that they disregard a substantial amount of variation in the data - all the
between-unit variation. However, I think that this criticism misses the point. The
particular purpose of the ﬁxed eﬀects approach is exactly to focus only on within-
unit variation, with units of observation acting as their own controls. As Halaby
(2004, 523) nicely puts it,
the luxury of "throwing out" between variation is the very source of
the advantage that panel data provide over cross-sectional data and
that within-group estimators, such as ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrst diﬀerence,
exploit to avoid heterogeneity bias. Throwing out between variation is
not wasting data: It buys protection against biased and inconsistent
parameter estimates.
Related to the general issue of ineﬃciency is a particular concern that seems to
come up frequently in discussions of the conditional likelihood approach. Only the
units of observation that exhibit change in the dependent variable enter the esti-
mation. Observations with no variation on the dependent variable eﬀectively drop
out. At ﬁrst sight, this might raise concerns about problems of sample selection,
i.e., selecting on the dependent variable. This is however fallacious (Brüderl, 2010,
987). It is simply that “such data points contain no information for estimating
β, and so they should drop out of estimation” (Wooldridge, 2010, 621). That no
change is observed is fully explained by the unobserved heterogeneity. For exam-
ple, the behavior of a voter who participates in each election can be completely
explained by setting αi to inﬁnity. If αi may be inﬁnitely high, there is nothing
left to explain by the time-varying characteristics: The large impact of unobserved
factors makes it impossible for the included variables to have any eﬀect in these
cases.
Although the exclusion of cases that have no variation on the dependent variable
is not directly a problem of sample selection, the exclusion still has implications
for the interpretation of the estimated parameters. This concerns the distribution
of treatment eﬀect magnitudes in the population. If treatment eﬀects are homo-
geneous, i.e., the coeﬃcient is the same for each individual, the exclusion will not
bias the results. However, if treatment eﬀects are heterogeneous, i.e., diﬀerent
subgroups have diﬀerent coeﬃcients, then the exclusion can weight the results to-
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wards one subgroup.10 This does not damage the integrity of the estimates for
that subgroup, but should make us careful about generalizing the estimates to the
whole population. The eﬀect estimated by ﬁxed eﬀect models is always an Average
Treatment Eﬀect on the Treated (ATET), and not an Average Treatment Eﬀect
(ATE) (Brüderl, 2010).
Additionally, it is often brought up that a disadvantage of the ﬁxed eﬀects ap-
proach is that characteristics that are constant over time can not be included in
the model. While it is of course true that all time-constant factors drop out, it is
not true that time-constant variables cannot be included. This misunderstanding
arises from failing to distinguish between time-constant eﬀects and time-constant
variables. “Within-group estimators sweep away only those time-invariant regres-
sors with time-invariant parameters. Time-invariant variables with time-varying
parameters are easily handled because neither within transformation eliminates
them entirely.” (Halaby, 2004, 525; see also Lee, 2012; Lee, 2015). If the eﬀect
parameter of a variable is allowed to vary over time, the variable can be time-
constant, or time-varying. Time-varying parameters can be fairly easily estimated
even with standard statistical software by specifying an interaction eﬀect of the
time-constant variable with time-period dummies. This is an important point
especially in the context of this dissertation. The hypotheses I seek to test are
speciﬁcally about variation in the parameters across elections.
While some of the criticisms about ﬁxed eﬀect models is based on an incomplete
understanding of the method, there is one key disadvantage of the conditional like-
lihood approach. Since it eﬀectively “gets rid” of the αis, the unobserved hetero-
geneity, one looses the ability to evaluate individual choice probabilities. Thereby,
one cannot calculate, say, average marginal eﬀects. Depending on what the quan-
tities of interest for a speciﬁc research undertaking are, the conditional likelihood
approach may not be able to oﬀer a satisfactory answer. However, this is not the
case in the context of this dissertation. The quantity of interest that I seek to
estimate is the diﬀerence in the parameters of interest across elections, which can
of course be inferred directly from obtained parameter estimates.
Overall, I think that the conditional likelihood approach oﬀers a very elegant
analytical solution to the unobserved heterogeneity problem. It’s key advantage
is that parameters of interest are consistently estimated even if unobserved het-
erogeneity is related in any way to the included variables. This allows to improve
inferences about parameters of interest without relying on the strong assumption
of correct speciﬁcation or strict exogeneity of unobserved or omitted variables. Its
analytical approach means that two panel waves are suﬃcient to account for un-
observed heterogeneity. This makes panel conditional logit especially useful in the
ﬁeld of electoral behavior research, where normally only very short panel designs
are available.
In the above, I outlined my overall strategy to estimate the quantity of interest,
10I thank Prof Paul D. Allison for pointing this out to me in an email.
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the diﬀerence in eﬀect sizes across electoral arenas, from panel survey data. The
theoretical argument does not only imply that EU-related policy preferences have
a larger eﬀect on voting behavior in EP elections when compared to FOE, but also
compared to other second-order elections as well. In order to maximize leverage
by maximizing the number of observable implications (King et al., 1994), the
above discussed research design should therefore be ideally extended to include
other elections as well. Fortunately, this is possible with the data that I will be
using. As will be discussed in the next section that will introduce the data, voting
behavior can be observed in three electoral arenas in the data at hand: In an EP
election, a FOE and a state election, which qualiﬁes as a diﬀerent kind of SOE.
3.3 Case Selection: Multi-level elections in Bavaria
2013-2014
As has been pointed out above, panel data on individual preferences and voting
behavior across multiple elections taking place a diﬀerent levels of government is
needed in order to enable strong inferences. This requirement alone drastically
minimizes the set of suitable secondary data sets: The number of panel studies
that cover elections at diﬀerent levels of government, such as EP and FOE elec-
tions, and include measures of policy preferences, are rare. Moreover, in order
to compare vote choices across multiple electoral arenas, the institutional context
and the set of parties competing in these elections should ideally be held constant.
Lastly, time is of the essence. If elections are too far apart, the potential interfer-
ence from disturbances such as political or economic events becomes more likely.
Finding a set of elections that satisfy these conditions, and having these elections
covered by a good panel study is unlikely. In this light, a study that was designed
speciﬁcally for the study of multi-level phenomena, the Making Electoral Democ-
racy Work (MEDW) Bavaria Panel Study that I will use in this dissertation, comes
surprisingly close to the ideal case. The study covers three legislative elections in
the German state of Bavaria - State, Federal and European - that were held in
relatively close succession in the years 2013 an 2014. In the following, I introduce
the electoral context in which these elections took place, highlight factors that can
be held constant by case selection and discuss how factors that vary between the
elections can be accounted for at the modeling stage.
Institutional context Both the electoral system employed in the Bavarian state
and in the German federal election is a mixed-member proportional representation
(MMPR) system consisting of a ﬁrst-past-the-post district tier and a proportional
party-list tier. Both systems are fully compensatory, meaning disproportionality
in the plurality tier is compensated via the PR tier (Shugart, 2001). It is therefore
the party-list PR tier that determines the distribution of seats in the parliament.
The plurality tier vote is far less important since it only determines which district
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candidate represents the district in parliament. The main diﬀerence between the
systems is that a special kind of open list MMPR is used in Bavaria (Massicotte,
2011), whereas lists are closed in Federal elections. For the purposes of studying
party vote choice, the consequences of this diﬀerence for vote choice are negligible
since voters make only limited use of the full possibilities oﬀered by open list
(Faas and Schoen, 2006; Rudolph and Däubler, 2016). European Parliamentary
elections in Germany are conducted under (single tier) proportional representation
with closed lists.11 Even though there is variation in the kind of electoral system
used at the diﬀerent levels of government, I think there is a good point to be
made that the central, decisive part of the electoral systems is the same. In State,
Federal and EP elections, it is the proportional party list tier that preeminently
deﬁnes electoral outcomes.
While the deﬁning parts of the electoral system are relatively constant across
elections, the institutional settings vary somewhat in the incentives for strate-
gic voting. In the German context, two kinds of strategic voting incentives are
generally distinguished: The wasted vote logic, and coalition (assurance) voting
(Gschwend, 2007). The institutional factor that drives the wasted vote logic in
the German PR system is the electoral threshold. Votes for a party whose vote
share falls below the threshold will not obtain representation in the parliament,
an outcome strategic voters seek to avoid. The threshold is set at 5% of the PR
tier vote share in both the Bavarian state and Federal election. Until and includ-
ing the 2009 EP elections, a 5% threshold was also employed in the EP election,
but was reduced to 3% as part of an electoral reform in 2013. In February 2014,
the German Constitutional Court overruled the 3% threshold in EP elections as
unconstitutional, which meant that the 2014 EP election was conducted without
any threshold in place.12 The absence of a threshold in the EP election makes
voting for small parties more viable than in State and Federal elections. There-
fore, one should expect more sincere, policy-based voting in the EP election. The
chosen modeling approach will allow to take the changing viability of parties into
accout by allowing for election-speciﬁc intercepts. Moreover, the potentially in-
creased overall role of policy considerations for vote choice in EP elections are
not problematic, since I do not base my inferences on the absolute weight, but
the relative weight of the two policy dimensions. Coalition assurance voting, in
which supporters of the senior coalition partner “rent out” their list vote to the
prospective junior partner if he is in danger of falling below the threshold, is also
not a major concern (Gschwend et al., 2016). While some renting of votes from
CSU supporters to the FDP in the State and Federal election, and not in the EP
11One peculiarity of the EP election system in Germany is that parties can choose between
running a nation-wide or state-specific list in the EP election. The nature of the list is incon-
sequential as state-lists are merely used when seats that are obtained by a party nation-wide
are distributed to the lower level. In 2014, only the CDU/CSU used state-specific lists which is
primarily due to the state-specific character of the CSU.
12As 96 German MEPs were elected in a single national-level district, the effective threshold
was at around 0.7% (Lijphart, 1994; Taagepera, 2002; Gallagher and Mitchell, 2005).
45
CHAPTER 3. METHODS AND DATA
election, might have happended (Stoetzer et al., 2015), these two parties take very
similar positions on both Left-Right and EU integration issues, and will therefore
not distort the policy-based voting rationale.
Political and party system context The Bavarian multi-party system is heav-
ily dominated by the conservative, Christian-Democratic CSU (Christlich-Soziale
Union). On the State level, the CSU has been in government since 1946 and
often forms a single party government. Acting as the sister-party of the CDU,
the CSU also participates in the Federal government coalition since 2005. The
social-democratic SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) is the largest
opposition party in Bavaria. After the 2013 Federal election, the SPD joined a
government coalition with the CDU/CSU at the federal level. The free market-
liberal FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei), coalition-partner to the CSU at the
state and the CDU/CSU at the federal level, lost parliamentary representation in
2013 at both the Bavarian state and Federal level by falling below the electoral
threshold of 5%. Four more parties make up the opposition, of which two, the
Free Voters and the newly founded AfD, merit further introduction. Traditionally
rooted at the local level in Bavaria, the Free Voters (Freie Wähler) competed for
the ﬁrst time in 1998 at the State level, and could realize considerable vote shares
in State elections in recent years. Although the Free Voters are relatively hetero-
geneous in their political proﬁle, about two-third of the voters tend to be recruited
from CSU-leaning voters (Kießling, 2008). The right-wing populist Eurosceptic
AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) was founded in February 2013 in opposition to
the Euro crisis and Euro country “bailouts” (Arzheimer, 2015). The AfD did not
run in the Bavarian State election, but in the Federal and 2014 EP election.
The period between September 2013 and June 2013, in which the three elections
under investigation were held, can be described as politically quiet. Apart from
the elections that took place and their results, no major events or developments
can be identiﬁed that are likely to have inﬂuenced the political landscape. Even
though the overall political context was very much stable, there is substantial
variation in the party fortunes between the elections, as shown by Table 3.3, that
displays the oﬃcial election results in the State of Bavaria. Two important patterns
can be identiﬁed. First of all, the party results that vary substantially between
State and Federal elections are those of the Free Voters, and to a lesser degree
those of the CSU, FDP and Left. As the organization of the Free Voters is heavily
focused only on the State of Bavaria, and structurally weak in all other States, it is
generally not perceived as a viable option in Federal elections, and gets strategically
deserted in Federal elections. The CSU beneﬁted disproportionately from the
votes of former Free Voters voters. For the Left, it is the other way around - it is
generally not viable on the State level, but is safe to pass the electoral threshold
at Federal elections. The second pattern in the oﬃcial results is that the CSU lost
substantially in the EP election, while the Greens and AfD gained substantially.
First of all, the variation of party fortunes may be regarded as a positive feature.
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State Federal EP
CSU 47.7 49.3 40.5
SPD 20.6 20.0 20.1
Greens 8.6 8.4 12.1
Free Voters 9.0 2.7 4.3
FDP 3.3 5.1 3.1
Left 2.1 3.8 2.9
Pirates 2.0 1.9 1.2
AfD − 4.3 8.1
Table 3.1: Oﬃcial Election Results: Party vote shares
It indicates that there is variation in the vote choice of Bavarian citizens, variation
that needs to be explained. If there were no variation, there would be nothing to
explain. However, some of the variation of party fortunes across the elections may
also be problematic, as it may potentially bias our inferences. We can never be
sure whether the variation is the results of changes in the level of government, or
merely the consequence of time. Fortunately, the variation of party fortunes over
time can be easily adjusted for at the modeling stage by allowing for intercepts
that vary across elections. To help the readers’ intuition - if we were to estimate
a model of vote choice only with the intercepts on the right-hand side, the point
estimates would describe the changes in the observed vote shares of the parties
between the elections, i.e., the predictions would generate Table 3.3. Empirically,
this encompasses variation in institutional context that favors particular parties
in particular electoral arenas, or factors located at the party level. Put diﬀer-
ently, the intercepts capture all institutional and party-level factors that play out
equally in the vote choice calculus of all respondents. It is to be noted that the
intercepts therefore capture implicitly many aggregate-level explanations put for-
ward by second-order election theorists to describe the variation of party fortunes
between ﬁrst- and second-order elections - such as swings in the overall party pop-
ularities between elections, whether a party is a government or opposition party,
or a small party that beneﬁts from the absence of strategic voting incentives in
second-order elections, or a conservative/green/socialist/Eurosceptic party.
To summarize, the case of the 2013-2014 Bavarian multi-level election comes as
close as is possible to the ideal case for a study of multi-level voting behavior in the
real world. The electoral systems are very much comparable over the elections,
and the close timely proximity of the election and the stable party system and
political context allow to credibly exclude the possibility that changes in voting
behavior are merely the consequence of changes over time, rather than the change
in the level of government. Two problems are identiﬁed: The party fortunes vary
substantially across the elections as a consequence of strategic voting considera-
tions. However, as it turns out, these variations should be easily controlled for in
statistical models. Moreover, one party, the AfD, did not run in one election under
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investigation. As will be explained below, this problem can be tackled by using
additional measures available in the data at hand. Overall, the case of the 2013-
2014 Bavarian multi-level election constitutes a most promising empirical case to
study multi-level voting behavior.
3.4 The MEDW Bavaria Voter Panel study
The data I am analyzing is part of the Making Electoral Democracy Work project
(MEDW) (Blais, 2010). The panel covers the Bavarian State and German Fed-
eral elections in September 2013, as well as the 2014 European election and was
purposefully designed to study voting behavior of the same individuals in multiple
electoral arenas. The MEDW Bavaria Panel was administered by the polling ﬁrm
Harris Decima in cooperation with Infratest Dimap, and conducted as an online
survey for which respondents were recruited oﬄine. Oﬄine recruitment ensured
that, unlike other online surveys, the MEDW panel does not suﬀer from systematic
overrepresentation of young and/or left-leaning voters. Respondents were surveyed
in the week before and after each election, all in all ﬁve times.13 Good quality con-
trol and attractive compensation schemes lead to an unusually low panel attrition
rate, which meant that the target sample size of 1000 respondents in the last wave
was substantially surpassed. In the end, 2854 respondents participated in all panel
waves - without panel refreshments.14
Measuring voting behavior A panel participant is counted as having partic-
ipated in an election if he/she indicated to already have cast an absentee vote
in the pre-election wave, or if he/she indicated to have voted in the post-election
wave. 302 participants refused to indicate whether they turned out or not in at
least one of the elections - I drop these from the data. Participants who reported
to have turned out where asked to indicate their party vote choice. Two of the
three elections took place under a two-tier electoral system. As discussed in detail
above, I only use the party-list PR tier votes as measures of party vote choice.
The party set encompassed the CSU, SPD, Greens, Free Voters, FDP, Left, Pirate
Party and AfD. Respondents received the same set of parties in the same order in
each survey wave, with the exception of the AfD in the State election, in which the
party did not compete. Respondents could also indicate “Other party”, “Wasted
vote” and “Don’t know” - these I treat as missing information. In my analyses of
party vote choice, I conﬁne my sample to panel participants who voted for one of
the eight parties in all elections. There were 1896 participants who reported to
13Since the Federal election took place only one week after the State election, the second panel
wave was a combined post-election survey for the State election and pre-election survey for the
Federal election.
14For further information on the data set visit electoraldemocracy.com/voter-behaviour or see
Golder et al. (2017).
48
3.4. THE MEDW BAVARIA VOTER PANEL STUDY
have turned out in all elections. Of those, 527 did not indicate a party vote for
one of the eight parties in the party set. The vast majority of these chose “Don’t
know”, therefore indicating either not remembering party vote choice or refusing
to report party vote choice. Thereby, 1369 remaining panel participants constitute
my core sample for the analysis of party vote choice. I discuss the selectivity of the
sample and employ alternative operationalizations, mainly for robustness testing,
in the relevant Chapters 5,6,7.
Table 3.2 investigates the representativeness of the sample by comparing the
observed turnout and party vote choice rates with the oﬃcial results of the three
elections in the state of Bavaria. To make oﬃcial party results comparable, they
are transformed into the percentage of votes the parties received as a share of
the votes cast for any of the eight parties included. Furthermore, the diﬀerence
between sample percentages and oﬃcial percentages is calculated.
Turnout CSU SPD Greens FV FDP Left Pirates AfD
State
Sample 92.9 45.7 24 10.1 9.8 5.4 2.4 2.6 .
Official 63.6 51.1 22.1 9.2 9.6 3.5 2.3 2.1 .
Difference (29.3) (-5.4) (2) (0.9) (0.1) (1.9) (0.2) (0.4) .
Federal
Sample 95.3 46.4 23 8.7 3.5 5.6 4.5 1.9 6.4
Official 70 51.6 20.9 8.8 2.8 5.3 4 2 4.5
Difference (25.3) (-5.2) (2.1) (-0.1) (0.7) (0.2) (0.5) (-0.1) (1.9)
EP
Sample 77.1 40.2 22.4 11.9 6.1 3.1 4 1.5 10.9
Official 40.9 43.9 21.8 13.1 4.7 3.4 3.1 1.3 8.8
Difference (36.2) (-3.6) (0.6) (-1.2) (1.4) (-0.3) (0.9) (0.2) (2.1)
Table 3.2: Comparison of sample turnout and party choice rates with oﬃcial
election results
Table 3.2 oﬀers two important insights: First, there is a considerable diﬀerence
between turnout rates observed in the sample and oﬃcial turnout in all three elec-
tions. Observed turnout varies between 93% (+29%) in the State, 95% (+25%)
in the Federal and 77 (+36%) in the EP election.15 Such discrepancies between
observed sample and population turnout is not speciﬁc to this particular data set,
but are a phenomenon observed in virtually all survey studies. There are two main
explanations for this: overrepresentation of actual voters in the sample, and overre-
15The level of turnout overreporting in the data seems higher than usual (e.g. Schmitt and
Mannheimer, 1991; Swaddle and Heath, 1989). There are two plausible explanations: Firstly,
non-response bias is higher in panel studies as panel attrition tends to be stronger among respon-
dents with low turnout probabilities. Secondly, respondents might alter their behavior simply
because they are a participant in a study (Hawthorne effect), which might even be more pro-
nounced in a panel study (Selb and Munzert, 2013, 192). In the present panel data, the effect
of being repeatedly contacted by a polling firm over the course of almost one year might have a
cumulative effect on electoral participation.
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porting by actual nonvoters (Selb and Munzert, 2013). Important methodological
issues arise from these that will be addressed in detail in my analysis of turnout
in Chapter 4. I also show how panel data can be leveraged to buy some protec-
tion against these issues. Second, looking at the party vote choices, the partisan
balance of the sample seems satisfactory. CSU voters are underrepresentated, and
SPD and AfD voters are slightly overrepresented in the sample, compared to the
oﬃcial election results. However, I would suggest that these deviations are minor
and overall partisan balance surprisingly good, given panel attrition eﬀects and
the necessarily selective construction of my party vote choice sample.
Measuring policy preferences Policy preferences are measured using simple
11-point policy scales, on which panel participants place themselves and the par-
ties multiple times over the course of the panel study. I deliberately choose this
very basic and conventional operationalization strategy for policy preferences in
order to keep my analysis comparable with the literature I am contributing to.
The vast majority of EP election studies have used the EES Voter Survey. The
MEDW Bavaria Panel used the exact same phrasing of the question on European
integration as in German version of the EES (see e.g., Schmitt et al., 2016). Voter
opinion on European Integration are measured by asking respondents to locate
themselves on a 0-10 11pt scale ranging from “Integration has gone too far” to
“Integration should be pushed further.”16 Directly after this item, respondents In
the MEDW Bavaria panel were also asked to place all eight parties on the same
scale. Both items were asked two times throughout the panel study, early on in
the pre-State election wave in September 2013, and again in the June 2014 pre-
EP election wave. Left-Right self-placements and party positions are measured
analogously: Respondents were asked to place themselves on a 0-10 11pt scale17,
ranging from “Left” to “Right”, and then then asked to locate the eight parties on
the same scale. The left-right self-placement and party measures were part of the
MEDW panel in each pre-election wave, i.e., three times.
To infer European integration preferences for the Federal election, I use the mea-
sures from the pre-State election panel wave as a proxy. I think this is unproblem-
atic since the Federal election took place only one week after the State election,
and respondents are unlikely to have changed their views on Europe in such a
short time frame. Additionally, I reduce missing information by inserting the most
timely measure of policy self-placement that is available for the respondent. E.g.,
16“Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone
too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a scale from 0 to 10, where
‘0’ means unification”has already gone too far" and ‘10’ means it “should be pushed further”."
Party scales were introduced with “Where would you place each of the following political parties
in Bavaria on that scale?”, with the eight parties being arranged in a item battery.
17The question was “In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place
yourself on a 0 to 10 scale where 0 means far left and 10 means far right?”. Party scales were
introduced with “Where would you place each of the following political parties in Bavaria on that
scale?”, with the eight parties being arranged in a item battery.
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if a respondent refused to indicate a self-placement in the pre-EP election wave,
I insert the self-placement from the pre-Federal election wave instead if available.
I think this is the best proxy for a respondents EU integration placement that is
available, and helps to eliminate potential selection bias due to missing data. I
apply the same procedure to Left-Right placements. Missing party placements are
not inserted.
Measuring party positions I operationalize party positions as the mean party
placements across all respondents, separately for each election. This strategy is
most commonly used and considered “best practice” to obtain objective party
positions because it buys protection against projection bias that is inherent in
subjective, individually perceived party positions (Conover and Feldman, 1982;
Granberg and Holmberg, 1986; Merrill III et al., 2001; Adams et al., 2005; Grand
and Tiemann, 2013). Moreover, it avoids scalability issues that would arise if
party positions were inferred from external sources, such as expert surveys or
party manifestos.
Figure 3.4 displays the estimated party positions in the two-dimensional Eu-
ropean policy space. For clarity’s sake, I only display the party position in the
Federal election and EP election.18 As a frame of reference, I additionally plot
the party positions from the 2014 Chapel Hill expert survey (Bakker et al., 2015).
First of all, movement of the mean perceived party positions between Federal and
EP election is minor. Party positions seem more volatile on EU integration than
on Left-Right. Most parties seems to be perceived to move slightly to the center on
EU integration before the EP election, but are largely constant on the Left-Right
dimension. The AfD is an exception to this pattern, as it is perceived distinguish-
ably more rightist and slightly more anti-EU at the EP election. Comparing the
mean perceived party placements to the party positions estimated by the Chapel
Hill expert survey, one can see surprisingly little diﬀerences. For all parties except
the AfD, survey respondents and experts seem to largely agree about the party po-
sitions on both dimensions. The diﬀerence between voters and experts about the
Left-Right position of the AfD is remarkable. One plausible explanation may be
that the AfD was founded primarily as a Eurosceptic party. The strong emphasis
on European issues (voters and experts seem to agree about the AfD position on
this dimension) might make it diﬃcult for voters to place the newly-founded AfD
on Left-Right issues, on which the party had largely remained silent (Arzheimer,
2015; Jankowski et al., 2016).
18Party positions across the State and Federal election, which took place only one week apart,
are practically indistinguishable.
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Figure 3.5: Jittered voter self-placements on Left-Right across Federal and EP
election. Correlation coeﬃcients .6 and .67
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Figure 3.6: Jittered self-placements of EU integration and Left-Right. Correlation
coeﬃcients -.06 and -.16
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Chapter 4
Legitimacy or Alienation? EU
integration preferences and
differential turnout
4.1 Introduction
Does Euroskepticism drive low turnout in European Parliamentary (EP) elections?
With EP election turnout rates at an all-time low and a Europe-wide trend to-
wards rising Euroskepticism in years of political and economic crisis, it is vital for
policy makers and researchers to understand whether there is a causal relationship
between the two. While the conventional wisdom of the public falsely tends to
treat the existence of such a relationship as a self-evident truth, scholars of EP
elections remain divided. Political scientists are currently not in a position to base
their advise to the public on a broad academic consensus. Clearly this is not a
satisfactory state of European election research.
Divisions among scholars persist due to conﬂicting theoretical backgrounds.
Second-order theory (Reif and Schmitt, 1980), the traditional theoretical lens
through which European elections have been analyzed, argues that the prefer-
ences and attitudes of citizens about the EU and its policies do not play a decisive
role for voting behavior in European elections. Even though the election is sup-
posed to be about Europe, citizens are said to behave just like in a less important
election at the national level. This transfer hypothesis (Clark and Rohrschneider,
2009), that citizens apply their domestic decision-making calculus to the European
level, has over the years become the essence of second-order thinking. In the recent
decade a body of research has emerged that particularly challenges the validity of
the transfer hypothesis. The Europe matters argument centers on the proposition
that voting behavior in EP elections is at least partially driven by considerations
that are speciﬁc to the European arena. These considerations entail attributions
of legitimacy and policy preferences over the extent of European integration that
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range from opposition to support for EU institutions and its policies (see de Vries
and Hobolt, 2016, for an overview).
While the theoretical points of contention have been worked out very precisely,
mixed empirical evidence from often weak research designs have so far prohibited
the ﬁeld from unifying behind a consensus position. Empirical studies from second-
order theorists generally ﬁnd no indication that preferences and attitudes towards
European Integration have a non-negligible inﬂuence on EP turnout (Schmitt,
2005; Schmitt and van der Eijk, 2007; Marsh, 1998; van der Eijk and Franklin,
1996), those of proponents of the Europe matters argument do (e.g. Stockemer,
2012; Hobolt et al., 2009; Hobolt and Spoon, 2012). This contribution will cer-
tainly not trigger such a consensus. But what I want to attempt here is to provide
a more deﬁnite answer to the fundamental question how EU preferences and at-
titudes are connected to electoral participation in EP elections. Unlike previous
research that has sought to provide a broad picture of the correlates of EP election
participation across member states based on aggregate turnout rates (e.g. Stock-
emer, 2012; Mattila, 2003; Studlar et al., 2003) or individual-level voter survey
data (e.g. Schmitt and van der Eijk, 2007; Hobolt et al., 2009; Stockemer, 2012),1
my primary concern is the internal validity of the supposed relationship. Previous
research designs often faced unsurmountable methodological challenges that under-
mined their inferential potential considerably. Since aggregate-level analyses are
necessarily exposed to the danger of ecological fallacy, the more recent literature
has converged on individual-level data from voter surveys, most commonly using
the European Election Study (EES). Limited to cross-sectional survey data, pre-
vious research had to rely on retrospective measures of previous voting behavior,
which opened the door for potential retrospective bias. Cross-sectional analyses
are also notoriously prone to speciﬁcation bias due to unobserved heterogeneity.
Furthermore, the consequences of overreporting of voting for the validity of infer-
ences were not addressed by previous contributions. In the face of these potentially
multiplicative and/or countervening biases, it is no wonder that the academic ver-
dict is still out whether European preferences inﬂuence electoral participation in
EP elections.
The present study proposes a research design that comes to grips with some of
the methodological obstacles that previous studies have faced. In the ﬁrst part, I
explore the three competing main theoretical arguments about the relation between
European preferences and EP turnout and work out the testable implications. In a
second part, I address methodological challenges and develop a research design that
allows for strong inferences. The empirical analysis employs the MEDW Bavaria
Panel which traces individual voting behavior across the 2013 State, the 2013
Federal and the 2014 EP election. I analyze the data using a panel conditional logit
model that is particularly well suited for the analysis of short panels and allows
to control for unobserved heterogeneity and individual-speciﬁc overreporting.
1A notable exception is Hobolt and Wittrock (2011), who employ experimental methods.
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4.2 Theoretical background
Electoral participation is the subject of a vast literature (for an overview see Blais,
2006; Geys, 2006; Aldrich, 1993). The key factors for turnout can be separated into
two categories: Individual-level factors and context-level factors. While individual
factors primarily explain why some citizens are more likely to turn out than others,
contextual factors explain why turnout levels are higher in some elections or coun-
tries than in others. The question whether European preferences drive turnout
in EP elections operates at the intersection between individual- and context-level
factors.
The EU preferences of a voter - broadly deﬁned as a set of preferences about
speciﬁc EU policies and integration eﬀorts - are an individual-level characteristic.
However, the research question is not concerned with the eﬀect of EU preferences
on the likelihood of voting in EP elections per se. It might be that EU preferences
aﬀect turnout in any election. Of course, this is not what is implied by the research
question. Rather, what we want to know is whether EU preferences have a stronger
eﬀect on turnout in EP elections than in other elections. Stating it even more
precisely, the research question is how the eﬀect of EU preferences on electoral
participation interacts with the change in the electoral context, that is the change
of the electoral arena from the national arena to the European arena.
The second-order argument on EP turnout The traditional theoretical
framework to analyze electoral outcomes between diﬀerent electoral arenas is
the second-order national elections model (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1997).
Second-order theory is based on the idea that there is a hierarchical relationship
between the electoral arenas that is deﬁned by the importance that citizens assign
to elections held in the arenas. Election in second-order arenas where there is
“less at stake” are subordinate to elections in the ﬁrst-order arena, which are de-
ﬁned as serving the function of electing the head of government. The subordinate
role of second-order elections expresses itself in the way citizens think about and
behave in these elections. Citizens are said to have no considerations or prefer-
ences that are speciﬁc to the second-order arena. Instead, they get their bearings
from the ﬁrst-order arena. This “transfer hypothesis” (Clark and Rohrschneider,
2009), that citizens simply transfer their ﬁrst-order decision-making calculus to
the second-order arena even if the election is about something else is “the essence
of the second-order interpretation” (Marsh and Mikhaylov, 2010, 13). As follows
from this line of reasoning, second-order theorists have argued that EP elections
are not European, but (second-order) national elections. Even if this is the case,
second-order theory does not preclude a potential inﬂuence of European issues on
electoral behavior in EP elections. Second-order theory merely suggests that the
issues remain the same even if the arena changes. So if EU preferences have an
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eﬀect on voting behavior in the national arena2, the eﬀect should be the same in
the European arena.
A growing body of research has emerged in the recent decade that challenges the
transfer hypothesis and argues for a role of EU preferences in explaining electoral
participation in EP elections. Two diﬀerent theoretical arguments can be distin-
guished that have emerged in the literature. First, an explanation that is based on
the perceived legitimacy of the European Union and second, an explanation based
on policy alienation on European integration issues (see Schäfer and Debus, 2015,
for this useful typology).
The legitimacy argument on EP turnout Legitimacy-based studies (Stocke-
mer, 2012; Flickinger and Studlar, 2007; Mattila, 2003; Studlar et al., 2003; Blondel
et al., 1997) have not explicitly speciﬁed the causal mechanism that relates EU
preferences to diﬀerential turnout in EP elections. These studies merely state that
pro-EU integration preferences should increase a citizen’s likelihood to turn out,
anti-EU integration preferences should decrease turnout likelihood. Implicitly, the
argument is based on the proposition that citizens turn out based on the degree
to which they support the political system. Taking cues from the Voice-Exit lit-
erature (Hirschman, 1970; Weber, 2011), withholding participation is a means to
discredit a political system that is seen as illegitimate, while participation yields
psychological rewards for citizens with strong system support. The crucial point
that the argument makes is that citizens assign speciﬁc legitimacies to speciﬁc
electoral arenas. In order to explain diﬀerential participation across diﬀerent elec-
toral arenas, attitudes towards the EU need to have a larger eﬀect in EP elections
than in national elections. Moreover, the argument has clear implications about
the functional form of the relationship between EU preferences and turnout. If the
legitimacy story is correct, an increase in EU support should always lead to more
participation. One should therefore expect a monotonic relationship between EU
preferences and the likelihood to turn out in EP elections.
The policy alienation argument on EP turnout Studies arguing based on a
EU issue voting model (Clark and Rohrschneider, 2009; Hobolt et al., 2009; de Vries
et al., 2011; Hobolt and Spoon, 2012) have been much more speciﬁc about the the-
oretical foundations of the relationship between EU preferences and turnout in EP
elections. At the heart of the argument is a model of multidimensional spatial
voting. European citizens are said to be located in a two-dimensional policy space
consisting of a Left-Right and EU integration dimension. While the Left-Right
dimension represents the traditional line of national party-competition, the EU
integration dimension captures diverging preferences over the extent of European
integration that are cross-cutting left-right issues. As discussed in Chapter 2, the
2de Vries and Hobolt (2012), de Vries (2010) and de Vries (2007) have shown that EU issues
matter at the national level in many elections.
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argument hinges on the proposition that citizens assign diﬀerent weights to the
issue dimensions in diﬀerent elections - they “recalibrate their issue space” (Marsh
and Mikhaylov, 2010, 13). They are said to do so by altering the relative salience of
the EU integration dimension. I.e., policy distance on the EU integration dimen-
sion becomes more salient relative to policy distance on the left-right dimension
to voters in European arena than in national arenas.3
How does this tie in with voter turnout? If voters care more about the positions
parties take on European integration in EP elections than in national elections,
this might lead to policy alienation from the parties citizens usually vote for in
the national arena. Moreover, whether EU preferences lead to policy alienation is
fundamentally contingent upon party system characteristics. Voters can only feel
alienated if the party system does not oﬀer political alternatives that represent
voters’ recalibrated policy preferences. Ultimately this means that the relation
between EU preferences and diﬀerential turnout might vary a great deal between
diﬀerent party-systems and electoral contexts. While empirical research clearly
needs to carefully account for the features of party systems, this does not absolve
me from proposing a general model. The most widely accepted model of party-
competition in the two-dimensional European policy space among European elec-
tion scholars is the inverted U curve (Hooghe et al., 2002). It states that left-right
centrist catch-all parties tend to adopt similarly pro-European positions, while
left-wing and right-wing parties, even if for diﬀerent reasons, take Euroskeptic or
anti-EU positions. Given such a typical constellation of party positions in the
European policy space, voters at risk of high policy alienation in EP elections can
be identiﬁed. Firstly, these are left-right centrist voters with anti-EU preferences.
As all centrist parties are also pro-European, these voters would have to sacriﬁce
too much policy closeness on the left-right dimension to ﬁnd a matching anti-EU
party. The second high-risk group are pro-European voters that hold extreme po-
sitions on the left-right dimension. These voters do not feel represented by leftist
or rightist parties on European issues and would have to give up too much on left-
right closeness in order to get their preferred position on European issues, since
the political alternatives are located at the center of the left-right dimension.
This verbal investigation of the multidimensional spatial model shows that the
increased policy alienation in EP elections, due to the recalibration of the issue
space, does not only depend on EU preferences, but left-right preferences as well.
Policy alienation on EU preferences is conditional on Left-Right preferences.4 The
voters that are most likely to be feel increasingly alienated in EP elections, and
3Whether European issues matter more in EP elections to voters is to be investigated in
Chapter 5.
4In terms of a statistical model, such a relationship can be modeled with interaction terms,
potentially with added polynomial terms to account for non-linearities. Previous research has
not adequately taken into account the conditionality of the relationship. E.g., while Hobolt et al.
(2009) control for the left-right position of respondents in their empirical analysis, there is no
interaction effect with EU integration preferences to capture this prediction of the alienation
argument.
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are therefore more likely to abstain, are the voters with no political alternatives in
their left-right vicinity that match the voters’ EU preferences. In a typical party
system, in which multidimensional party positions follow an inverted U-shaped,
the conditional relationship should therefore follow a U curve. Following the left-
right continuum, leftist voters with more pro-EU preferences, centrist voters with
more anti-EU preferences, and rightist voters with more pro-EU preferences should
feel increasingly alienated, and be less likely to turn out.
To summarize the three theoretical arguments: The second-order argument, the
legitimacy argument and the policy alienation argument have diverging implica-
tions for the relationship between EU preferences and turnout in EP elections.
These can be formulated as
H0: EU preferences have the same effect on turnout in EP elections as in first-
order elections. (second-order model)
H1: EU preferences have a larger effect on turnout in EP elections than in na-
tional elections. The likelihood to turn out increases monotonically with increas-
ingly pro-EU preferences. (legitimacy model)
H2: The effect of EU preferences on turnout in EP elections varies conditional
on the left-right position of voters and the constellation of parties in the European
policy space. (policy alienation)
4.3 Research Design
Empirical Challenges
Retrospective partipation measures Studying voting behavior across the
electoral arenas ideally requires panel survey data that tracks individual turnout
decisions across multiple elections. While this insight is well appreciated through-
out the literature, such data has until recently not been available. Instead, pre-
vious research designs have almost exclusively relied on retrospective measures of
previous voting decisions of respondents. It is well established that retrospective
measures of voting behavior come with systematic distortions (Benewick et al.,
1969; Weir, 1975; Waldahl and Aardal, 2000; van der Eijk and Niemöller, 1979).
Substantial proportions of respondents tend to mis-remember or mis-represent for-
mer voting decisions. Retrospective evaluations tend to err systematically in the
direction that makes previous evaluation seem more consistent with current evalu-
ations. These distortions have methodological implications (Shachar and Eckstein,
2007). The magnitude of retrospective bias seems to be often systematically related
to key individual-speciﬁc characteristics that also relate to turnout. E.g., more ed-
ucated citizens feel a higher pressure to appear consistent and are more likely to
mis-represent their previous voting decisions in order to appear consistent. In the
context of this investigation: If more educated citizens tend to have more pro-EU
preferences, this will lead to confounded estimates of the eﬀect of EU preferences
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on electoral participation. Due to the multitude of potential causal relationships,
it is unlikey that standard techniques of statistical control can credibly eliminate
retrospective bias. In the most commonly used data set, the European Election
Study (EES), respondents are asked at the time of the EP election whether they
voted in the general national election or not. Here, retrospective bias is espe-
cially threatening, as respondents from diﬀerent countries vary in the distance in
time to the last ﬁrst-order election, which should introduce systematic variation
in the magnitude of retrospective bias, since the likelihood to mis-remember or
mis-represent voting behavior seems to increase with time (Blank et al., 2003).
Such retrospective bias risks can be substantially reduced with panel survey data
that polls voting decisions simultaneously for all respondents only a couple of days
after each voting decision.
Overreporting of turnout Another common problem in the study of electoral
participation on observational data is systematic overreporting of turnout. Two
reasons for overreporting of electoral participation in survey data can be distin-
guished: the overrepresentation of voters among respondents (non-response bias),
and the mis-reporting of actual abstainers as voters (measurement bias) (Selb and
Munzert, 2013). While the former means that the sample is not representative
of the wider electorate, the latter concerns the misclassiﬁcation of actual voting
behavior.
Non-response bias is generally considered to occur at the sample selection stage.
The problem of non-response is notable aggravated in panel data, as panel attrition
tends to be stronger among those with low ex-ante probabilities to turn out. An-
other prominent cause is the Hawthorne eﬀect in election surveys (Clausen, 1968;
Persson, 2014). Here, ex-ante probabilities to turn out are increased merely by
participation in a (panel) study on voting behavior. From a causal inference per-
spective, non-response bias results from treatment eﬀect heterogeneity, that is the
average eﬀect estimated among citizens who take part in the survey is (in expec-
tation) diﬀerent from the eﬀect among all citizens. Non-response bias is therefore
primarily a problem of external validity as it undermines our ability to general-
ize our inferences from a given sample to the population. While there are some
options to deal with non-response bias (e.g., Heckman, 1979; Manksi, 1995; Jack-
man, 1999), the problem shall not be addressed in the following analysis, primarily
because the eﬀect estimated by panel ﬁxed eﬀect models are never average treat-
ment eﬀects anyways. Problems of generalizability are discussed in the concluding
section.
Measurement bias due to misreporting is generally seen as much more danger-
ous for the validity of the inferences of empirical research.5 Katz and Katz (2010)
warn against disregarding the issue of misreporting as this might lead to “poten-
5Ansolabehere and Hersh (2012) find that “most of the overreporting of turnout is attributable
to misreporting rather than to sample selection bias” even in Web-based surveys. Selb and
Munzert (2013) arrive at a more balanced verdict.
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tially distorting the relative impact of the characteristics of interest on the response
variable and leading to erroneous conclusions”. Neuhaus (1999) shows that even
response misclassiﬁcation that is independent of covariates leads to attenuation
bias, i.e., coeﬃcient estimates are biased towards the null hypothesis. However,
if respondent-speciﬁc misclassiﬁcation probabilities are dependent on covariates,
which research comparing validated and reported votes has convincingly shown
(Silver et al., 1986; Bernstein et al., 2001; Cassel, 2003), biases can go either way.
In such situations, relatively small amounts of misclassiﬁcation can lead to signif-
icant bias (Hausman et al., 1998). Seen from a causal inference perspective, bias
is in this case due to confounding factors that are both related to turnout and
misreporting. E.g., since educated citizens are more likely to overreport, estimates
of the eﬀect of education on voting are most likely overestimates if misreporting
is not accounted for (Bernstein et al., 2001). Similar confounding factors might
be at play for EU preferences. If those most supportive of the overall regime are
more likely to overreport and also tend to hold more pro-EU preferences, this
might lead to an overestimate of the eﬀect of EU preferences on reported turnout.
Previous research has not speciﬁcally addressed potential bias due to overreport-
ing. This paper acknowledges that in the absence of validated voting records,
voting decisions in survey data are reported and not actual voting decisions. As
I will show, overreporting can be framed and modeled as a form of unobserved
heterogeneity. Standard techniques such as adding control variables for poten-
tial confounders are unlikely to succeed in adequately addressing the fundamental
problem of measurement bias. As will be outlined in detail in the next section, the
proposed research design allows to partially account for overreporting by taking
into account respondent-speciﬁc propensities to overreport.
Unobserved heterogeneity Much of the turnout literature is dedicated to ex-
plaining which factors determine individuals’ inclination to turn out. Among the
most prominent factors are political interest, socio-economic factors such as in-
come, status and education, or a general habit of (non-)voting that individuals
have developed over the years, just to name a few. The important point about
individual-speciﬁc eﬀects is that they are not conﬁned to one electoral arena, but
determine an individual’s innate ability to (report) voting in any election or elec-
toral arena. In the econometric literature, individual-speciﬁc eﬀects are referred
to as incidental parameters or unobserved heterogeneity. Even though individual-
speciﬁc eﬀects are constant across arenas, this does not mean that they can be
disregarded if one wants to explain diﬀerences in electoral participation across
arenas. As has been discussed in Chapter 3, unlike in linear models, ﬁrst diﬀerenc-
ing does not solve the incidental parameter problem in non-linear models such as
Logit or Probit that are used to study electoral participation. Much of the research
on diﬀerential turnout between national and EP elections has used the diﬀerence
in individual turnout between one election and another as the dependent variable
- with voters that turned out in one, but not the other, being coded as diﬀerential
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voters (e.g. Schmitt, 2005; Hobolt et al., 2009). While this operationalization of the
dependent variable might reﬂect a substantive interest in the motivations of these
voters, from a statistical perspective it is not clear what the diﬀerencing should
accomplish. As has been discussed in Chapter 3, not accounting for individual-
speciﬁc eﬀects opens the door for heterogeneity bias. Standard techniques such as
including control variables are unlikely to succeed in reducing heterogeneity bias.
Especially since individual-speciﬁc factors, such as an individual’s inclination to
misreport turnout behavior remains unobserved.
A panel conditional logit model of turnout in multiple elec-
tions
The probability of an individual i to report to have turned out in an election t,
P (yit = 1) (yit ∈ 0, 1), can be thought of as a function of the true likelihood to
turn out in the election (ηit), plus the inclination to misrepresent turnout behavior
(θit), i.e. P (yit = 1) = f(ηit + θit). ηit can be further separated into election-
speciﬁc factors and individual-speciﬁc factors that are constant across elections,
and a random error component: ωit + µi + ǫit.
The obvious diﬃculty here is the “cheating parameter” θit that represents the
inclination to misrepresent turnout behavior. An individual’s inclination to cheat
of course remains unobserved. To come to terms with this problem, I make a
simplifying assumption: That individuals’ inclination to cheat are constant across
elections, i.e. θit = θi. While this assumption is certainly a bold one, it is consistent
with the literature on overreporting, which has to my knowledge only theorized
about the connection between individual-speciﬁc factors and overreporting, and
not about variation in overreporting across elections.
Having made this assumption, the reported turnout function can be simpliﬁed
by collecting terms. P (yit = 1) = f(ωit + αi + ǫit), where αi is the sum of the
cheating parameter and the individual-speciﬁc turnout factor, i.e., αi = θi+µi. The
election-speciﬁc eﬀect ωit captures the eﬀect of the variables of interest and shall
be discussed in more detail later on. Again, αi are individual-speciﬁc eﬀects that
are not conﬁned to one electoral arena, but determine an individual’s innate ability
to report voting in any electoral arena. This is the unobserved heterogeneity.
A key motivation for using panel data is to prevent bias as a consequence of
unobserved or unspeciﬁed time-constant factors that may act as confounders. As
discussed in Chapter 3, ﬁxed eﬀect models allow for a consistent estimation of the
eﬀects of interest, even if unobserved time-constant factors are arbitrarily related
to the variables of interest. Unobserved heterogeneity is particularly challenging
for limited dependent variables. For binary dependent variables in a panel data
structure, such as participating in an election or not, I propose to use Cham-
berlain’s (1980) conditional logit model (PCL). After conditioning on a suﬃcient
statistic si, the number of successes for each respondent over all panel time periods,
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the conditional maximum likelihood function is free of unobserved heterogeneity
(see e.g., Allison, 2009; Lee, 2015). The resulting conditional choice probabilities
have the structure P (yit = 1|si) = f(ωit), from which the αis are successfully
eliminated. The researcher is left only to specify the factors that vary between the
elections ωit.
Parameterizing the election-specific factors
I specify three models that capture the competing theoretical arguments about the
causal relationship between EU preferences and electoral participation: Second-
order, legitimacy and policy alienation. Importantly, two kinds of factors that
vary between the elections need to be distinguished. First, a variable can vary
across elections, while its coeﬃcient remains constant. Second, the coeﬃcient of a
variable (no matter whether time-varying or -constant) can vary across elections.
First of all, I include election-speciﬁc intercepts αt that captures diﬀerences
in the overall level of electoral participation between the elections. Second-order
theory suggests that the key variable that inﬂuences turnout is the importance that
respondents assign to elections in a particular arena. Elections in the ﬁrst-order
arena are seen as most important, and second-order elections as less important.
Obviously, measures of the electoral importance are speciﬁc to the electoral arena.
However, as the change of electoral arenas is synonymous with change in time
(see Chapter 3), electoral importance can be treated as a time-varying variable.
Conceptually, the eﬀect of a unit change in electoral importance should be constant
across elections. Accordingly, I model the eﬀect parameter β as constant across
elections.
SOE Model: P (yit = 1|si) = f(αt + β importanceit)
Voter EU and Left-Right preferences are time-varying variables. Both the legit-
imacy and policy alienation argument however suggest that the eﬀects of policy
preferences vary across the elections, as EU preferences become more relevant in
EP elections. As neither the legitimacy and policy alienation argument contests
that electoral importances matter, their suggested speciﬁcations are represented
as extensions of the SOE Model speciﬁcation. The Legitimacy model argues for a
direct eﬀect of EU preferences on the likelihood to turn out:
Legitimacy model: P (yit) = f(αt + β importanceit + γ1tEUit)
Note that γ1t varies over t, so for each election one coeﬃcient is estimated.
The policy alienation model implies that the election-speciﬁc eﬀect of EU pref-
erences varies conditional on respondents’ Left-Right preferences. This condition-
ality is incorporated by including an interaction eﬀect between EU and Left-Right
preferences. Moreover, the interaction is said to not be linear but U curve shaped.
To allow for non-linearity in the conditional relationship, I include an additional
interaction between EU and the squared Left-Right variable, and all constituent
terms (Brambor et al., 2006; Berry et al., 2012). As the eﬀects of policy prefer-
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ences are election-speciﬁc, the policy alienation contains 12 more additional eﬀect
parameters than the legitimacy model.
Policy alienation model: P (yit) = f(αt+β importanceit+ γ1tEUi+ γ2tLR+
γ3tLR
2 + γ4tEU × LR + γ5tEU × LR2)
The three panel conditional logit models are estimated by maximizing condi-
tional log-likelihood w.r.t. the α’s, β’s and γ’s.6
Theoretical predictions
Second-order theory posits that turnout behavior across electoral arenas is pri-
marily explained by the relative importances of elections in these arenas, and
independent of issues that are speciﬁc to the arena. For the data to be consistent
with the second-order argument, the second-order model should ﬁt the data best.
I compare model ﬁt with Likelihood ratio tests, which in this case should be in-
signiﬁcant when comparing the legitimacy policy and the alienation model to the
second-order model.
I regard the legitimacy argument as supported by the data if three conditions
are fulﬁlled. First of all, the legitimacy model should ﬁt the data signiﬁcantly
better than the second-order model and the alienation model. Secondly, I expect
the eﬀect of EU preferences to be signiﬁcantly larger in the European arena than
in the Federal arena and the State election. Thirdly, the magnitude of the eﬀect
of EU preferences should be independent of Left-Right preferences.
The policy alienation model implies that the magnitude of the eﬀect of EU
preferences systematically varies conditionally on voter Left-Right preferences. A
ﬁrst condition for this to be the case is that the policy alienation model ﬁts the
data signiﬁcantly better than the legitimacy argument. Additionally, the shape of
the eﬀect conditional on voter Left-Right preferences needs to be in line with the
constellation of parties in the European policy space.
4.4 Operationalization
Dependent variable Election-speciﬁc electoral participation is measured as de-
scribed in Chapter 3. In the panel conditional logit model, the log-likelihood con-
tribution of uniform turnout sequences, that is of respondents who always or never
reported to have turned out, is zero. This follows from the logic of the conditional
likelihood approach that uses each respondent as its own control group. Since
only within-unit variation identiﬁes the eﬀects of interest, respondents with uni-
form choice sequences are eﬀectively dropped from the analysis (see Chapter 3
for a detailed discussion). The eﬀective sample size is therefore reduced consider-
6I maximize conditional log-Likelihood using R’s optim() function. Monte Carlo simulations
show that the estimator converges reliably and fairly quickly on the true parameters.
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Voting sequence 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
Frequency 54 15 39 42 18 9 416 1837
Table 4.1: Dependent variable: Frequency of individual-level turnout sequences
in State, Federal and EP election. 1 indicates reported participation, 0 reported
abstention.
ably, since it is conﬁned to the voters with variation on the dependent variables
across elections. Table 4.1 shows the frequency of turnout sequences across the
State, Federal and EP elections for respondents with no missing information on
the independent variables employed in this analysis. 1 signiﬁes that the respon-
dent reported turnout, and 0 otherwise. There are 539 respondents that changed
their voting behavior between the three elections, and 1891 with uniform turnout
sequences (000, 111). Those reporting to have turned out in the state and the
federal, but not the EP election (110) are by far the most common among the
non-uniform turnout sequences.
Policy preferences Policy preferences are operationalized as described in Chap-
ter 3. To facilitate interpretation of the coeﬃcients, I center both EU and LR
preferences on the midpoint on the 0-10 scale, 5.
Electoral importance The MEDW Bavaria panel study repeatedly asked re-
spondents to indicate what importance they assign to State, Federal and EP
elections, using a 0 to 10 scale.7 All three items were part of the survey in all
pre-electoral waves, i.e., three times. Variation of electoral importances over the
panel waves is minimal. Rather than variation in time, variation between electoral
arenas is the deﬁning characteristic of this measure. I therefore chose to aver-
age importance evaluations for each respondent and each kind of election over the
three waves to obtain a robust measure of the structure of respondent’s importance
evaluations that is less prone to measurement error. This also has the beneﬁt of
reducing missing information considerably - only three respondents that reported
to have changed their voting behavior between the arenas had to be dropped due
to missing information on this variable. To facilitate interpretation of the coef-
ﬁcient, I ﬁnally recode electoral importances as the diﬀerence in importance to
the importance of the Federal election. This is of no further consequence since
only variation in importance across elections is used by the PCL model anyways.
Comparing the means, I ﬁnd that State elections are seen as only slightly less
important than Federal elections (0.2). Most respondents clearly identify EP elec-
7The wording implied that respondent should rate the importance not of a specific individual
election, but elections in a specific electoral arena in general: “Please rate the importance to you
personally of these three elections: State elections, Federal elections, European elections.” The
three 0-10 scales ranging from Not important at all to extremely important were arranged in an
item battery.
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tions as least important: On average, the diﬀerence in importance between Federal
election and EP election is 3.1.
Time-varying control variables While all individual-speciﬁc time-constant
factors are “controlled” for in the panel conditional logit, there may be time-varying
individualistic factors that explain changes in voting behavior across the elections.
If these are also causally related to policy preferences, these factors need to be
included in the model in order to identify the parameters of interest. To keep my
model parsimonious, I focus only on two main factors that have been identiﬁed in
the relevant literature so far. Second-order theory argues that government popu-
larity aﬀects changes in voting behavior in EP elections. The original argument
operates at the party-level (Reif and Schmitt, 1980), and is therefore captured
by the election-speciﬁc intercepts. However, individuals may without doubt vary
in their perception of government performance. Individual-level studies therefore
traditionally have included measures of respondents government evaluations to in-
corporate the individualistic protest motive into their models (e.g., Hobolt et al.,
2009; Schmitt et al., 2008). Equally, I include a time-varying measure of satisfac-
tion with the Federal government as a control variable. Respondents were asked
two times how satisﬁed they were with the performance of the “Federal government
in Berlin”, once before the Federal and once before the EP election. Respondents
used a 4-point scale ranging from “Not satisﬁed at all” to “Very satisﬁed” to in-
dicate their assessment. Due to the short time-span between State and Federal
election, I use the ﬁrst measurement for the State election as well. Economic fac-
tors have been identiﬁed as an additional motive for changing voting behavior in
EP elections (Braun and Tausendpfund, 2014; Garry and Tilley, 2015; Hobolt and
de Vries, 2016; Schakel, 2015). Insofar as these might be also causally related to
policy preferences, they constitute potential confounders that should be controlled
for.8 I do so by including a measure that captures changes in the perceived eco-
nomic situation of the respondents between the elections. Respondents were asked
two times if they thought they were ﬁnancially better oﬀ (1), about the same as a
year ago (2), or worse oﬀ (3) than last year.
4.5 Bivariate analysis
Are policy preferences associated with turnout in EP elections? I conduct a ﬁrst
bivariate investigation of the relationship on the 539 respondents that changed
their voting behavior across the three election, and therefore constitute the eﬀec-
tive sample. Figure 4.1 plots the proportion of respondents that report to have
participated in the EP election, given the respondents’ EU preferences as reported
8For the vivid debate about the causal relationship between economic perception and voting,
to which this contribution shall remain largely agnostic, see e.g. Lewis-Beck et al. (2008); Evans
and Andersen (2006); Johnston et al. (2005).
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less alienated, and rightist more alienated, if they hold more pro-EU preferences.
4.6 Results of the panel fixed effects analysis
I estimate three main models that are speciﬁed as outlined in Section 4.3. Ad-
ditionally, I include the economic situation and government satisfaction as time-
varying control variables for all models. Table 4.2 displays coeﬃcient estimates
and standard errors. The second-order model explains election-speciﬁc turnout
as a function of the importances that voters ascribe to elections in the electoral
arena and time-varying controls. As expected, I ﬁnd that electoral importance
has a statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the likelihood to turn out.9 Taking
into account that the variable is coded relative to the importance of the Federal
election, which has the value of zero, each unit on the 0-10 scale another election
is seen as less important leads to a decrease of .35 (95% CI: [.24;.46]) in the linear
predictor function for turnout. As the mean importance of EP elections is roughly
3 points lower, this translates in an average eﬀect on the linear predictor of -1.05
[-.7; -1.39]. As PCL gets rid of the individual-speciﬁc constant factors, putting
this in real terms, i.e., predicted probabilities or average marginal eﬀects, is not
possible. However, in order to help grasp the magnitude of the eﬀect, one can
think of the eﬀect on a synthetic voter with certain characteristics. Imagine a
voter who will turn out with a probability of .8 in any election, which corresponds
to her individual intercept being 2.2 in linear predictor terms.10 In an election that
is seen as three points less important, her probability to turn out is predicted to
be around 20 percentage points lower, at .58 [.5; .66]. As this constitutes a quite
substantial drop in the probability to participate, I assess the magnitude of the
eﬀect of relative importances on turnout as substantially meaningful.
9The effect parameter of importance is modelled as homogeneous over the three elections. I
tested this assumption in an auxiliary model (not reported) where I allowed for election-specific
parameters. I found only minimal variation between the election-specific importance parameter,
a finding which lends supports to the parameter homogeneity assumption.
10Furthermore, one would have to also assume that the unobserved individual-specific inter-
cepts, the unobserved heterogeneity, to be unrelated to all included variables.
69
CHAPTER 4. DIFFERENTIAL TURNOUT
SOE Legitimacy Legitimacy+ Alienation
αstate 0.75
∗ 0.68∗ 0.72∗ 0.74∗
(0.19) (0.20) (0.23) (0.23)
αep −1.36∗ −1.35∗ −1.21∗ −1.17∗
(0.18) (0.19) (0.22) (0.22)
Importance 0.35∗ 0.34∗ 0.35∗ 0.35∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Economy 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.13
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)
Gov.satisf. −0.02 −0.01 0.03 0.02
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20)
EUstate 0.08 0.08 0.02
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
EUfed −0.00 0.00 0.03
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
EUep 0.13
∗ 0.14∗ 0.19∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
LRstate −0.14 −0.19
(0.10) (0.11)
LRfed −0.18 −0.24∗
(0.11) (0.12)
LRep −0.07 −0.15
(0.09) (0.11)
LR2state 0.06
∗ 0.07∗
(0.03) (0.03)
LR2fed 0.05 0.05
(0.03) (0.04)
LR2ep 0.02 −0.01
(0.03) (0.04)
EU × LRstate −0.02
(0.03)
EU × LRfed −0.04
(0.03)
EU × LRep −0.10∗
(0.03)
EU × LR2state 0.01
(0.01)
EU × LR2fed −0.01
(0.01)
EU × LR2ep −0.01
(0.01)
N 539 539 539 539
LogLikelihood −261.2 −258.5 −254.9 −246.1
p-value LR test 0.14 < 0.001
Table 4.2: Panel conditional logit model estimates with standard errors in brackets.
∗ indicate p < 0.05. Likelihood ratio tests are evaluated relative to the model
speciﬁcation in the column to the left.
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The legitimacy model additionally includes time-varying EU preferences with
election-speciﬁc eﬀects. As there are three elections (subscripts state, fed, ep),
three additional parameters were estimated. As the second column of Table 4.2
shows, the eﬀect of EU preferences in the State election is estimated as positive,
but indistinguishable from zero. For the Federal election, the eﬀect is estimated
as close to zero. EU preferences only have a positive eﬀect on turnout in the EP
election that is conﬁdently distinguishable from zero. The magnitude of the eﬀect
can best be gauged by setting it into relation to the eﬀect of electoral importance: If
we put some trust into the point estimate, the eﬀect of EU preferences is roughly
one third of the eﬀect of importance, meaning that being three points more in
favor of further EU integration (11pt scale) can oﬀset about a one point decrease
in importance (also 11pt scale). Since the average drop in importance between the
Federal and EP election is about 3, a voter would need to move about 8 points on
the EU integration scale. So I would suggest that the estimated magnitude of the
eﬀect of EU preferences is not meaningless, but also not very substantial in the
grand scheme of things.
This cursory reading of the estimated parameters indicates that my ﬁndings of
the Legitimacy model may be consistent with theoretical expectations. EU pref-
erences do seem to only play a role in EP, and not in domestic elections. However,
my hypothesis are not about the coeﬃcient per se, but whether the eﬀect of EU
preferences is larger in EP elections than in domestic elections. Since the diﬀerence
between a signiﬁcant and an unsigniﬁcant coeﬃcient is not automatically signiﬁ-
cant itself, I investigate the ﬁrst diﬀerence. I take a large number of random draws
from the coeﬃcient sampling distribution and calculate the diﬀerence between the
EP coeﬃcient and the State and Federal coeﬃcient for each draw. Densities are
plotted in Figure 5.4. P-values are approximated by the proportion of coeﬃcient
draws for which a negative diﬀerence was obtained.
The diﬀerence in the EU preference coeﬃcients for the EP and Federal elections
p=0.04 p=0.2
EP−Federal EP−State
−.5 −.25 0 .25 5 −.5 −.25 0 .25 5
First Difference
Figure 4.3: Legitimacy model: Density of ﬁrst diﬀerence in election-speciﬁc EU
preference coeﬃcients
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is statistically larger than zero, which indicates that EU preferences play a larger
role in EP elections than in Federal elections. For the comparison of eﬀect between
EP and State elections, one cannot conﬁdently exclude the possibility that the true
coeﬃcients are the same. The ambiguity of the ﬁndings from the Legitimacy model
are further supported by a comparison of the model ﬁt: The Loglikelihood ratio test
indicates that the Legitimacy model does not ﬁt the data signiﬁcantly better than
the second-order model. Overall, I therefore conclude that the Legitimacy model,
while indicating that EU preferences may play a role in explaining EP-speciﬁc
turnout, provides ambiguous results that do not satisfy all observable implications
drawn from the theoretical argument.11
Before proceeding to the policy alienation model, I run a modiﬁed Legitimacy
model (Legitimacy+) which serves as the new base model against which the pol-
icy alienation model can be evaluated. To the Legitimacy model speciﬁcation, I
add Left-Right preferences and its square, both of which also enter the speciﬁca-
tion of the policy alienation model. Accordingly, the Legitimacy+ model diﬀers
from the policy alienation model only insofar as it does not include interaction
eﬀects between EU and Left-Right preferences. The policy alienation model then
tests whether the eﬀect of EU preferences is conditional on Left-Right preferences
by including interaction eﬀects. Although interaction eﬀects are cumbersome to
interpret from a regression table, it may give us some ﬁrst indications. First of
all, the previously observed patterns remain very robust: Parameter estimates for
electoral importance and the direct eﬀect of EU preferences remain substantively
the same. Secondly, the interaction eﬀect between EU and Left-Right diﬀerences
is negative, but is only statistically signiﬁcant and substantial for the EP election.
Since both policy preference measures were centered on 5, moving one unit to the
right from the center is estimated to modify the direct EU preference coeﬃcient by
about -.1, and moving one unit in Left-Right to the left will increase it by .1. This
indicates that the eﬀect of EU preferences is larger for leftist voters than for rightist
voters. The interaction eﬀect between EU and squared Left-Right preferences are
all inconclusive, indicating that the interaction is rather linear. Finally, the policy
alienation model ﬁts the data substantially better than the Legitimacy+ model,
and indeed all other models that were estimated, as indicated by the signiﬁcant
Likelihood Ratio test.12
I test whether the direct eﬀect of EU preferences is larger in the EP election than
in the domestic election.Due to the interaction eﬀect, the interpretation is however
diﬀerent, as the direct eﬀects now captures the eﬀect of EU preferences for a voter
who is located at the midpoint of the scale (policy preferences were recentered
11The Legitimacy model tests for a linear effect of EU preferences on turnout. Since the
assumption of effect linearity may not hold, I also tested for non-linearities by including second-
and third-order polynomials. I did not find any indications for non-linearities.
12I tested for potential effect non-linearity by including also an interaction between squared
EU integration scores and squared Left-Right scores, and included all constituent terms. I did
not find any indications for non-linearities in the conditional effect of EU preferences on turnout.
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p=0.06 p=0.03
EP−Federal EP−State
−.5 −.25 0 .25 5 −.5 −.25 0 .25 5
First Difference
Figure 4.4: Policy alientation model: Density of ﬁrst diﬀerence in election-speciﬁc
EU preference coeﬃcients for Left-Right centrist voter
on 5, see previous section). Figure 4.4 shows that for the alienation model, the
diﬀerence in coeﬃcients is barely not signiﬁcant for the contrast EP-Federal, but
signiﬁcant for the contrast EP-State. To investigate the conditionality on Left-
Right preferences more closely, I calculate the marginal eﬀect of EU preferences
on the linear predictor function in the EP election, given Left-Right preferences.
I do so by taking random draws from the coeﬃcient sampling distributions, and
calculating the linear eﬀect of a one unit change in EU preferences, given diﬀerent
values for Left-Right preferences for each draw. Figure 4.5 presents the ﬁndings.
For a Left-Right centrist voter (5), becoming one unit more in favor of further
EU integration has a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on turnout. The more a voter
locates himself to the left of the center, the stronger the eﬀect becomes. For a
voter located two units to the left on the Left-Right dimension, the eﬀect is almost
twice as high. If a voter is located to the right of the center, the marginal eﬀect of
EU preferences becomes indistinguishable from zero. It may even become negative
for right-wing voters, however there is substantial uncertainty about this.
I count this as strong evidence that the eﬀect of EU preferences on turnout in
EP elections varies systematically conditional on voters Left-Right preferences.
The direction of the conditionality is consistent with the predictions derived from
the policy alienation argument. However, a ﬁnal test has to be conducted. The
investigation into the results from the policy alienation model has so far only looked
at turnout in EP elections. This is not suﬃcient, since I want to know whether
the eﬀect is stronger in EP elections than in other elections. To capture the
diﬀerence in election-speciﬁc eﬀects, I modify the way in which the above presented
marginal linear eﬀect was calculated. For each coeﬃcient draw from the sampling
distribution, I additionally calculate the marginal eﬀect of EU preferences in the
State and Federal election on turnout in these elections, and then subtract these
from the ones obtained for the EP election. Thereby, I obtain the ﬁrst diﬀerence
of the marginal eﬀect between turnout in the EP election and the Federal election,
and between turnout in the EP election and the Federal election.
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The results are plotted in Figure 4.6. The ﬁrst diﬀerence between the EP and
Federal election is depicted in the left panel, the one between EP and State election
in the right panel. The substantive patterns that were observed for EP election
turnout remain intact. The diﬀerencing across elections primarily only introduces
additional uncertainty. EU preferences have a larger positive eﬀect in the EP
election than in Federal election for Leftist voters. If the contrast is changed to
the comparison between the EP election and the State election, I also ﬁnd that
more pro-EU preferences have a larger negative eﬀect in EP elections for right-wing
voters.
I conclude that my ﬁndings are only consistent with the policy alienation ex-
planation. I do not ﬁnd that the eﬀect of EU preferences is constant across the
elections, as predicted by the second-order model’s transfer hypothesis. However,
I also do not ﬁnd that EU preferences have a direct eﬀect on turnout in the EP
election, as implied by the legitimacy argument. The increased eﬀect of EU pref-
erences in EP elections seems to be contingent upon voters’ Left-Right preferences
as predicted by the policy alienation explanation.
4.7 Conclusion
EP election researchers stand divided on whether the views voters hold on Europe-
related issues contribute to low turnout rates in EP elections. I test three com-
peting theoretical arguments about the relationship between EU integration pref-
erences and electoral participation. Second-order theory suggests that EU pref-
erences have the same impact on EP election turnout as on ﬁrst-order election
turnout. The legitimacy argument stipulates that EU preferences have a larger
impact on the likelihood to participate in EP elections than in other elections,
and that the eﬀect is direct and unconditional on Left-Right preferences. A third
argument, derived from a multidimensional spatial model of voting, predicts an
indirect eﬀect via the route of policy alienation. If European preferences play a
larger role in European elections than in national elections, particular ideological
subsets of the electorate should be less likely to turn out as they experience higher
policy alienation.
I develop a research design to test the competing predictions. My research design
focuses on the internal validity of inferences drawn from observational individual-
level panel data of Bavarian voters in the election years 2013/2014. I address major
inferential problems that plague empirical research on individual-level turnout be-
havior: retrospective bias, overreporting bias and unobserved heterogeneity. I ﬁnd
that the employed panel conditional binary logit is well suited for the analysis of
the determinants of turnout across multiple electoral arenas. While the method
has its caveats, it is an attractive option to control for unobserved heterogeneity
because of its low data requirements and computational ease. Although my re-
sults may not qualify as causal estimates of the relation between EU preferences
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and electoral participation, I would argue that they constitute the most credible
estimates in terms of internal validity that have been presented so far. I ﬁnd clear
empirical evidence that voter preferences on EU integration have a substantial ef-
fect on the likelihood to turn out, but only in EP elections. Moreover, the eﬀect
appears to be contingent upon the Left-Right preferences of voters. Only among
Leftist voters are pro-EU integration views associated with substantially higher
turnout, and more anti-EU views with lower turnout. Rightist voters with more
pro-integration preferences are not more likely, or maybe even less likely to turn
out than rightist voters with anti-EU integration preferences.
The ﬁnding that there is an interaction eﬀect between Left-Right and EU inte-
gration preferences is remarkable in two ways. First, the ﬁnding is substantively
interesting, as it gives a novel insight into how preferences structures are related to
political outcomes in EP elections. This study is (to my knowledge) the ﬁrst study
that has tested for and discovered such an eﬀect. Secondly, the ﬁnding is not con-
sistent with traditional theoretical predictions about the relationship between EU
integration preferences and EP election turnout. The second-order elections model
predicts that policy preferences have no speciﬁc eﬀect on EP election turnout, and
the legitimacy argument predicts a direct eﬀect of EU integration preferences that
is independent of a voter’s Left-Right preference. The ﬁnding is however fully con-
sistent with the policy alienation argument derived from a multidimensional model
of spatial competition: The eﬀect of EU preferences on turnout seems to be con-
tingent on the relative constellation of voters and parties in the two-dimensional
policy space. As policy priorities change between electoral arenas - European issues
becoming more important in EP elections than in national elections - particular
groups of voters feel more alienated in EP elections than in national elections.
In the Bavarian party system under investigation, these are anti-EU center-leftist
voters, and pro-EU rightist voters.
What about alternative explanations for my ﬁndings? From a statistical perspec-
tive, not many alternative explanations for the empirical ﬁndings come to mind
as my research design has ruled out that the estimated eﬀect is confounded by
uncontrolled-for voter characteristics. However, an interesting one follows from a
methodological limitation of this study: Although the study controls for individual-
speciﬁc likelihoods to overreport, the possibility of selective overreporting in the
European arena can not be ruled out. Pro-European voters might simply feel
more pressured into reporting turnout in EP elections than Euroskeptic voters,
even though they are just as likely to turn out in reality. Due to absence of vali-
dated voting records or long-term multi-arena panel data it is not possible to test
this alternative explanation convincingly at the present date. Moreover, it is not
apparent to me how selective overreporting might explain the conditionality on
Left-Right preferences. From a theoretical perspective, there might be other, not
yet explored theoretical explanations for the ﬁndings. Ultimately, this study has
only provided an indirect test of the predictions of the policy alienation argument
on one subnational electorate. The policy alienation argument however implies
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that how EU preferences are related to turnout ultimately depends on the constel-
lation of parties in the two-dimensional European space, and is predicted to vary
across EU member states according to the conﬁguration of the respective party
systems. Therefore, it is imperative to conduct further studies in other EU member
countries to test whether predictions hold in these other contexts. Good testing
cases for future studies are countries in which the party system is substantially
diﬀerent, i.e., where the predominant Leftist parties are Euroskeptic, and pro-EU
parties are rightist. Following the policy alienation argument, the conditional re-
lationship between EU preferences and turnout should be reversed in such party
systems, i.e., more pro-EU preferences having a negative eﬀect on the likelihood to
turn out for leftist voters, and a positive eﬀect for rightist voters. This study may
serve as a methodological blueprint for these much needed further investigations
of the connection between EU-related preferences and EP election turnout.
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Chapter 5
Transfer or recalibration? EU
integration preferences and vote
choice
5.1 Introduction
The second-order elections model and the Europe Matters argument make diverg-
ing assumptions about the role of issues in EP elections. Second-order theorists
maintain that, even though the electoral arena changes, the issues remain the same
as in the ﬁrst-order arena. Voters do not evaluate the issues that are at stake in
the SOE arena in their own right, but simply transfer their issue-based decision
calculus from the ﬁrst-order arena to the second-order arena. In eﬀect, this trans-
fer hypothesis would mean that, if the issues at stake in SOE are considerably
diﬀerent from those in the FOE, input legitimization through elections does not
work in SOE since voters are unable to base their voting decision on the relevant
issues.
The Europe Matters argument is more optimistic about the ability of voters
to distinguish the diﬀerent issues that are at stake in diﬀerent policy arenas. In
its weak form, voters are seen as incorporating Europe-related issues into their
decision calculus when they vote in EP elections. I call this the weak form since
voting based on European issues is fully consistent with the transfer hypothesis,
assuming that European issues also play the same role in FOE. In its strong form,
voters are thought to adjust their decision calculus between FOE and EP elections
by putting a larger emphasis on Europe-related issues in EP elections than in
FOE. The argument is best expressed in terms of a spatial model of EU issue
voting, in which voters “recalibrate their issue space” between elections (Marsh
and Mikhaylov, 2010, 13).
Logically, the transfer hypothesis and the recalibration hypothesis are mutually
exclusive. Either voters use the same issue calculus across diﬀerent electoral arenas,
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or they adjust it to the speciﬁc electoral arena. Which of the two hypotheses is
true is a fundamentally empirical question. Although this question is well known
(e.g., Clark and Rohrschneider, 2009; Marsh and Mikhaylov, 2010), so far no study
has formulated it precisely and tested it convincingly. Rather, both the second-
order and the Europe Matters literature tend to use the transfer or recalibration
hypothesis as an (more or less implicit) assumption in their theory. I think that
this research question is too important to be treated as a mere assumption, as it
is not a simple working assumption but the theoretical linchpin for both strands
of research.
In this chapter, I formalize the competing hypotheses from the perspective of
a multidimensional model of spatial competition. In a two-dimensional policy
space consisting of a European integration and Left-Right dimension, transfer and
recalibration can be precisely expressed as the absence or presence of changes of
the relative dimensional weight across electoral arenas. The research question
then boils down to estimating the election-speciﬁc relative dimensional weight
parameters. However, estimation is not straightforward. In a Monte Carlo study,
I show that conventional statistical models will likely underestimate the change in
weights in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity that is related to the spatial
preferences of voters. The solution I propose is a ﬁxed-eﬀect multinomial logit
model that is particularly well suited for voter panel survey data.
5.2 The spatial voting model with relative dimen-
sional weights
The transfer and recalibration hypotheses can be expressed precisely in the multi-
dimensional model of spatial competition (Davis et al., 1970; Enelow and Hinich,
1984b; Hinich and Munger, 1997). In line with the EU issue voting literature (e.g.,
de Vries, 2010; de Vries et al., 2011; Hobolt et al., 2009; Hobolt and Wittrock,
2011; Hobolt and Spoon, 2012), I start with the proposition that the relevant
policy space for European voters consists of two (latent) policy dimensions: A
Left-Right dimension, which eﬀectively summarizes policy preferences related to
economic and social considerations, and an EU integration dimension, which sum-
marizes policy preferences related to the extent and/or deepening of European
integration (see also Chapter 2).
Dimensional weights in a single election
In the cross-sectional case, i.e., voting in a single election, the utility U of voter i
voting for a party j decreases with the sum of squared Euclidean distance between
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the party position p and voter ideal point v on all relevant dimension.1. This
spatial component is normalized by the parameter β, which expresses the impact
of spatial considerations, relative to non-spatial considerations c.
Uij = cij + β[(peuj − veui)2 + (plrj − vlri)2] (5.1)
At this stage, an equal weight is assigned to both dimensions, meaning that
increasing the distance by one unit decreases the utility to the same extent for each
dimension. This inﬂexible proposition is lifted by introducing a mixing parameter
ω that allows the dimensions to vary in their relative weights. ω is deﬁned on the
unit interval, and expresses the relative weight of distance on the EU dimension
in the spatial component (see e.g., Kedar, 2005, for a similar approach)
Uij = cij + β[ω(peuj − veui)2 + (1− ω)(plrj − vlri)2] (5.2)
In the extreme cases of ω, the two-dimensional model collapses into a unidi-
mensional one: If ω = 0, distance on the EU dimension has no eﬀect on utility,
and the spatial component consists entirely of distance on the left-right dimension
(since 1 − ω = 1), and vice versa if ω = 1. Accordingly, ω can be interpreted
as a percentage: If ω = .5, distances on the EU and left-right dimension have
the same impact on utility, they are weighted 50:50 etc. While this mixing pa-
rameter formulation makes the inner workings of the spatial model transparent
and allows for a straightforward interpretation of the weights, it is not conve-
nient to estimate in the maximum-likelihood framework.2 More common in the
spatial literature is the formulation of dimension-speciﬁc spatial eﬀect parame-
ters that ﬁts the linear predictor function of generalized linear models, such as
βeu(peuj − veui)2 + βlr(plrj − vlri)2. The linear speciﬁcation has more desirable sta-
tistical properties, such as allowing for unconstrained likelihood maximization. As
can be shown, the linear predictor formulation can be easily derived from the mix-
ing parameter formulation. Multiplying out the spatial component in Equation
(5.2), the dimension-speciﬁc weight parameters βeu and βlr are simply β × ω and
β×(1−ω). In turn, this means that relative dimensional weights can be recovered
from estimates of the generalized linear predictor function. The relative weight of
a dimension is the spatial coeﬃcient of that dimension, divided by the sum of all
spatial coeﬃcients3, i.e.,
1Subscripts eu and lr indicate the EU and the Left-Right dimension. Additionally, I make
the standard assumption that preferences are additive separable. This assumption is lifted in
Chapter 6.
2Point estimation of ω is relatively straightforward. The unit interval constraint on ω can be
included by applying an inverse logit transformation on ω (ω∗ = 1/(1 + exp(−ω))). This allows
an unconstrained maximization of the likelihood function. Estimates for ω are then obtained
post-estimation by employing the transformation to the maximum-likelihood estimates for ω∗.
However, standard error estimates are unreliable for boundary cases, e.g., if ω → 0.
3Proof: Substituting βeu (βlr) with β × ω (β × (1 − ω) and canceling, the true statements
ω = ω (1− ω = 1− ω) are obtained.
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ω =
βeu
βeu + βlr
; 1− ω = βlr
βeu + βlr
. (5.3)
The multiple elections case for panel data
To reiterate, the goal of this investigation is to compare the relative weight of EU
integration preferences across multi-level elections. To this avail, I reformulate a
spatial model of voting in multiple elections for panel data. I extend the cross-
sectional utility function by introducing the subscript t (1, 2...T ) that denotes the
particular election that a voter participates in. These might be domestic SOE,
FOE or EP elections.
Uijt = cijt + βeut(peujt − veuit)2 + βlrt(plrjt − vlrit)2 (5.4)
The key feature of the above equation is that the spatial parameters are modeled
as election-speciﬁc. This is vital because it is to be tested whether these vary
between elections. The βt’s now denote the impact of distances on the EU and
Left-Right dimension in the speciﬁc election t. Furthermore, party positions and
voter ideal points are also allowed to vary between elections, as elections take place
at diﬀerent points in time.
Non-spatial factors cijt now also vary between elections. These can be further di-
vided up into an election-varying component and an election-constant component
δij. δij is the unobserved heterogeneity. This is the voter-speciﬁc contribution to
the utility of voting for a speciﬁc party that is independent of the election - the gen-
eral inclination of a voter to vote for a party irrespective of the election. Examples
might be long-lasting party attachment or identiﬁcation, psychological or socio-
demographic factors, or any unobserved individual-speciﬁc factor that is constant
across elections. Furthermore, there are election-varying non-spatial factors, i.e.,
all changes in the utility of voting for a party that vary between elections. This
can be parameterized as a vector of party-election-speciﬁc constants or valence
parameters αjt, which capture the overall ebbs and ﬂows of party fortunes across
elections, a matrix of individual-election-speciﬁc covariates X with party-speciﬁc
eﬀect parameters γj and error term ǫijt.4 The full utility function then is:
Uijt = αjt + Zitγj + βeut(peujt − veuit)2 + βlrt(plrjt − vlrit)2 + δij + ǫijt (5.5)
Observable implications
Assuming for a moment that estimates of the dimension-speciﬁc weight parame-
ters, βˆeut and βˆlrt are miraculously obtained, the validity of the competing transfer
4Additionally, this may encompass also a matrix of election- and party-specific time-varying
covariates if such covariates are to be included.
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and recalibration hypotheses can be evaluated. In a ﬁrst stage, the relative dimen-
sional weights of the EU dimension (ωt) can be calculated. These are obtained for
each election t by ωˆt =
βˆeut
βˆeut+βˆlrt
.
Now, the main hypotheses can be readily evaluated in the classical null hypoth-
esis testing framework. The transfer hypotheses forms the null hypothesis as it
predicts no change in the relative weight of the EU dimension across elections,
H0 : ωEP − ωFOE = 0 (transfer hypothesis)
The recalibration hypothesis is the alternative hypothesis. It stipulates that the
relative weight of the EU dimension is larger in EP elections, and can therefore be
formulated as a directed hypothesis.
Ha : ωEP − ωFOE > 0 (recalibration hypothesis)
and
Ha : ωEP − ωState > 0.
5.3 Estimating the dimensional weights
The conventional statistical approach for estimating the dimensional weights (βs)
in Equation 5.5 is McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit model, a generalized form
of the multinomial logit that allows for alternative-speciﬁc variables such as policy
distance between individuals and party positions. This makes conditional logit
the workhorse model for empirical applications of spatial models (e.g., Alvarez
and Nagler, 1998; Schoﬁeld and Zakharov, 2009; Stoetzer and Zittlau, 2015).5 As
the term conditional logit is extremely confusing in the context of this dissertation
due to other similarly named models, I shall refer to McFadden’s conditional logit
simply as multinomial logit (MNL) in the following.
One possible research design to estimate the weights would be to estimate sepa-
rate cross-sectional MNL models for each election t. A cross-sectional MNL model
can be derived by selecting a particular t in Equation 5.5, and by assuming the
error-term ǫij to be assumed distributed i.i.d. Type-1 extreme value (McFadden,
1974). Collecting the systematic terms of the utility function in Vijt, the choice
probability of voter i for party j is given by Pr(Yij = 1) = e
Vij
∑J
j=1 e
Vij
. Theoretically,
parameter estimates, obtained by maximizing likelihood, can then be readily com-
pared. However, this is only possible if very strong assumptions are met. In prac-
tice, parameter estimates from discrete choice models such as multinomial logit are
not comparable across samples, groups within samples or over time (Mood, 2010;
Allison, 1999; Wooldridge, 2010, 582-585). Unlike linear models, discrete choice
estimates are aﬀected by omitted variables, even if these variables are unrelated
5MNL relies on the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption. Multinomial probit
is considered a solution (Schofield et al., 1998; Quinn et al., 1999; Dow and Endersby, 2004), but
is computationally unwieldy. Practical experience shows that the consequences of IIA violations
are often minor, especially in stable party systems (Whitten and Palmer, 1996, 255).
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to the variables included in the model. At the root of the problem is unobserved
heterogeneity which can bias estimates upwards or downwards to a diﬀerent degree
in diﬀerent samples. Estimates from multiple cross-sectional models will therefore
only be comparable if the model is fully and correctly speciﬁed - i.e., the entire
voting calculus of voters is captured in the correct functional form - certainly a
hopeless endeavor. This comparability problem is ameliorated if the individuals
remain the same as is the case in panel data set. However, the fundamental prob-
lem only goes away with panel data if the omitted variables are unrelated to the
included variables, as I will show in the Monte Carlo study below.
The conditional likelihood approach oﬀers an elegant way to circumvent these
problems, which will allow to draw stronger inferences about the variation of rel-
ative weights across elections. As has been noted already by Chamberlain (1980),
the conditional likelihood approach is not limited to binary logit but also extends
to MNL. Compared to the binary case, the panel conditional multinomial logit
(PML) has one more dimension (J alternatives), which complicates the model
somewhat. However, the logic of conditioning on a suﬃcient statistic remains the
same. As the reader will draw little additional beneﬁt from a full mathematical
exposition of the multinomial extension, this shall be avoided there.6 In the case
of multinomial choice, it can be equally shown that the frequency of successes (in
my case the number of vote choices for party j), sij =
∑T
t=1 yijt, where yijt is a
dummy indicator of vote choice of individual i for party j at time t, is a suﬃcient
statistic for δij. Intuitively speaking, suﬃciency means that the aggregate choice
pattern, i.e., the sum of the dependent variables, is generated solely by the un-
observed heterogeneity, while the time-varying factors generate the timing of the
choices among the alternatives, the speciﬁc party choice sequence. Conditioning
on the suﬃcient statistic in eﬀect means analyzing the choices for a given sij. For
example, if sij = 1, meaning voter i voted for party j once, one estimates in which
election this vote choice took place, given that it is known that the choice sequence
belongs to the set of all possible choice sequences that could have generated exactly
one vote for party j. Since timing becomes the choice variable, time-constant char-
acteristics, of which unobserved heterogeneity is a part, are irrelevant and drop
out.
The structure of conditional multinomial choice probabilities P (yij|sij) resem-
ble the choice probabilities of the MNL, only that the denominator is the sum
of the exponentiated linear predictor of all sequences that could have produced
the observed aggregate voting pattern (Chamberlain, 1980, 71; Lee, 2012). These
sequences are the set of all permutations of the dependent variable, which is some-
times referred to as the permutation matrix (Pforr, 2013). An example might come
in handy here.7 Consider a three-wave panel, in which a voter chooses between
three parties. This voter chooses party 1 in the ﬁrst wave, party 2 in the second
and party 3 in the third. Since the voter selected each party once, the suﬃcient
6A detailed discussion can be found in Pforr (2013), or Lee (2012), Lee (2015).
7This following example is taken from Pforr (2013, 45).
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statistics are s1=1, s2=1 and s3=1. The voter’s permutation matrix then is the
set of all potential sequences that are consistent with the suﬃcient statistics, i.e.,
{(1,2,3), (1,3,2), (2,1,3), (2,3,1), (3,1,2), (3,2,1)}.
Computationally, panel conditional multinomial logit (PML) is very similar to
standard MNL and estimation in the maximum-likelihood framework is numer-
ically stable and straightforward. The likelihood function is the sum over all
realized conditional probabilities. As in the binary case, the likelihood function is
free of the δij’s, which means that parameters are consistently estimated even if
unobserved heterogeneity is related in any way to the included variables.
A Monte Carlo Study of the Panel multinomial estimator
I conduct a Monte Carlo study to illustrate the consequences of unobserved het-
erogeneity for a cross-sectional analysis of relative dimensional weights and to
investigate the statistical properties of the proposed PML. The scenario under in-
vestigation consists of 1000 voters that participate in three elections. The choice
set consists of three invariant parties in each of the three elections.
In a ﬁrst step, the true data generating process of party utilities is speciﬁed,
following the systematic part of equation 5.5, as a function of
1. party- and election-speciﬁc valence
2. party- and election-speciﬁc policy distances on two dimensions with election-
speciﬁc spatial eﬀect parameters (the spatial component)
3. one individual- and election-speciﬁc covariate with party-speciﬁc eﬀect pa-
rameters (the control variables) and
4. one individual-speciﬁc, election-constant covariate (the unobserved hetero-
geneity).8
The true spatial parameters are set to -1 for the EU integration dimension and
-2 for the Left-Right dimension in the ﬁrst election, to -2 and -1 in the second, and
again to -1 and -2 in the third election. The true relative weights are then 1/3 in
the ﬁrst and third election, and 2/3 in the second election.
In a next step, I incorporate the two possible assumptions about the causal
relationship between included and unobserved factors. As discussed above, unob-
served heterogeneity can either act as a confounding factor by being related to the
included variables, or be unrelated. I generate two versions of the data: In the
ﬁrst version, there is no confounding: Policy distances and election-varying covari-
ates are unrelated to the unobserved heterogeneity - they are strictly exogenous.9
As I laid out in the previous section, we expect to obtain biased estimates even
8The stochastic part ǫijt is accounted for by the random multinomial draw, from which the
dependent variable is generated.
9Generated by random draws from a normal distribution.
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Figure 5.1: Monte Carlo Experiments: Spatial eﬀect parameters
for unconfounding unobserved heterogeneity in non-linear models such as logit.
Whether estimates of the relative weight are also biased is not so straightforward,
as we shall see. In the second version, policy distance on one dimension is related
to the unobserved heterogeneity, and acts as a confounding factor.10 Here, we
expect coeﬃcient and weight estimates to be biased.
In a third step, the calculated systematic utilities (Vijt) are transformed into vote
choices. For each respondent in each election, a probability vector containing the
party-speciﬁc vote choice probabilities is obtained via Pr(Yijt = 1) = e
Vijt
∑J
j=1 e
Vijt
.
Election-speciﬁc vote choices are then generated by a random draw from a multi-
nomial distribution, where the probability vector constitutes the success parameter
vector (see Stoetzer and Zittlau, 2015, for a similar approach).
This entire process is repeated 240 times, resulting in 480 datasets with 1000
vote choices in three elections each. For each dataset, I estimate separate cross-
sectional multinomial models for each of the three election, and the PML model.
Obviously, since the heterogeneity remains unobserved, it is not included in the
model speciﬁcation.
10Policy distance on this dimension is the sum of a random normal draw and a realization of
the unobserved random variable.
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Figure 5.2: Monte Carlo Experiments: Relative weights
Figures 5.1 presents the distribution of the deviations from the true spatial pa-
rameters, i.e., the spatial coeﬃcient estimates that I obtained in each run of the
Monte Carlo experiment, minus the true parameter value. The distribution of
the deviations of the estimates is summarized by its median and 90% range.11
The ﬁndings for the case where unobserved heterogeneity is not a confounder are
depicted on the left-hand side, the confounded case on the right-hand side.
First of all, it can be seen that the Panel ML is able to recover the true value
of the parameter in all cases. However, the sampling variance of the Panel ML
estimator is clearly larger due to the conditioning on the suﬃcient statistic. As
expected, the cross-sectional ML yields biased estimates of the spatial parame-
ters in both cases. It is to be noted that in the not-confounding case, the bias
is constant across the elections although the imaginary voters change the relative
dimensional weight between the ﬁrst and second election, and second and third
election, whereas the bias is not constant in the confounding case. To investi-
gate this more closely, I calculate the relative dimensional weight obtained in each
Monte Carlo experiment. The density function estimate of all weights that ap-
proximates the sampling distribution of the weight estimator is depicted in Figure
5.2.
As was hinted at by the constant bias of the spatial parameters, cross-sectional
ML recovers the true relative weight in each election if unobserved heterogeneity is
not confounding. The reason for this is that spatial estimates for both dimensions
are equally aﬀected: The degree to which the eﬀect of distances on one dimension
is mis-estimated is proportional to the degree to which the eﬀect of distances on
the other dimension is mis-estimated. Therefore the relative weight estimator is
unaﬀected by unobserved heterogeneity that is unrelated to the included variables.
11MNL intercept term and election-varying coefficient estimates are biased as well, but not
reported because they are of minor interest here.
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However, this is clearly not the case if unobserved heterogeneity is related to spatial
distances, a scenario that is much more likely than the special case of exogenous
heterogeneity. In the confounded case, cross-sectional ML yields estimates of the
weights that are not comparable across elections. Neither does cross-sectional ML
yield unbiased weight estimates, nor is the bias constant across elections. If the
“true” relative weight changes between the elections (here from 1
3
to 2
3
between
Election 1 and 2, and back to 1
3
in Election 3), so does the extent of the bias.
As true changes in the weights can not be separated from changes in the bias,
inferences about the ﬁrst diﬀerence of weights between elections are invalidated by
unobserved heterogeneity that is related to the included variables. Contrarily, the
proposed Panel ML delivers unbiased estimates of the dimensional weights in the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity even if it is related to the policy distances.
However, this comes at a price: As can be seen by the wider spread of the sampling
distribution of the weight estimate, the unbiased Panel ML estimator is less precise
than conventional ML estimates.
To recapitulate the main ﬁndings so far: Research designs that seek to com-
pare estimates of the relative weight of EU integration issues across domestic and
European elections using cross-sectional vote choice data are likely to come up
with the wrong answers. The reason is unobserved heterogeneity which prohibits
the comparison of estimates across elections. Multi-election panel data alone is
not the solution. Even if the unobserved factors are constant within individu-
als across elections, estimates of relative dimensional weights are not comparable
across these elections if unobserved factors are somehow related to the spatial
measures. Weight estimates obtained by conventional statistical models are only
comparable if the assumption of strict exogeneity holds - in my opinion an assump-
tion that researchers should not be willing to make if it can be avoided. As my
Monte Carlo study has shown, more elaborate statistical techniques are required
to obtain comparable estimates. The proposed PML can help a great deal to
put inferences on a more solid footing by addressing the unobserved heterogeneity
problem. Its low data requirements make it an especially attractive option for the
short panels that are available. In the next section I discuss the model speciﬁcation
and operationalization of the data.
5.4 Operationalization
Vote choice
I measure vote choice by reported post-election vote choice as outlined in the
description of the data in a previous chapter. The AfD did not compete in the
State election. This might raise concerns about a potential violation of the IIA
assumption upon which the multinomial logit relies. In order to prevent that
changes in the the party set due the entry of the AfD dilute the results, I chose
to identify counter-factual AfD voters in the State election. I overwrite reported
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vote choices only in the State election in instances where respondents indicated
a certain hypothetical vote choice had the AfD participated in the election. This
procedure aﬀects the dependent variable only in 126 cases of vote choice in the
State election, and is of very minor consequence for the results.12 In the following,
I refer to this operationalization of the dependent variable as Observed Choice.
The dependent variable contains 2318 missing values. Missing values are primar-
ily the result of respondents not participating in elections. These missings might
be problematic as they might introduce selection bias. Most (1300) stem from the
EP election, where turnout was substantially lower. This might lead to my results
speaking only about those voters who turned out in the EP election which might
be substantively diﬀerent than non-voters. Moreover, the variables of general in-
terest, the spatial preferences of voters on the EU and Left-Right dimensions, have
an inﬂuence on the decision to participate, as I show in Chapter 4. In order to
prevent these detrimental consequences and to improve the robustness of my re-
sults, I generate an additional version of the dependent variable, for which I try
to infer the counter-factual vote choice had the respondents participated as good
as possible. Eﬀectively, this version of dependent variable tries to simulate full
turnout in all elections. In a ﬁrst step, I overwrite missing reported post-election
vote choice with reported pre-election vote intentions. In a second step, I make
additional use of a survey question to infer hypothetical vote choice in the EP
election for the remaining missing votes. All respondents that reported to have
abstained in the EP election were asked which party they would have voted for had
they participated. They received the same party set and answer options as those
who reported to have participated. I overwrite the remaining missing vote choice
information in the EP election with the reported hypotheticals. In the following,
I refer to this operationalization of the dependent variable as Full turnout.
Policy preferences
Voter ideal points and party positions on the Left-Right and EU dimensions are
operationalized as described in Chapter 3. Policy distance in election t is simply
coded as the squared Euclidean distance between party positions and voter ideal
point in election t.
12Reported vote choices in the State election are replaced with “AfD”, if the respondent in-
dicated that he/she would have certainly voted AfD. The survey question reads: “The party
‘Alternative for Germany’ did not participate in the Bavarian state election. If this party had
participated, would you have voted for it?” Respondents could choose between “Certainly would
have voted AfD”, “Perhaps would have voted AfD”, “Certainly would have not voted AfD” and
“Don’t know”. I also estimated the model without this manipulation of the dependent variable,
and get the same results.
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Election-varying control variables
While PML allows to treat all factors that are constant across elections as unob-
served and to be conditioned out, election-varying factors still need to be speci-
ﬁed and parameterized in order to identify the spatial estimates. Conceptually,
election-varying factors can be separated into variation due to elections taking
place at diﬀerent points in time, and variation due to the elections taking place in
diﬀerent electoral arenas. Empirically, these two dimensions of variation are vir-
tually impossible to separate since the counter-factuals remain unobserved. In the
panel data at hand, one does not observe voting in the same arena at a diﬀerent
point in time, or voting in diﬀerent electoral arenas at the same point in time.
Theories of voting behavior can however serve as guidelines to identify election-
varying factors. The task is furthermore facilitated by the fact that the timely
distance between the election is relatively small. As the Federal election taking
place one week, and the EP election nine months after the State election, I think
it is plausible to assume that variation due to slow-moving factors such as parti-
san realignment, social status etc is negligible. This is further supported by the
qualitative evaluation of the political context as a period of political stability (see
Chapter 3).
The ﬁrst major part of trying to capture the party utility variation across elec-
tions are the intercept terms. As outlined in the previous section, these are speci-
ﬁed as election- and party-speciﬁc. Conceptually, the intercept captures the utility
of casting a vote for a particular party in a particular election that is constant over
the respondents. As is generally the case in multinomial models, the constant of
one party needs to be set to zero in order to identify the model - the reference or
base category. However, this is not suﬃcient in PML since only changes in the
party intercepts across elections are identiﬁed. Additionally to choosing a reference
party, a reference category in terms of elections needs to be selected. This is done
by additionally setting the intercept of all parties for one election to zero. The
remaining free intercepts to be estimated then express the change in party utilities
between the elections, relative to the changes of the utility of the reference party.
Which empirical phenomena are captured by the intercept terms? The intercepts
describe the overall electoral fortunes of the parties across elections. To help the
readers’ intuition - if we were to estimate the model only with the intercepts on the
right-hand side, the point estimates would describe the changes in the observed
vote shares of the parties between the elections. Empirically, this encompasses
variation in institutional context that favors particular parties in particular elec-
toral arenas, or factors located at the party competition level, or changes in party
vote shares over time. Put diﬀerently, we can say that the intercepts capture all
institutional, time and party-level factors that play out equally in the vote choice
calculus of all respondents. It is to be noted that the intercepts therefore implicitly
capture many aggregate-level explanations put forward by second-order election
theorists to describe the variation of party fortunes between ﬁrst- and second-
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order elections - such as swings in the overall party popularities between elections,
whether a party is a government or opposition party, or a small party that bene-
ﬁts from the absence of strategic voting incentives in second-order elections, or a
conservative/green/socialist/Euroskeptic party (e.g., Hix and Marsh, 2011, 2007;
Marsh and Mikhaylov, 2010; Reif and Schmitt, 1980).
While aggregate-level variation is captured by the intercepts, second-order the-
ory also identiﬁes time-varying individualistic factors that explain voting behavior
between ﬁrst- and second-order elections. If these are also causally related to pol-
icy preferences, these factors need to be included in the model in order to identify
the parameters of interest. To keep my model parsimonious, and since additional
control variables in multinomial choice models quickly burn through degrees of
freedom, I focus only on two main factors that have been identiﬁed in the relevant
literature so far. Second-order theory argues that government popularity aﬀects
changes in voting behavior in EP elections. The original argument operates at the
party-level (Reif and Schmitt, 1980), and is therefore captured by the election-
varying intercept. However, individuals may without doubt vary in their percep-
tion of government performance. Individual-level studies therefore traditionally
have included measures of respondents’ government evaluations to incorporate the
individualistic protest motive into their models (e.g., Hobolt et al., 2009; Schmitt
et al., 2008). Therfore I include an election-varying measure of satisfaction with
the Federal government as a control variable. Respondents were asked two times
how satisﬁed they were with the performance of the “Federal government in Berlin”,
once before the Federal and once before the EP election. Respondents used a 4-
point scale ranging from “Not satisﬁed at all” to “Very satisﬁed” to indicate their
assessment. Due to the short time-span between State and Federal election, I use
the ﬁrst measurement for the State election as well. Economic factors have been
identiﬁed as an additional motive for changing voting behavior in EP elections
(Braun and Tausendpfund, 2014; Garry and Tilley, 2015; Hobolt and de Vries,
2016). Insofar as these might be also causally related to policy preferences, they
constitute potential confounders that should be controlled for.13 I do so by in-
cluding a measure that captures changes in the perceived economic situation of
the respondents between the elections. Respondents were asked two times if they
thought they were ﬁnancially better oﬀ (1), about the same as a year ago (2), or
worse oﬀ (3) than last year.
Model estimation
I estimate a PML model for each of the two versions of the dependent variables,
Observed Choice and the hypothetical Full turnout vote choice. The linear predic-
tor function is speciﬁed according to utility function 5.5, with the exception of δij
13For the vivid debate about the causal relationship between economic perception and voting,
to which this contribution shall remain largely agnostic, see e.g. Lewis-Beck et al. (2008); Evans
and Andersen (2006); Johnston et al. (2005).
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that drops out in the PML. Accordingly, I estimate the party- and election-speciﬁc
intercepts, the election-speciﬁc weights of squared distances on the Left-Right and
EU dimension and the party-speciﬁc eﬀects of election-varying measures of Gov-
ernment satisfaction and Economic situations. For identiﬁcation purposes, the
intercepts of all parties are set to zero for the ﬁrst time period, and for one party,
the CSU, for all time-periods. As described above, the remaining free intercepts
express the change in party utilities between the elections, relative to the changes
of the utility of the reference party.
5.5 Results
Table 5.1 displays the point estimates and standard errors of the spatial coef-
ﬁcients.14 Coeﬃcients express the (average) weight of squared distances on the
EU and Left-right dimension in the spatial utility function of the respondents in
each election. The ﬁrst column presents the estimates from the Observed Choice
model, the second from the hypothetical Full turnout model that tests for a po-
tential sensitivity of estimates due to selection on electoral participation. The
weight of EU distances is estimated at close to zero and statistically insigniﬁcant
in both the State and Federal election and in both models. This indicates that
distances on the EU dimension have no detectable relevance for vote choice in
these elections. In these elections, only distances on the Left-Right dimension
are estimated to be a determining factor. The coeﬃcients are statistically distin-
guishable from zero, with the exception of the Federal election coeﬃcient in the
Observed Choice model.15 The spatial coeﬃcient estimates for the EP elections
seem substantively diﬀerent. Here, the estimates for both dimensions are statis-
tically signiﬁcant, indicating that both dimensions seem to matter in the spatial
utility calculus. Moreover, the magnitude of the coeﬃcients is larger for both di-
mensions than in the other elections, indicating that spatial considerations as a
whole played a larger role. This is in line with the second-order theory prediction
of more sincere voting in EP elections.
In order to enable a clear-cut testing of the observable implications I have for-
mulated, I calculate the relative weight of the EU integration dimension from the
estimated spatial coeﬃcients. I take 10,000 draws from the sampling distribution of
the coeﬃcients to incorporate the estimation uncertainty about the coeﬃcients.16
For each election, I calculate the weight parameter for each draw as ωt =
βeut
βeut+βlrt
.
However, as the unit interval constraint on the relative weight that enables an
14A complete table of estimates can be found in the Appendix to Chapter 5, in section 5.6.
15I can only speculate why the Left-Right coefficient is not distinguishable from zero in the
Federal election. One possibility would be strategic voting considerations (see e.g., Gschwend
et al., 2016).
16The asymptotic sampling distribution is multivariate-normal, with coefficient maximum-
likelihood estimates as mean vector, and the inverse of the observed Fischer information as the
variance-covariance matrix (Pawitan, 2013).
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Election Dimension Observed Choice Full Turnout (hyp.)
β s.e. β s.e.
State EU -0.001 (0.011) 0.004 (0.008)
LR -0.029∗ (0.014) -0.029∗ (0.011)
Federal EU -0.005 (0.01) -0.011 (0.008)
LR -0.016 (0.013) -0.031∗ (0.010)
EP EU -0.038∗ (0.011) -0.033∗ (0.008)
LR -0.041∗ (0.013) -0.045∗ (0.011)
Note: Table reports point estimates and standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ : p < .05
Table 5.1: Spatial parameter estimates
interpretation of the weight as a percentage was not taken into account during
the estimation procedure, coeﬃcient values in some draws need to be transformed.
This is the case when a positive spatial coeﬃcient was obtained in a draw. Larger
distances having a positive utility contribution is logically inconsistent with the
spatial theory of voting, and prevents an interpretation of the relative weights.
Therefore I replace all positive coeﬃcient values with close to negative zero values
(−10−10). Eﬀectively this means that draws with a positive EU integration coef-
ﬁcient are interpreted as cases with a relative EU weight of close to zero. While
this might seem arbitrary for some readers, hopefully only at ﬁrst sight, there are
two main reasons why I am convinced that this is appropriate. Firstly, a simi-
lar procedure would have been employed if the constraint had been implemented
during the estimation procedure. Secondly, it leads to a more conservative test as
positive coeﬃcients are moved into the direction that is unfavorable to the research
hypothesis that I test.
The approximated sampling distributions of relative weights that I obtained by
the above described procedure are plotted in Figure 5.3. Horizontally, the panels
display the results for the Observed Choice and hypothetical Full Turnout model.
The election-speciﬁc weight estimates in the three elections are arranged vertically.
As could already be inferred from the table of parameter estimates, the relative
weight of distances on the EU dimension is estimated at close to zero in the State
Election in both the Observed Choice and Full Turnout model. In the Federal
election, the relative weight estimate seems ambiguous in the Observed Choice
model. The density estimate stretches over the whole continuum, is however also
tilted towards zero. The ambiguous picture is a results of the non-signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient for left-right distances in the model. The estimate from the Full Turnout
92
5.5. RESULTS
Observed Choice Full Turnout (hyp.)
S
tate E
lectio
n
F
ed
eral E
lectio
n
E
P
 E
lectio
n
0 .25 .5 .75 1 0 .25 .5 .75 1
Relative weight of EU dimension
Figure 5.3: Density of Relative weight estimate
speciﬁcation seems more reliable here. The point estimate of the relative weight
of the EU dimension is at around .25, suggesting that voters weighed EU issues
at around a quarter, compared to three quarters on Left-Right. However, the
spread of the sampling distribution ranges from zero to roughly .5, indicating
substantial amounts of uncertainty. My ﬁndings are much clearer for the EP
election. Here the distribution of the weights peaks close to the midpoint of the
continuum, suggesting that voters weigh EU and Left-Right roughly equally. The
Full Turnout estimate seems to be a bit more conservative than the Observed
Choice estimate. Taking a summary view, my results suggest that the relative
weight of the EU dimension seems to indeed vary across the elections. Although
there is considerable estimation uncertainty, the pattern of variation seems to
be consistent with the recalibration hypothesis. The relative weight seems to be
higher in EP elections than in the State and Federal election.
Although the relative weights illustrate the variation of relative weights nicely,
a further step needs to be taken to enable a test of the competing hypotheses.
To reiterate, the transfer and recalibration hypothesis are not concerned with
the relative weights per se, but the change of relative weights between the EP
and other domestic elections. While the transfer hypothesis argues that a change
of relative weights does not take place, the recalibration hypothesis states that
the relative weight of the EU dimension is larger in EP elections than in other
elections. Therefore the sampling distribution of the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the relative
weights between the EP and State, and EP and Federal election, needs to be
investigated. The ﬁrst diﬀerences are simply calculated as the relative weight
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Figure 5.4: Simulated ﬁrst diﬀerence of relative weight and p-values
in the EP election minus the relative weight in the State election, and minus
the relative weight in the Federal election for each simulation draw. Note that
this procedure is asymptotically equivalent to null hypothesis signiﬁcance testing
(NHST) - the long-run relative frequency of negative diﬀerences can be interpreted
as the p-value. To calculate the p-value, I simply count the simulation draws in
which the ﬁrst diﬀerence is smaller than zero, and divide this count by the overall
number of draws (10,000).
Figure 5.4 displays the density of ﬁrst diﬀerences and the simulated p-value. As
above, the two estimated models are arranged horizontally, and weight diﬀerences
between elections vertically. On a ﬁrst view, one can see that a clear majority of the
simulation draws yield positive diﬀerences. Positive diﬀerences indicate a larger
weight in the EP election and are therefore the simulation draws that are consistent
with the recalibration hypothesis. However, there is a substantial proportion of
the draws with non-positive weight diﬀerences, indicated by the density below zero
and the p-values. For the Observed Choice model, slightly more than 5% of the
simulation draws yield a negative diﬀerence between the relative weight in EP
and State election. Employing the conventional signiﬁcance level for NHST, the
diﬀerence therefore does not qualify as statistically signiﬁcant. The diﬀerence in
weights between EP and Federal election are also clearly not signiﬁcant, as 25 and
13% of the simulations have negative diﬀerences. Only the ﬁrst diﬀerence between
EP and State in the Full Turnout model is conﬁdently distinguishable from zero.
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Weighing the evidence
As I have shown above, the transfer hypothesis cannot be consistently rejected.
If one would pursue a strict falsiﬁcationist standpoint, there is little additional
knowledge that can be drawn from this study. As this study fails to reject the
null hypothesis consistently, strict falsiﬁcationists might simply book this study
as evidence for the transfer hypothesis, and move on. However, I don’t think that
such an approach does justice to the ﬁndings. There are good epistemological
reasons for a more nuanced interpretation of the ﬁndings. I think that in this case,
strictly employing the null hypothesis testing framework unfairly stacks the deck
in favor of the transfer hypothesis. Any failure to reject the null hypothesis since
the p-value falls below an arbitrary threshold, even if due to lacking statistical
power, is counted as evidence against the recalibration hypothesis. However, I
would argue that the transfer hypothesis is not a null hypothesis that researchers
should be happy with. For what it’s worth, the transfer hypothesis is not equally
plausible as the recalibration hypothesis as it does not built on a convincing the-
oretical argument. As I laid out in Chapter 2, it was developed rather ad-hoc
as a “ceteribus paribus” assumption that enabled second-order theorists to treat
policy issues as ﬁxed between elections while they studied the consequences of the
change in election importance on voting behavior. It does not logically follow that
the “less-at-stake” logic of SOEs necessarily crowd out considerations about which
issues are at stake in which election.
Taking the theoretical plausibility of the competing hypotheses into account and
embracing the uncertainty that is associated with the ﬁndings, a more informative
picture arises. The patterns that are observed in the data indicate that the spatial
voting calculus of Bavarian voters likely varied between the elections. Indeed,
the observed patterns are more consistent with the recalibration hypothesis than
the transfer hypothesis. The point estimates indicate a substantial change of the
relative weights from close to zero in the State election to roughly a quarter in
the Federal election, up to slightly below one half in the EP election. This is in
line with the EU issue voting model, which suggests that EU issues play no role in
electoral arenas without an electoral connection to EU-level policy making (such as
State elections), a diminished role on the national level where an indirect electoral
connection exists, and a heightened role in EP elections.
Figure 5.5 illustrates this by plotting the estimated shape of the spatial utility
indiﬀerence contours.17 In the State and Federal election, the utility indiﬀerence
ellipsoid is “compressed” along the left-right dimension, meaning that voters are
very critical to deviations along this dimension, and fairly lenient to deviations
along the EU dimension. In the EP election, utility indiﬀerence contours become
almost circular, indicating that both dimensions are weighted roughly equally.
17Utility indifference contours are calculated using the negative of obtained spatial weight
point estimates as the diagonal entries of the A matrix (Davis et al., 1970; Stoetzer and Zittlau,
2015). Additionally, I use weighted Euclidean distance as the spatial metric here.
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5.6 Conclusion
Second-order theory and the Europe Matters argument disagree about the role
that European issues play in EP elections. While second-order theory sees voters
as simply transferring their national-level decision making calculus to EP elections,
the Europe matters argument builds on the idea that voters recalibrate their issue
space in EP elections by putting a larger emphasis on European issues compared to
national elections. In this Chapter, I tested these competing conceptions. I showed
that the transfer and the recalibration hypotheses can be precisely formulated in
the multidimensional model of spatial competition as diverging predictions about
the change of relative dimensional weights across elections. I developed a research
design that allows for the consistent estimation of the relative weights from panel
data in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. I ﬁnd that the empirical evi-
dence is much more consistent with the recalibration hypothesis than the transfer
hypothesis. However, while my ﬁndings suggest that voters are more likely recali-
brate than to transfer, the study fails to conﬁdently reject the transfer hypothesis
with the data at hand. Moreover, the ﬁndings suggest that the extent to which
voters recalibrate is moderate at best: European issues do not play a dominant
role in EP elections, as the traditional dimension of political conﬂict, Left-Right,
maintains its relevance across all elections.
This study is novel in two major ways: First, it is the ﬁrst study of EU multi-
level voting behavior that seeks to go beyond merely establishing correlational
patterns in observational data. By eliminating potential confounding due to un-
observed heterogeneity, it presents a research design for exploiting panel data to
the fullest which will enable researchers to place inferences on a much more solid
footing. For the new panel data that will come online in the foreseeable future not
only in the ﬁeld of voting behavior research, this study may serve as a method-
ological blueprint. Secondly, it is, to my knowledge, also the ﬁrst application of
a conditional likelihood approach to multinomial choice data in political science.
While the approach has its caveats, the proposed panel conditional multinomial
logit model with time-varying parameters is show to be a powerful statistical tool
that is particularly well suited to studying voter behavior across elections. It is
particularly handy for voter panel surveys, which typically have only a small num-
ber of panel waves. Furthermore, the inclusion of alternative-speciﬁc variables is
straightforward which makes it ideal for the estimation of empirical spatial models
with panel data.
The study purposely focused on the internal validity of the estimates, and there-
fore necessarily neglects generalizability. The question of generalizability entails
two aspects: First, how generalizable are the ﬁndings to the entire population on
Bavarian voters in the given time-periods, and secondly how generalizable are they
to other populations and time-periods. Both aspects depend on how one imagines
developed in Chapter 7.
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true eﬀect sizes to be distributed in the population or across countries and time.
The ﬁrst aspect follows from the ﬁxed eﬀects approach that only incorporates
information from respondents who show varying voting behavior across elections
(see Chapter 3 for a discussion). These respondents might be disproportionately
drawn from a particularly mobile subset of the population who recalibrate more
as they are also intellectually more ﬂexible. In such a case, the obtained estimate
is likely an overestimate of the average eﬀect in the population. Therefore one
should be careful to extrapolate the ﬁndings of this study to the entire population.
However, I think a valid estimate for this group, even if not readily generalizable
to the entire population, is more useful than an invalid estimate for the entire pop-
ulation. The second aspect, generalization to other countries and time periods, is
probably more relevant for the comparativist literature on EP elections. Naturally,
the ﬁndings of this study are not generalizable beyond the case of Bavaria 2013-
2014. Spatial theory suggests that the extent of recalibration may indeed heavily
dependent on party system characteristics and the particular electoral context.
Speculation should be guided by plausibility considerations about how eﬀect sizes
are distributed across time and space. While it is clearly plausible that eﬀect sizes
vary substantially across settings, I think that it is less plausible the fundamental
mechanism works diﬀerently in diﬀerent settings: If Bavarians recalibrate, why
shouldn’t voters in other countries as well? Nevertheless, additional studies em-
ploying a similar research design in other electoral context are necessarily required
to obtain a broader and deeper understanding of multi-level spatial voting in the
European policy space.
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5.7 Appendix to Chapter 5
Model 1: Observed Choice
Election Variable SPD Greens Free Voters FDP Left Pirates AfD
Federal Constant -0.247 -0.616 -1.676 -0.066 1.797 -0.587 0.624
(0.194) (0.243) (0.264) (0.236) (0.455) (0.48) (0.274)
EP Constant 0.402 0.628 -0.314 -0.514 2.698 -0.158 2.211
(0.199) (0.24) (0.233) (0.313) (0.473) (0.543) (0.304)
State EU distance -0.001 (0.011)
LR distance -0.029 (0.014)
Federal EU distance -0.005 (0.01)
LR distance -0.016 (0.013)
EP EU distance -0.038 (0.011)
LR distance -0.041 (0.013)
Econom. situation 0.614 -0.56 0.06 -1.065 0.151 -0.335 -0.099
(0.223) (0.219) (0.281) (0.293) (0.294) (0.341) (0.342)
Government satisf. 0.001 0.244 -1.045 0.68 -2.2 0.493 -0.28
(0.336) (0.446) (0.355) (0.765) (0.712) (0.302) (0.268)
Table 5.2: Parameter estimates Model 1: Observed Choice
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Model 2: Full Turnout (hyp.)
Election Variable SPD Greens Free Voters FDP Left Pirates AfD
Federal Constant -0.358 -0.717 -1.85 -0.143 1.309 -0.656 0.529
(0.157) (0.197) (0.212) (0.186) (0.332) (0.335) (0.222)
EP Constant 0.151 0.343 -0.714 -0.828 1.949 -0.299 1.8
(0.159) (0.192) (0.187) (0.245) (0.342) (0.361) (0.233)
State EU distance 0.004 (0.008)
LR distance -0.029 (0.011)
Federal EU distance -0.011 (0.008)
LR distance -0.031 (0.010)
EP EU distance -0.033 (0.008)
LR distance -0.045 (0.011)
Econom. situation 0.44 -0.71 -0.064 -1.114 0.231 -0.307 -0.28
(0.177) (0.188) (0.229) (0.248) (0.243) (0.262) (0.257)
Government satisf. -0.122 -0.012 -1.284 0.028 -1.743 -0.052 -0.742
(0.274) (0.347) (0.323) (0.411) (0.47) (0.248) (0.231)
Table 5.3: Parameter estimates Model 2: Full Turnout (hyp.)
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Chapter 6
Spatial voting with non-separable
preferences
6.1 Multidimensional Spatial Voting with Non-separable
Preferences (with Lukas F. Stoetzer, pub-
lished in Political Analysis 23(3))
Introduction
The spatial model of voting is the work-horse for theories and empirical models
in many ﬁelds of political science research, such as the equilibrium analysis in
mass elections (e.g., Schoﬁeld, 1978; McKelvey, 1986; Calvert, 1985; Lin et al.,
1999), the estimation of legislators ideal points (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal, 1985;
Clinton et al., 2004) and the study of voting behavior (e.g., Kedar, 2005; Dow
and Endersby, 2004; Quinn et al., 1999; Alvarez and Nagler, 1998). Since Downs’
(1957) seminal work, the theory has come a long way. Its generalization to the
multidimensional policy space, the Weighted Euclidean Distance (WED) model
(Davis et al., 1970; Enelow and Hinich, 1984b; Hinich and Munger, 1997) forms the
stable theoretical foundation upon which nearly all present variations, extensions
and applications of multidimensional spatial voting rest.
While all these contributions have advanced spatial theory and methodology, we
argue that an important concept that used to be an integral part of the multi-
dimensional spatial model was somehow lost along the way: the idea that policy
preferences on multiple dimensions may be non-separable. Non-separability means
that utility derived from policy distance on one dimension is dependent on policy
distances on other dimensions. Empirical as well as formal models commonly rely
on additive separable speciﬁcations of the spatial utility function, which preclude
this possibility as utility is only a function of the sum of dimension-speciﬁc policy
distances. In separable speciﬁcations, the dimensions have “nothing to do with
101
CHAPTER 6. NON-SEPARABLE PREFERENCES
each other” (Ordeshook, 1986, 90). In this paper we make the case that we should
not stick to model speciﬁcations that preclude non-separability a priori. “There is
nothing perverse about this preference rule” (Hinich and Munger, 1997, 86), and
there are good reasons why real-world voter utility functions may be non-separable
(Milyo, 2000).
The original mathematical formulation of the WED model explicitly allows for
the possibility of non-separability, which is modeled as the product of dimension-
speciﬁc directed distances (Davis et al., 1970; Enelow and Hinich, 1984b; Hinich
and Munger, 1997). The textbook example for non-separability is a scenario of
committee voting, where committee members vote sequentially on multiple issues
(Hinich and Munger, 1997, 60). Here, preferences on one issue are conditional
on the outcome of voting on another issue, if the two issues are non-separable.
Non-separability has also been studied in similar contexts, such as legislative vot-
ing on multiple issues (Kadane, 1972; Kramer, 1972; Schwartz, 1977), voting in
multiple simultaneous elections or referenda (Brams et al., 1997, 1998; Lacy and
Niou, 2000), voting for multiple candidates (Cox, 1984; Benoit and Kornhauser,
1994; Lacy and Niou, 1998), in models of committee agenda control (Denzau and
Mackay, 1981; Mackay and Weaver, 1981; Enelow and Hinich, 1984b) and EU coun-
cil bargaining, where actors’ spending preferences are conditional on expected pol-
icy outcomes (Finke, 2009; Finke and Fleig, 2013). A major contribution is also
Lacy’s model of survey responses, which explains item instability and question
order eﬀects by the non-separability of the underlying policy preferences (Lacy,
2001a,b).
The concept of non-separability has not yet been applied to the logic of multidi-
mensional spatial voting in mass elections, in which voters choose policy platforms
by evaluating their policy positions on multiple relevant policy dimensions. In the
context of mass elections, non-separability means that a voter’s evaluation of a
platform on one policy dimension is conditional upon the position of this platform
on other policy dimensions. If voters have non-separable utility functions, they no
longer only evaluate platforms by their multidimensional distance from their ideal
point, but also take into consideration how platforms combine directed distances
over dimensions. As we show, these combinations, which we call policy packages,
then have distinctive properties that voters care about. We suggest and provide
evidence that accounting for non-separability might in fact be essential to our un-
derstanding of political choice. As all real-world policy platforms only come as
policy packages, packaging might matter to voters.
Using the generalized Weighted Euclidean Distance model as the starting point,
we discuss the theoretical foundations and implications of non-separability in mass
elections. We show how non-separability can be incorporated and estimated in
standard discrete choice models. In a Monte Carlo experiment we study the
statistical consequences if the separability assumption is violated. We ﬁnd that
separable speciﬁcations then yield biased and/or unreliable estimates. In three
empirical applications to national and presidential elections in the Netherlands,
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the US and Germany we demonstrate that accounting for non-separability can
lead to very diﬀerent conclusions about the substantive role of policy preferences
in explaining voting behavior. Lastly, we discuss how testing for non-separability
should be an essential part of robustness testing in all empirical applications of
multidimensional spatial models.
Non-separability in the Weighted Euclidean Distance Model
The canonical WED model (Davis et al., 1970; Enelow and Hinich, 1984b; Hinich
and Munger, 1997) explicitly allows for non-separable voter utility functions. The
spatial loss function for voter i and policy platforms j in a d-dimensional policy
space is
Uij = −
√
[pj − vi]TA[pj − vi] (6.1)
where v is a coordinate vector of voter ideal point of length d, and p is a co-
ordinate vector of policy platform positions of length d. A is a d × d weighting
matrix.1 Its diagonal entries are weights expressing the importance, or salience,
voters attach to distances on the policy dimensions. Oﬀ-diagonal entries contain
the separability terms. Preferences are separable iﬀ A is a diagonal matrix, i.e.,
all oﬀ-diagonal entries are zero. A is subject to an important constraint: It is a
symmetric positive deﬁnite matrix (Davis et al., 1970, 433).2 Positive deﬁniteness
guarantees that the quadratic form [p−v]TA[p−v] is positive for all pj − vi 6= 0.
The substantive meaning of the symmetric property is that non-separability does
not depend on which dimension is evaluated ﬁrst. Positive non-separability pa-
rameters indicate a substitutional relationship between dimensional preferences,
negative a complementary relationship.
Two directions of non-separability can be distinguished: dimensional preferences
can be substitutes . Negative entries in the oﬀ-diagonals of A are associated with
positive complementarity, and vice versa. This is due to the fact that distance en-
ters utility negatively: If separability parameters are positive, larger distances on
the individual dimensions lead to even higher loss in utility. As this nomenclature
might be confusing at times, we will refer to distances on dimensions as substi-
tutes if they are negative complementary, and complements if they are positive
complementary.
Non-separability has far-reaching consequences for our understanding of spatial
voting. Non-separability “requires that voters consider all issue positions before
choosing any” (Hinich and Munger, 1997, 85). In eﬀect, this means that voters
1A may be individual-specific or, as we assume here, homogeneous in the population. For a
detailed discussion of the homogeneity assumption see Rivers (1988).
2A symmetric matrix is positive definite if all its eigenvalues are positive. A 2 × 2 matrix
is positive definite if the product of the diagonal elements is larger than the product of the
off-diagonal elements.
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to the policy package. Platform 2 simply yields higher utility because it combines
dimensional distances in a way that conforms with the direction of the voter’s
non-separability terms.4
If spatial preferences are non-separable, policy packages hold properties of their
own. All real-world policy platforms only come as policy packages, and packaging,
the way in which policy platforms combine policies, might matter to voters. We
think there is no good reason why it should not. Thus taking non-separability
into account has the potential of oﬀering a more realistic picture of spatial vot-
ing. Whether policy preferences are non-separable is, at this stage, an empirical
question.
A Conditional Logit Model with Non-Separable Preferences
McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit is widely considered an appropriate discrete
choice model to study spatial voting in multi-party systems (Alvarez and Nagler,
1998; Dow and Endersby, 2004).5 Taking the conditional logit as our starting
point, we propose a non-separable speciﬁcation of the systematic component that
follows from the WED model, and account for the positive deﬁnite constraint over
A. Unlike conventional speciﬁcations, which specify A as diagonal, we specify A
to be symmetric and positive deﬁnite.
In the conditional logit, choice probabilities for voters i ∈ (1, . . . , n) choosing
between policy platforms j ∈ (1, . . . , k) take the form
Pij =
eVij∑k
j=1 e
Vij
. (6.3)
Vij is the systematic component of the voter utility function, which we specify
as
Vij = θj +Xiδj −
√
[pj − vi]TA[pj − vi].6 (6.4)
4The consequences of non-separability may also be analyzed as sequential voting over in-
dividual dimensions. Keeping a party’s positions on the economic dimension fixed, the voter
ideal point on the liberal-conservative dimension shifts if preferences are non-separable. The
new conditional ideal point is v∗
2
(p1) is v2 − a12a22 (p1 − v1) (Enelow and Hinich, 1984b). Although
conditional ideal points shift, this does not mean that unconditional voter ideal points are no
longer fixed. Only the context changes. Voters still have an ideal package - their unconditional
ideal point, but “there is no ‘best’ unique issue-by-issue ideal point” (Hinich and Munger, 1997,
61).
5Conditional logit, like multinomial logit, assumes the random error to be independently and
identically distributed Type-1 extreme value. An undesirable feature of conditional logit is its
reliance on the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) (for a detailed discussion see e.g.
Rivers, 1988; Alvarez and Nagler, 1998; Dow and Endersby, 2004). Multinomial probit has been
considered as a solution. Specifying the systematic component in multinomial probit models
as non-separable works the same way. Nevertheless, we opt for conditional logit because of
its continuing popularity and since its computational convenience facilitates our Monte Carlo
experiments.
6δj and θj are choice-specific parameters, while A is assumed to be homogeneous over choices
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θj is a platform-speciﬁc constant that captures non-policy aspects, oftentimes la-
belled party or candidate valence. Xiδj captures the eﬀect of non-spatial individual-
speciﬁc covariates on choice probabilities. The negative square root is the mul-
tidimensional spatial voting part as conceptualized in the WED model. A is a
symmetric positive deﬁnite matrix. To incorporate this constraint in the maxi-
mum likelihood framework, we re-parameterize A as its Cholesky decomposition.
This is a common procedure to solve numerically diﬃcult optimization problems,
such as the estimation of variance-covariance matrices (Pinheiro and Bates, 1996).
A is parameterized as a lower triangular matrix L, with A = LTL.
For a 2× 2 A matrix, L contains three parameters.
L =
[
l1 0
l12 l2
]
(6.5)
A is restored post-estimation after maximizing likelihood with respect toL, θk, δk.7
The consequences of misspecification: A Monte Carlo Exper-
iment
Failing to account for non-separability if it is part of the true data generating
process constitutes a misspeciﬁcation of the functional form of how voter and
party platform positions enter into the utility function. We study the consequences
of misspeciﬁcation using Monte Carlo methods. In order to obtain conservative
estimates and to facilitate interpretation, we opt for a very basic design: Political
choice in a policy space with two equally salient orthogonal policy dimensions.8
In separable speciﬁcations (6.6a), dimension-speciﬁc policy distances enter utility
additively, in the non-separable speciﬁcation (6.6b) they enter utility additively
and multiplicatively .
U(v, p) = −
√
a11[p1 − v1]2 + a22[p2 − v2]2 (6.6a)
U∗(v, p) = −
√
a11[p1 − v1]2 + a22[p2 − v2]2 + 2a12[p1 − v1][p2 − v2]. (6.6b)
If the data generating process follows (6.6b), a conventional model (6.6a) is
misspeciﬁed. Misspeciﬁcation in choice models can result in biases that are anal-
and individuals.
7The likelihood function is given by the product over all realized probabilities. In order to iden-
tify this model, θk and δk are set to zero, for a baseline platform j = k. We use Broyden-Fletcher-
Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) iterative numerical algorithm to maximize log-likelihood directly, using
R’s optim() function. In order to assure convergence on global maxima, maximization is repeated
multiple times using randomly drawn starting values.
8There is no indication that the implications of our findings do not apply to higher-dimensional
spaces as well. We suspect that the consequences of misspecification may become more pro-
nounced as the number of dimensions increases and with larger differences in dimensional salience
weights.
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ogous to omitting important variables (Signorino and Yilmaz, 2003). Omitting
non-separability terms when non-separability is present has the potential of lead-
ing to biased estimates of the salience parameters a11 and a22, which express the
importance of policy dimensions in the voters’ choice calculus - the parameters of
interest.
Under which circumstances are conventional estimates biased, in which direction
and how severely? We show that the magnitude and direction of bias depends on
the magnitude and direction of the non-separability parameter, and the distribu-
tion of platform positions in the policy space, relative to the distribution of voter
ideal points. In order to test our intuition, we analyze the conditions under which
the two expressions are not equivalent in expectation, i.e., E[U(v, p)] 6= E[U∗(v, p)].
If non-separability plays a role in the true data generating process (a12 6= 0), the
expressions are equivalent if E([p1 − v1][p2 − v2]) = 0. Without loss of general-
ity, assume E(vi1) = E(vi2) = 0, which would be for example the case if voter
ideal points are distributed independently multi-variate normal around the origin
of a Cartesian coordinate system.9 At this point, let us recall the properties of
the variables v and p. While voter ideal points vary between voters, platform
positions are ﬁxed in a given sample. With E(v) at [0, 0], E([p1 − v1][p2 − v2])
can become either negative or positive, depending on p’s position relative to [0, 0].
If a12 > 0, the multiplicative non-separability term is positive if the platform is
in quadrant I or III, negative in quadrant II and IV, and vice versa if a12 < 0.
The omitted term can therefore enter utility positively or negatively. As voters
choose between multiple platforms, one has to consider the direction the omitted
term has in expectation, over all platforms in the choice set. This is determined
by the directed distance of platform positions relative to the expected voter ideal
point. If platforms are positioned in a systematic way in the policy space rela-
tive to the expected voter ideal point, utility derived from policy distances under
non-separability and separability rule is systematically diﬀerent, if a12 6= 0. The
pattern of platform positions can be summarized by their correlation coeﬃcient on
the two dimensions. A positive correlation would indicate that positions along the
ﬁrst angle bisector of the Cartesian coordinate system are more likely, and negative
along the second angle bisector. If platform positions are uncorrelated, positive
and negative omitted terms cancel each other out in expectation. While conven-
tional estimates would still be unbiased in expectation, one should expect that
non-separability in this case increases the variance of the sampling distribution.
This rather intuitive analysis of the implications of violating the separability
assumption motivates our design of a Monte Carlo experiment.10 We study the
9Voter ideal points are also assumed to be uncorrelated over dimensions and platform positions
on one dimension are independent of voter ideal points on the second dimension.
10An analytical solution is not easily tractable for the outlined choice model. Studies that are
concerned with specification in choice models find omitted variable bias to be a more challenging
problem than in the linear case (Yatchew and Griliches, 1985; Wooldridge, 2002). In probit
models the estimates of a coefficient are generally biased downwards even if omitted variables
107
CHAPTER 6. NON-SEPARABLE PREFERENCES
consequences of violating the separability assumption for the unbiasedness and
sampling variance of the parameters of interest, the dimension-speciﬁc saliences,
in three scenarios in which we vary the distribution of platforms in the policy
space. In the ﬁrst scenario, platform positions on the two dimensions are cor-
related. In the second scenario, platform positions on the two dimensions are
uncorrelated, meaning that platforms are scattered unsystematically in the policy
space. Platform positions are again heavily correlated in our third scenario, this
time however negatively. For each of these three scenarios we draw 1000 voter
ideal points and four party positions. Platform positions are drawn from a bi-
variate normal with variance terms of 0.5 and scenario-speciﬁc covariance terms.11
Voter ideal points are drawn from a bivariate standard normal distribution. Voters
choose between platforms according to the non-separable speciﬁcation (Eq. 6.6b),
assuming constant equal weights to both dimensions (a11 = a22 = 1) and varying
degrees of separability. For each scenario, we vary the separability parameter a12
in 11 steps over the interval that meets the positive-deﬁnite constraint, [−1, 1].
500 random samples for each combination of platform scenario and value of the
non-separability parameter are drawn. For each of the resulting 16,500 unique
datasets, we estimate a conventionally-speciﬁed separable (Eq. 6.6a) as well as a
fully-speciﬁed non-separable model (Eq. 6.6b).
For each speciﬁc subscenario, we approximate the sampling distribution of the
salience parameters by their empirical distribution in the 500 Monte Carlo samples.
As we expect misspeciﬁcation to render salience estimates inconsistent and/or in-
eﬃcient, we report both the mean and 90% range of the bias in salience parameter
estimates (Figure 6.2). The upper horizontal panel displays the additive separa-
ble model estimates, the lower horizontal panel the estimates obtained from the
non-separable model. Vertical panels indicate the three main scenarios, in which
platform positions were either correlated, not correlated, or negatively correlated.
The upper horizontal panel shows that the misspeciﬁed model yields either biased
and/or more unreliable estimates depending on the distribution of policy platforms
in the policy space. If platform positions are positively correlated, and dimensional
distances are complements (a12 < 0), the misspeciﬁed models underestimates the
salience of both dimensions. If dimensions are substitutes (a12 > 0), their salience
is considerably overestimated. The bias is not negligible: Even with moderately
negative non-separability (a12 = −0.6), the salience parameters (a11 and a22) are
estimated at only around 50% of their true value, and are inﬂated by around 80%
are not correlated with other variables (Cramer, 2005). However, results from binary probit
models do not straightforwardly carry over to unordered choice models. Lee (1980) explicitly
studies omitted variable biases in the multinomial-logit context. His results of direction and
strength of the bias are restricted to the case where omitted variables can be expressed as a
linear function of other covariates with normal error. This is not the case here, since the omitted
non-separability term can be expressed as a function of the distance terms. Moreover, the omitted
variable bias is more complicated for the conditional logit model compared to the multinomial
logit model.
11Correlations are set to .8, 0, and negative .8 respectively.
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(1) Positively correlated platform pos. (2) Uncorrelated platform pos. (3) Negatively correlated platform pos.
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Figure 6.2: Monte Carlo Experiment: Bias in salience parameter estimates due to
omitted non-separability. True salience parameters are both set at 1. Dots indicate
mean estimates of salience parameters a11 (dark gray) and a22(light gray). Vertical
bars depict the 90% range of all estimates from Monte Carlo samples. (1) Platform
positions randomly drawn from bivariate normal with positive covariance terms
(ρ = .8), (2) Platform positions randomly drawn from bivariate normal with zero
covariance terms (ρ = 0), (3) Platform positions randomly drawn from bivariate
normal with negative covariance terms (ρ = −.8). Voter ideal points are drawn
from a bivariate standard normal distribution. The non-separability parameter
a12 is consistently estimated by the fully-speciﬁed model in all scenarios.
in the presence of moderately positive non-separability parameters (0.6). In case
platform positions are negatively correlated, the direction of the bias is reversed,
and positive non-separability parameters lead to a downward bias and negative
to an upward bias. There is no theoretical bias if platform positions are uncorre-
lated, for all values of non-separability. However, the sampling variance increases
considerably, as non-separability increases. This renders conventional estimates
unreliable. As the lower horizontal panel indicates, a fully-speciﬁed model reliably
recovers the true salience parameters in all scenarios.12. The non-separability pa-
rameter a12 is consistently estimated in all scenarios by the fully-speciﬁed model
12For a comparison of Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) and correctly predicted cases see the
Supplementary Materials, which are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/VCSRMX.
109
CHAPTER 6. NON-SEPARABLE PREFERENCES
(see Supplementary Materials)
The message of our Monte Carlo experiment is clear: In the presence of non-
separability, the statistical properties of a non-separable model are preferable to
conventional, separable speciﬁcations. Dependent on party positions, a separable
salience estimator is inconsistent and/or ineﬃcient. The size and direction of the
bias is dependent on the relative distribution of voters and policy platforms in the
policy space. Even in a most basic case of two equally salient dimensions we ﬁnd
that bias can become severe and is not easily tractable. Given real-world data, it is
therefore hardly ever apparent whether conventional models will run into problems
and if they do, how severe these are.
In light of these insights, it is advisable to test the robustness of conventional
models to potentially omitted non-separability. To demonstrate that non-separability
is relevant not only in highly stylized Monte Carlo experiments but in explaining
empirical phenomena, we proceed to three empirical applications in which we com-
pare estimates obtained by separable and non-separable speciﬁcations.
Empirical Applications
Empirical studies of spatial voting in mass elections ultimately rely on estimates of
voter ideal points and party platform positions. Voter ideal points are commonly
inferred from voter surveys, which ask respondents to locate themselves on various
policy or issue scales. Platform positions are inferred from either where respon-
dents place policy platforms on these policy scales, or from outside sources such as
expert surveys, roll call votes or analyses of platform manifestos. Over the years,
a multitude of approaches has developed, each addressing some of the diﬃculties
of estimating reliable ideal point and platform position estimates (e.g. Aldrich and
McKelvey, 1977; Poole and Rosenthal, 1985; Kedar, 2005; Bartels, 2006; Jessee,
2009; Lo et al., 2013).
For our purposes we deem factor-analytic techniques which have been employed
by Quinn et al. (1999), Schoﬁeld et al. (1998) and Schoﬁeld and Zakharov (2009)
as most appropriate. Using expert and voter survey responses on multiple con-
crete issue scales, this approach allows for the placement of voters and platforms
in a common multidimensional Euclidean policy space.13 In eﬀect, factor analytic
methods approximate the structure of the policy space by analyzing the structure
of voter survey responses. Policy dimensions are not deﬁned a priori, but are rather
uncovered using empirical data. The procedure can be described as follows: First,
survey responses on a number of issue items are used to estimate an explanatory
factor model. In these issue items respondents are asked to what degree they
agree or disagree with speciﬁc policy statements, such as “Politics should abstain
from intervening in the economy.”. From the factor analytic solution, the num-
13We closely follow the procedure outlined in Quinn et al. (1999), we kindly ask the reader to
refer to this article for details.
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ber of underlying dimensions is determined that suﬃciently describes the policy
space. In all cases, we ﬁnd a two-factor model to be most appropriate. We identify
the ﬁrst factor as an “economic left-right” dimension, and the second as capturing
socio-cultural preferences, which we label as the “liberal-conservative” dimension.14
Secondly, we conduct a two-factor conﬁrmatory factor analysis (CFA) with uncor-
related factors. Using the CFA factor loadings we locate respondents in the policy
space. In the third step policy platforms are projected into the same space, using
the factor loading from the voter CFA. In two of our applications, positions of
policy platforms on these issue items were not available. Here scales in expert
surveys are identiﬁed that thematically match the policy scales of survey items as
closely as possible. This necessarily involves a substantial degree of discretion, as
survey items and expert scales are not identical (see Supplementary Materials).
We apply this method to three diﬀerent empirical applications. The ﬁrst uses the
Euro-Barometer 11 dataset (Commission of the European Communities, 2012) on
vote intention in 1979 in the Netherlands employed by Quinn et al. (1999).15 The
second application is concerned with voting in the 2008 US presidential election.
Voter data is from the 10th wave of the American National Election Panel Study
2008-2009 (American National Election Studies, 2009), in which respondents were
asked a battery of eight policy issue questions ranging from immigration to health
care to taxation. Respondents were asked to locate themselves and the Democratic
and Republican candidate on each of these 7-point scales, ranging from “strongly
opposed” to “strongly in favor.” After projecting both voter and candidate place-
ments into the policy space, we average over the candidate positions to obtain a
robust measure of candidate positions. The third application analyzes vote in-
tention in the 2009 German federal election. Voter data is from the European
Election Survey 2009 (EES) (van Egmond et al., 2013), which includes seven is-
sue scales capturing attitudes towards immigration, extent of public services, state
intervention in the economy, redistribution of wealth, criminal punishment and ho-
mosexuality. In order to locate party platforms on these scales, we identify seven
issue scales in the Chapel-Hill Expert Survey 2011 (CHES) that match the EES
scales. For a more detailed description of the question wording, highest density
plot and factor loadings, see the Supplementary Materials.
14While this finding is hardly controversial for the Netherlands and Germany, where the two-
dimensionality of the policy space is well established (see e.g. Benoit and Laver, 2006; Schofield
et al., 1998), it may raise some eyebrows in the US application. Here the working consensus
seems to be that inter-party political conflict is virtually unidimensional (McCarty et al., 2006;
Poole and Rosenthal, 2007; Aldrich et al., 2014). However, unidimensionality of political conflict
among political elites does not imply that voter policy preferences are unidimensional as well.
Work on the structure of political ideology among Americans finds, very much in line with our
findings, that voter preferences are structured by an economic and a social policy dimension
(Shafer and Claggett, 1995; Treier and Hillygus, 2009; Klar, 2014).
15Replication data is well-documented and available online at http://adm.wustl.edu/
replication.php. The model estimated in the original article however does not allow, unlike our
WED model, for dimension-specific weights. Our results are therefore not readily comparable.
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In accordance with standard model speciﬁcations (see e.g. Dow and Endersby,
2004; Kedar, 2005; Quinn et al., 1999), we include individual-speciﬁc control vari-
ables such as gender, age, education, religion, income or party identiﬁcation. For
each application we specify two vote choice models: a normal WED model that al-
lows for dimension-speciﬁc weights, but assumes separability, and a non-separable
WED model that allows for non-separability. We estimate the two models accord-
ing to the conditional logit speciﬁcation outlined above.
Results
Table 6.1 compares the spatial parameter estimates obtained from the separa-
ble and non-separable model speciﬁcations. We report estimated saliences of dis-
tances on the economic left-right dimension and on the liberal-conservative dimen-
sion, and the estimated separability parameter for the non-separable models.16 As
salience parameters are constrained to be positive, 95% conﬁdence intervals are
used to quantify estimation uncertainty.17 How severe non-separability is in an
estimated A matrix is not immediately obvious. We therefore report an intuitive
measure of the degree of non-separability, that suﬃciently summarizes both the
direction and the degree of non-separability in two-dimensional policy spaces. This
measure utilizes the positive-deﬁnite constraint to scale the separability parame-
ter to the interval [−1, 1], where −1 indicates perfect complements, and 1 perfect
substitutes.18
Does modeling non-separability make a diﬀerence in the three applications we
present here? If it does not, both model speciﬁcations should yield similar salience
estimates. Salience estimates should not only have about the same magnitude,
but should also not vary in their relative magnitude. Model ﬁt is a second cri-
terion. If non-separability is not an issue, the non-separable model should not
exhibit a better model ﬁt. As the models are nested, Likelihood Ratio tests are
appropriate, which we report in the last row of Table 6.1. We also report ex-
pected Percentage Correctly Predicted (ePCP) (Herron, 1999) as an additional
measure of predictive ﬁt. In the ﬁrst application, concerned with vote intention
in 1979 in the Netherlands, the separable model suggests that only distances on
the economical left-right dimension are relevant for vote choice. The coeﬃcient of
the second, liberal-conservative dimension is virtually zero, from which we would
16The paramter estimates of the individual-specific control variables are reported in the Sup-
plementary Materials.
17Confidence intervals may be non-symmetrical due to the constraint induced by the Cholesky
decomposition. The separability parameter is not subject to the positive constraint, is however
constrained by the positive-definiteness of the A matrix.
18As A is a symmetric positive definite 2 × 2 matrix, the condition a11 · a22 − a212 ≥ 0 holds.
By rearranging we see that a12 is bounded between ±√a11 · a22. Therefore a12√a11·a22 is bounded
between [−1, 1]. In order to convey the estimation uncertainty associated with the measure,
we approximate 95% confidence intervals by calculating the degree of separability for repeated
draws from the sampling distribution of L.
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Table 6.1: Empirical applications: Parameter estimates
DV: Vote choice Netherlands 1979 United States 2008 Germany 2009
Sep. Non-sep. Sep. Non-sep. Sep. Non-sep.
Economic Left-Right (a11) 0.73 0.92 0.81 0.44 0.8 0.74
(0.43; 1.15) (0.56; 1.38) (0.42; 1.35) (0.21; 1.07) (0.38; 1.35) (0.35; 1.46)
Liberal-Conservative (a22) 0 0.38 1.77 0.98 0.14 0.18
(0; 0.2) (0.19; 0.63) (1.13; 2.56) (0.43; 1.79) (0.02; 0.41) (0.04; 0.44)
Separability term (a12) 0 0.59 0 0.44 0 0.17
. (0.33; 0.93) . (0.19; 0.64) . (0.02; 0.38)
Degree of Separability 0 1 0 0.67 0 0.49
. (0.99; 1) . (0.19; 1) . (0.06; 0.85)
Number of Observations 529 529 1133 1133 619 619
ePCP 0.49 0.5 0.75 0.76 0.6 0.6
logLikelihood −498 −483.5 −514.1 −510.9 −512.6 −510.6
Likelihood Ratio Test 6.7e-08 1.1e-02 0.04
Note: Table reports point estimates and 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
conclude that policy distance on this dimension is not associated with vote choice
probabilities. This interpretation changes when we run a model that accounts for
non-separability. Here we ﬁnd distances on the second dimension to play a still
subordinate, but noticeable role in explaining vote choices. The separability pa-
rameter estimate is signiﬁcantly larger than zero. As the measure of the degree
of separability indicates, policy distances on the two dimensions are estimated to
be perfect substitutes. The Likelihood Ratio test indicates that the non-separable
model ﬁts the data considerably better. ePCP reveals a small increase in predic-
tive accuracy when comparing the two models. In the application to voting in
the US presidential election 2008, the separable model suggests that policy dis-
tance on the socio-cultural liberal-conservative dimension is more important to
voters than distance on the economic dimension (95% C.I. for the diﬀerence in
a11 and a22: [−1.69, −0.37]). In contrast, the diﬀerence in coeﬃcients becomes
indistinguishable from zero in the non-separable model (95% C.I. [−1.07, 0.09]),
indicating that policy distances on both dimensions play an equally important role
in the vote choice mechanism. Again, the separability term is signiﬁcantly larger
than zero, as policy distances on the two dimensions are estimated to be partial
substitutes. The degree to which preferences are substitutes is associated with
substantial estimation uncertainty [(0.19, 1]. The Likelihood Ratio test indicates
that the non-separable model ﬁts the data better, ePCP shows a small increase in
predictive accuracy. In the German case, non-separability seems to be less of an
issue. Salience estimates are relatively robust to changes in the speciﬁcation of the
spatial model. The separability term has again a positive sign, but is only barely
distinguishable from zero. The non-separable model ﬁts the data only slightly
better.
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the positions policy platforms take on multiple dimensions. They rather care
about the policy packages that platforms oﬀer. If the way in which platforms
combine positions matters to voters, we need to allow for non-separability in our
models. We present a consistent way of including non-separability in vote choice
models. We ﬁnd that failing to allow for non-separability can seriously under-
mine the validity of empirical tests of spatial theory. Our Monte Carlo experi-
ments show that conventional salience estimates are biased and/or unreliable in
the presence of non-separability. The magnitude and direction of bias depends
on a non-trivial interaction between the degree and direction of non-separability
and the distribution of policy platforms relative to voter ideal points in the policy
space. If faced with real-world data, it is therefore not apparent whether omitted
non-separability might be problematic in a statistical sense. Even more so when
voter preferences are not limited to a low number of latent policy dimensions,
but are deﬁned over a high-dimensional issue space, where we might reasonably
suspect non-separability to be the rule rather than the exception. Thus, to be
on the safe side, careful researchers should test the robustness of obtained esti-
mates with non-separable model speciﬁcations. Researchers who want to rely on
linear predictor functions ﬁt for out-of-the-can statistical programs can accommo-
date for non-separability by adding the products of all combinations of directed
dimension-speciﬁc distances to the systematic component. In a two-dimensional
policy space and using squared Euclidean metric, voter utility can be speciﬁed as
Uij = β1(pj1 − vi1)2 + β2(pj2 − vi2)2 + β3(pj1 − vi1) × (pj2 − vi2). β3 then can be
interpreted as the non-separability parameter. If βˆ3 is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero, non-separability is an issue.
On a more positive note, addressing the issue of non-separability can help reduce
bias and/or increase the precision of spatial estimates. Our ﬁndings are therefore
potentially relevant for all empirical applications of multidimensional spatial voting
models that base their inferences on spatial salience estimates. Most prominently
in studies of voting behavior that compare the importance voters assign to various
issues or dimensions, such as the question whether economic issues trump “moral”
issues or vice-versa in U.S. presidential elections (Bartels, 2006; Gelman, 2008),
how party system compactness relates to relative issue importance (Alvarez and
Nagler, 2004), or which role attitudes towards Europe play in explaining electoral
behavior in European elections, relative to left-right preferences (de Vries et al.,
2011; Hobolt et al., 2009; Lo et al., 2013). Here, the validity of spatial estimates,
and the conclusion that one dimension is relevant, not relevant, or more relevant
for political choice than other dimensions may depend on whether voter utility
functions are speciﬁed as separable or non-separable.
Apart from being a safeguard against statistical pitfalls, caring about non-
separability opens up new interesting perspectives on the structure of voter pref-
erences in the multidimensional policy space. Analogous to a resource or budget
constraint (Milyo, 2000), non-separability in mass elections can be imagined as an
ideological constraint (Converse, 1964). The constraint determines which policy
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packages are more attractive to voters. In all of our empirical applications we
ﬁnd a substitutional relationship between economic and social policy preferences.
Such a relationship would indicate that the two policy dimensions share at least
to some degree the same function and fulﬁll the same voter needs. If preferences
are perfect substitutes, it becomes hard to argue that voters really care about
individual policy dimensions. Although voters have well-deﬁned preferences on
these policy dimensions, what they really care about when choosing representa-
tives is a lower-dimensional concept such as a single ideological dimension. In
such a case, non-separability leads to a reduction in the eﬀective dimensionality
of the policy space, linking multidimensional mass preferences to unidimensional
inter-party competition at the elite level.
Non-separability therefore not only informs the study of voting behavior but
also the formal analysis of party competition. How do equilibrium conﬁgurations
change if parties maneuver in a multidimensional policy space with non-separable
voter preferences (Merrill III and Adams, 2001; Schoﬁeld and Sened, 2005), and
can non-separability explain the empirical phenomenon that in many countries
parties align along a single axis of competition even though the policy space is two-
dimensional (Shikano, 2008)? Non-separability can also be brought to bear on the
empirical question whether political polarization in the US has increased in recent
decades (Fiorina et al., 2008; Levendusky, 2009; Aldrich et al., 2014). Polarization
may express itself not only in changes in voter preferences, issue partisanship, or
issue alignment, but also in increasing non-separability of voter utility functions.
The implications of non-separability are multifaceted. Additional research is
required to deepen our understanding of non-separability, and to thereby deepen
our understanding of spatial voting in multidimensional spaces. To be sure, we
do not suggest that multidimensional representations of voter preferences are gen-
erally preferable to one-dimensional representations. But we argue that if em-
pirical researchers opt for multidimensional spatial representations, the potential
non-separability of spatial preferences needs to be addressed. We hope that the
ﬁndings and methods presented in this paper can serve as a guideline for future
research to bring non-separability back into the fold of spatial theory.
6.2 Testing for non-separability of Left-Right and
EU preferences
In Stoetzer and Zittlau (2015), we argue that non-separability should be treated as
an integral part of the spatial model whenever the policy space is multidimensional.
We also show that omitted non-separability may have detrimental statistical con-
sequences for the integrity of dimensional weight estimates. Clearly, these insights
are pressingly relevant for the investigation of relative dimensional weights of the
EU dimension that I presented in Chapter 5. Accordingly, this section replicates
the analysis using the analytical toolkit that we developed in Stoetzer and Zitt-
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lau (2015). The re-analysis serves two purposes: Firstly, it tests the robustness
of the results to potential violations of the separability assumption. Secondly, it
answers the substantively interesting question whether Left-Right and EU integra-
tion preferences are separable or non-separable. The study of non-separability of
preferences in the European policy space is novel in its own right, and updates the
EU issue voting model to the latest developments in the spatial voting literature.
As described in the Conclusion section of Stoetzer and Zittlau (2015), includ-
ing non-separability in standard estimators of spatial voting models is relatively
straightforward. If the distance metric is squared Euclidean, (symmetric) non-
separability is captured by simply including the product of directed distances as
an additional independent variable. Additionally, the positive-deﬁnite constraint
on the A matrix can be dropped to simplify estimation further. As the proposed
modiﬁcation concerns the linear predictor function, this strategy is not only vi-
able for the MNL model as used in our article, but applies to PML as well. My
non-separability estimator therefore diﬀers only slightly from the the setup I have
developed in the previous Chapter. I only change the linear predictor function for
the spatial component to βeut(peujt − veuit)2 + βlrt(plrjt − vlrit)2 + βnonsept(peujt −
veuit) × (plrjt − vlrit). This means that three additional parameters are estimated
(βnonsept), which express the direction and magnitude of the non-separability in
the election-speciﬁc spatial voting calculus of respondents.
Election Dimension Observed Choice Full Turnout (hyp.)
β s.e. β s.e.
State EU -0.002 (0.011) 0.003 (0.008)
LR -0.03∗ (0.014) -0.03∗ (0.011)
nonsep -0.022 (0.017) -0.019 (0.014)
Federal EU -0.005 (0.01) -0.012 (0.008)
LR -0.016 (0.013) -0.032∗ (0.01)
nonsep -0.011 (0.016) -0.002 (0.013)
EP EU -0.04∗ (0.011) -0.035∗ (0.009)
LR -0.045∗ (0.014) -0.049∗ (0.011)
nonsep -0.016 (0.017) -0.014 (0.014)
Note: Table reports point estimates and standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ : p < .05
Table 6.2: Non-separability model: Spatial parameter estimates
Taking a ﬁrst cursory look on Table 6.2 that presents the spatial parameter
estimates, one can see that the substantive ﬁndings remain largely the same. While
only the weight of Left-Right distances is distinguishable from zero in the State and
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Federal election (with the exception of LR in the Federal election on the Observed
Choice data set), distances on the EU dimension do seem to play a role in the EP
election as well. Investigating the additional non-separability parameter estimates,
one can see that these are indistinguishable from zero in all elections. This means
the null hypothesis that Left-Right and EU preferences are separable can not be
rejected on the basis of my data.
If one would take the point estimates literally, the negative sign of the non-
separability indicates that preferences on the two dimensions act as substitutes
rather than as complement. If distances point in the same directions, e.g., a party
is more rightist and more pro-EU that the voter, the utility of voting for said
party is more negative compared to an equally distant party that is located in
the direction more right/anti-EU or left/pro-EU. Putting it the other way around,
voters are more forgiving to parties that align along the left/pro-EU and right/anti-
EU diagonal, as seen from the voter’s ideal point. This can also be seen in Figure
6.2 that depicts the estimated shape of the spatial utility indiﬀerence contours. In
the State and Federal election, the utility indiﬀerence ellipsoid practically collapses
into a line along which parties more or less yield the same utility. As a result, the
policy space becomes one-dimensional, orthogonal to the utility indiﬀerence “line”.
The line is close to orthogonal to the Left-Right dimension in the State election,
which means that voters are almost exclusively concerned with distances on the
Left-Right dimension when they make up their mind for whom the vote for. In the
Federal election, the line is more tilted, indicating the European integration aspects
may play a small role, but are largely considered to be functionally equivalent to
Left-Right aspects by voters. While the voter utility function is largely consistent
with a uni-dimensional Left-Right policy space in the State and Federal election,
the policy space clearly become more two-dimensional and mostly separable in
the EP election, indicated by the almost circular utility indiﬀerence contours.
European integration aspects seems to be evaluated in their own right, and become
consequential for vote choice.
Although the analysis of the shape of utility function gives interesting insights
into the conﬁguration of the European policy space, they have to be taken with
a grain of salt. These are merely point estimates - there is large uncertainty
about the non-separability parameter. Indeed there is barely any evidence for
non-separability of Left-Right and EU preferences. This is good news for students
of European voting behavior, and in fact for this dissertation. Describing the rele-
vant policy space for voters in EP elections as consisting of a separable Left-Right
and EU dimension is most likely accurate. Also the analysis has revealed that
the ﬁndings of the previous chapter are robust to a lifting of the separability as-
sumption. A very similar picture arises: While spatial voting in State and Federal
elections is dominantly structured by Left-Right preferences, EU preferences seem
to become more important in EP elections. However, the ﬁndings do not sug-
gest that EU preferences play a dominant role. Nevertheless, these patterns are
consistent with the predictions of the recalibration hypothesis that sees voters as
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Chapter 7
EU integration preferences and vote
switching in EP elections
7.1 Introduction
The question why some voters vote for diﬀerent parties in European Parliamentary
(EP) elections than in ﬁrst-order elections (FOE) has been at the core of the
literature on European multi-level democracy since the ﬁrst EP election in 1979.
The traditional and dominant theoretical lens through which scholars, media and
political actors alike view and interpret EP elections, the second-order elections
model (Reif and Schmitt, 1980) argues that the key factor that explains why voters
vote for diﬀerent parties is that there is simply “less at stake” in EP elections.
Second-order theory speciﬁcally precludes the possibility that voters switch their
vote to a diﬀerent party because they perceive that there are diﬀerent issues at
stake in EP elections, on which other parties may better represent the voter.
Instead, voters are thought to simply “apply their evaluations of national-level
phenomena to the EU level”, which has been labeled “the transfer hypothesis”
(Clark and Rohrschneider, 2009, 645). Opposition to this interpretation has been
voiced in the form of the Europe Matters argument. Several contributions have
argued that due to the increasing powers of the European Parliament, EP elections
have become more important and more European after all (e.g., Hobolt et al.,
2009; Hobolt and Wittrock, 2011; de Vries et al., 2011). The key proposition of this
alternative strand of research is that voters vote for diﬀerent parties in EP elections
because they perceive the election to be about diﬀerent issues. Particularly, voters
recalibrate their issue space by putting a larger emphasis on European issues when
they decide whom to vote for in EP elections. In Chapter 5 and 6, this dissertation
has presented empirical evidence that voters indeed recalibrate their issue priorities
between FOE and EP elections. However, these chapters have remained mostly
quiet about the political consequences of this recalibration. An important research
question therefore remains to be answered in the context of this dissertation: To
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what extent do preferences on European issues motivate vote switching in EP
elections?
As has been discussed in Chapter 3, previous studies of vote switching in EP
elections have faced major theoretical and methodological shortcomings. I have
argued that previous studies developed their hypotheses based on an incomplete
spatial model. Common practice is to collapse diﬀerent vote choices across FOE
and EP elections into a binary variable, and then to establish to which degree policy
disagreement on European issues with the party chosen in the FOE explains this
variable. I ﬁnd that this practice misses a fundamental point about the process of
voting in two successive elections. For each voter, there is a party of origin, the
party chosen in the FOE, and a party of destination, the party chosen in the EP
election. If the party of origin is not the same as the party of origin, the voting
behavior can be qualiﬁed as vote switching. Modeling vote switching as a binary
variable however means loosing the ability to take characteristics of both the party
of origin and destination into account. This is necessarily required if one argues
based on a spatial model of voting in multi-party systems. In the spatial model,
the characteristics of the party of destination, and in fact the characteristics of all
possible parties of destination, matter for vote switching.
This chapter proposes an alternative way to study vote switching. I argue that
vote switching is best represented as a Markov process, where the transition prob-
abilities, the probability of a change from one state to a second state are expressed
as a function of policy preferences. This allows for modeling vote switching proba-
bilities in line with spatial theory - conditional of the policy positions of all possible
parties of destination. I propose a multinomial transition model to estimate the
impact of policy distances on a Left-Right and EU integration dimension on tran-
sition probabilities. Based on the estimates, I investigate the consequences of
policy disagreement on European issues for vote switching in EP elections using
simulation techniques.
7.2 Descriptive Analysis
Given vote choice data, a frequency cross-table of vote choices in the Federal and
EP election summarizes the observed voting sequences. Table 7.1 presents the
(post-election) reported vote choices in my data. Vote choices in the previous
Federal election are arranged horizontally, and EP election vote choices vertically.
The frequencies on the diagonal of the table signify the loyal voters that stayed
with the party they voted for in the ﬁrst election, oﬀ-diagonal entries are inter-
party movements signifying vote switching behavior. First of all, one can see that
the amount of vote switching in the data is substantial. Roughly one third of
the voters that participated in both elections voted for a diﬀerent party in the
EP election. At this point, binary switching models collapse the frequency table
into a binary variable: All observations on the diagonal are coded as partisans,
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all observations on the oﬀ-diagonals are coded as switchers. Obviously this means
a drastic loss of information. Information is lost because all parties of origin and
destination are eﬀectively treated alike.
Federal election party vote
EP vote AfD CSU FDP Free V. Greens Left Pirates SPD
AfD 92 41 10 4 5 12 1 24 189
CSU 10 485 35 8 5 7 6 20 576
FDP 2 15 22 3 0 0 0 3 45
Free Voters 7 28 2 29 4 1 2 19 92
Greens 1 35 5 5 85 5 5 35 176
Left 1 6 0 2 2 27 0 19 57
Pirates 4 1 1 0 1 0 11 4 22
SPD 6 61 8 4 25 13 2 204 323
123 672 83 55 127 65 27 328 1, 480
Table 7.1: MEDW Bavaria panel: Vote choice frequency table
Instead, I propose to investigate the transitions not as binary (switch vs no
switch), but as a transition process from a party of origin to a party of destination.
If the party of destination is not the same as the party of origin, a transition can be
classiﬁed as a switch. Such a sequence of choices constitutes a ﬁrst-order Markov
process. First-order Markov transition probabilities, the probability of voting for
party x in election 2 conditional on having voted for party y in election 1, can
be estimated from this frequency table. The maximum likelihood estimate of the
transition probability is the sample conditional probability that a vote for party x
will follow a vote for party y (Anderson and Goodman, 1957). Therefore, transition
probabilities are simply the column percentages of Table 7.1, the resulting Table 7.2
is the transition matrix collecting all transition probabilities. E.g., the probability
of voting for the AfD in the EP election, conditional on having voted AfD in the
previous Federal election is .75 etc.
Federal election party vote
EP vote AfD CSU FDP Free V. Greens Left Pirates SPD
AfD 0.75 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.18 0.04 0.07
CSU 0.08 0.72 0.42 0.15 0.04 0.11 0.22 0.06
FDP 0.02 0.02 0.27 0.05 0 0 0 0.01
Free Voters 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.53 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.06
Greens 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.67 0.08 0.19 0.11
Left 0.01 0.01 0 0.04 0.02 0.42 0 0.06
Pirates 0.03 0.001 0.01 0 0.01 0 0.41 0.01
SPD 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.20 0.20 0.07 0.62
Table 7.2: MEDW Bavaria panel: Sample Transition matrix
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From the sample transition matrix one can already see some notable patterns in
the data. First of all, parties diﬀered substantially in their ability to retain former
voters in the EP election. Retention rates are the entries on the diagonal of the
transition matrix, the switching rate is obviously one minus the retention rate.
AfD and CSU have the highest retention rates (.75 and .72), followed by Greens
and SPD (.67 and .62). The very low retention rate of the FDP (.27) requires
speciﬁc attention. First of all, it reﬂects the breakdown of the FDP’s electoral
support after loosing parliamentary representation after the 2013 Federal election.
An additional plausible explanation is that a substantial part of the FDP votes
in the Federal election were rental votes from CSU supporters (Gschwend et al.,
2016), who returned to their party in the EP election.
However, one is usually not interested in the sample transition matrix itself.
What I am interested in is the transition matrix conditional on voter characteris-
tics, such as the EU integration preferences of voters. One simple way of doing this
is to investigate the sample transition matrices for subsets of voters with diﬀerent
levels of EU integration support. In eﬀect, I calculate the transition matrices for
subsets of the sample, each subset containing only voters with similar EU policy
preferences. As described in Chapter 3, I use the EU integration self-placement on
a 11-pt scale. Figure 7.1 graphically displays the transition probabilities of voting
for a diﬀerent party, the switching rate, for selected parties, conditional on the
respondents’ self-placement on the EU integration scale. I omit smaller parties as
the low number of respondents that voted for these parties make a sensible inter-
pretation of transition probabilities in the subsets impossible. Furthermore, I also
omit all frequency matrix cells with less than ﬁve observations. Mean perceived
party positions on the EU integration dimension are signiﬁed by the dashed verti-
cal lines. Point sizes and ﬁt weights are proportional to the number of respondents
in the respective cell of the subsetted frequency matrix.
The observed switching rates of the parties under investigation vary substan-
tially, dependent on the EU integration preferences of the voters. Switching rates
for the anti-EU party AfD (EU integration position: 1.5) seem to increase for
former AfD voters that hold more pro-EU positions than the party. The most
loyal AfD voters, with a switching rate of only around 10 percent, are those that
hold more extreme anti-EU preferences than the mean perceived party position.
Former CSU voters seem to be most loyal when they hold centrist positions, which
conforms with the centrist CSU position on EU integration (5). Former CSU vot-
ers that hold more pro-EU integration positions than their party have an only
slightly higher chance to switch. Observed switching rates increase more steeply
for former CSU voters who hold more anti-EU preferences. For the pro-EU Green
party (6.5), more pro-EU voter preferences seem to have a positive monotonic ef-
fect on the probability of former Green voters to cast a vote for the Green party in
the EP election as well. The pro-EU party SPD seems to have a relatively stable
switching rate, only very EU-skeptic former SPD voters are more likely to desert
their party.
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tance on Left-Right. The eﬀect of policy disagreement should therefore be more
pronounced in the anti-EU direction. For anti-EU SPD voters, viable alternatives
are located to the left (Left party), and right (AfD), which means that policy dis-
agreement on EU integration needs to be substantial to oﬀset the switching costs
due to increased distance on Left-Right.
7.3 Modeling transition probabilities
The descriptive investigation of transition probabilities suggests that vote switch-
ing in EP elections may indeed be driven by policy considerations on EU-related
issues. However, a bivariate investigation can be misleading since other factors
might be confounding the results. I already identiﬁed one confounding factor in
the above discussion. The proposed spatial voting model posits that vote choice is
a function of the policy preferences not only on EU issues, but on left-right issues as
well. While it is theoretically possible to extend the descriptive approach above by
further subsetting on left-right preferences, in practice this is not a viable strategy
due to data constraints. Very quickly there are simply not enough data points left
in most cells of the transition frequency tables to make reliable inferences. Also
other factors might act as confounders. E.g., voter in larger policy disagreement
with the party they voted for in the Federal elections might be more likely to lack
a strong party identiﬁcation, which in turn makes them more likely to switch.
The analytical solution I shall pursue in this paper is to employ a parametric
model that allows for the expression of transition probabilities as a function of
multiple voter characteristics. Fortunately, it is fairly straightforward to modify
conventional logit models to ﬁt the structure of a Markov process. Cox (1970,
72ﬀ) was among the ﬁrst to note the link between Markov transition probabilities
and the logistic regression framework. A logit model for transition probabilities
is generally called a (Markov) transition model. Transition models belong to the
standard statistical repertoire in many disciplines, such as bio-statistics (e.g., Dig-
gle et al., 1994), econometrics (e.g., Boskin and Nold, 1975) and sociology (e.g.,
Coleman, 1964), but have found their way into the political science mainstream
only fairly recently (Epstein et al., 2006; Jackman, 2000; Hillygus and Jackman,
2003; Hillygus, 2007). In its general form, transition models are usually written
as logit[Pr(yit = 1|yi,t−1)] = Xitβ + yi,t−1Xitα.1 The model resembles the con-
ventional logit in that choice probabilities are modeled as the logit of covariate
matrix X with eﬀect parameter vector β. Additionally, transition models include
all possible interactions with the lagged dependent variable. The interactions al-
1See also Jackman (2000, 8). Following a distinction introduced by Cox (1981), the model is an
observation-driven transition model, as the realized choice yi,t−1 is conditioned on. Parameter-
driven transition models use the latent choice y∗i,t−1 instead. While the latent model is often
seen as preferable, it shall not be pursued here since estimation is notoriously difficult (Jackman,
2000, 9ff).
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low the eﬀect to vary dependent on previous choice. Accordingly, the αs express
the change in β, given the previous choice. In practice, researchers deviate quite
a bit from this general form due to how the number of interactions scales. Given
the number of covariates, time points or choice alternatives, including all possible
interactions makes the transition model very quickly too unwieldy to interpret.
To arrive at a parsimonious model speciﬁcation, insigniﬁcant or theoretically im-
plausible interactions are typically eliminated (Diggle et al., 1994; Epstein et al.,
2006).
While transition models for binary choices are most common, the approach trav-
els easily to the ordered and multinomial case. These are merely more complicated
in that an additional dimension is introduced. However, it is not quite clear to me
how alternative-speciﬁc variables as in McFaddens conditional logit model, such as
spatial distances, can be incorporated into transition models. Therefore, I turn to
closely related econometric models which generally go by the name dynamic dis-
crete choice models. These models were originally developed in marketing research
to study consumer demand such as brand choice with scanner data of repeated
product purchases (see Keane, 2013, for an overview). Formulated in the random
utility framework, these models typically include product attributes such as price.
Dynamics are introduced by allowing for state dependence. State dependence is
“brand loyalty”, or in the language of politics, party loyalty. The basic utility
function of individual i to choose alternative j at time t may be written as
Uijt = αj +Xijtβ + ωjyij,t−1 + ǫijt,
where αj are alternative-speciﬁc intercepts, Xi is a matrix of choice attributes
with utility weight parameter β. yij,t−1 is an indicator variable that takes the value
of 1 if i chose j in the previous election, and 0 otherwise. Note that the parameter
ω varies over j, which allows for diﬀerent state dependence given diﬀerent previous
vote choices. This captures the notion that it matters which particular party is
the party of origin. If state dependence has a positive eﬀect, individuals obtain
additional utility from choosing the same alternative again. If ω is negative, choos-
ing the same alternative yields lower utility and individuals are more inclined to
switch to a diﬀerent alternative as these relatively gain utility. However, it is well
established that such a “lagged dependent variable” speciﬁcation will not only cap-
ture “true” state dependence, the causal eﬀect of previous choice on present choice,
but also unobserved or unspeciﬁed factors that aﬀect both the vote choice in the
European election and vote choice in the past national election, i.e., unobserved
heterogeneity. This has been referred to as ‘spurious’ state dependence (Heckman,
1981). While a multitude of sophisticated statistical models have been developed
to disentangle true from spurious state dependence (see e.g. Erdem, 1996), this
paper shall remain agnostic to this question. That the lagged dependent variable
will ultimately capture spurious state dependence is of no primary concern for my
analysis. Where state dependence comes from is unimportant insofar as only its
presence is relevant to explain which voters stay loyal or not. Putting it the other
way around, eﬀectively “controlling” for unobserved time-constant factors that co-
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determine vote choice in both elections is a positive property of this speciﬁcation.
Unobserved variables “are not relegated to the disturbance term” (Jackman, 2000,
9), but are incorporated into the state dependence term, making the speciﬁcation
more robust to omitted variable bias.
Assuming the i.i.d. error-term ǫ to be distributed Type-1 extreme value, the
model can be estimated as a multinomial logit for alternative-speciﬁc variables,
or conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974). Collecting the terms of the utility
functions in Vij, the choice probability of voter i for party j is given by Pr(Yij =
1) = e
Vij
∑J
j=1 e
Vij
. Parameter estimates are obtained by maximizing log-Likelihood
w.r.t. the parameters αj, β and ωj.2
How is the proposed model related to transition probabilities, and therefore vote
switching? Imagine a very basic model that includes only party-intercepts αj
and state-dependence terms ωyij,t−1. We can obtain each cell entry of the sample
transition matrix by inserting the estimated coeﬃcients into the multinomial logit
function. pA2 |A1, a vote for party A given a vote for party A in the previous
election is eα1+ωj∗1/
∑J
j=1 e
αj+ωj∗yj,t−1 , etc. In a next step, transition probabilities
are made dependent on other variables as well. In line with the spatial voting
models so far used in this dissertation, I specify Xijtβ as the squared Euclidean
policy distance on the EU integration and Left-Right dimensions: (pjeu − vieu)2
and (pjlr − vilr)2. The respective eﬀect parameters, the dimensional weights, are
βeu and βlr. Note that, in line with spatial theory, βeu and βlr are modeled as
parameters that are homogeneous in the population, meaning that every voter
uses the same parameter to evaluate every party on EU integration issues, and
the same parameter to evaluate them on left-right issues. To keep the model
parsimonious, I also assume for the moment that the eﬀect of spatial weights on
transition probabilities does not depend on previous vote choice, all voters use the
same spatial coeﬃcients, irrespective of their party of origin. The sensitivity of
the results to this assumption are tested in a second step. Additionally, I control
for the partisan identity of the voters, as partisan voters should be suspected to
exhibit a much higher state dependence than non-partisans. I include a lagged
measure for party identiﬁcation, i.e., party identiﬁcation as it was reported by the
respondents at the point of the Federal election. I include party identiﬁcation as a
choice-speciﬁc covariate that takes the value of 1 if voter i identiﬁes with partyj,
and 0 otherwise.
7.4 Results
Table 7.3 reports parameter estimates and standard errors for three speciﬁcations
of the dynamic discrete choice model of vote choice in the EP election. The ﬁrst
2I estimate the models using the mlogit R package (Croissant, 2012; Henningsen and Toomet,
2010)
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EP Vote | Federal vote
LR only LR & EU Lagged Preferences
Distance EU2 −0.045∗ (0.005) −0.030∗ (0.004)
Distance LR2 −0.069∗ (0.007) −0.068∗ (0.007) −0.045∗ (0.006)
PIDt−1 0.937
∗ (0.105) 0.932∗ (0.107) 0.940∗ (0.105)
Yt−1 = 1 1.570
∗ (0.163) 1.572∗ (0.164) 1.563∗ (0.162)
Yt−1 =AfD 1.033
∗ (0.315) 0.730∗ (0.336) 0.685∗ (0.321)
Yt−1 =FDP 0.300 (0.386) 0.297 (0.386) 0.323 (0.384)
Yt−1 =Free Voters 0.605 (0.361) 0.587 (0.362) 0.605 (0.360)
Yt−1 =Greens 0.182 (0.289) 0.018 (0.293) 0.171 (0.291)
Yt−1 =Left 0.434 (0.392) 0.383 (0.394) 0.181 (0.383)
Yt−1 =Pirates 1.961
∗ (0.536) 2.221∗ (0.538) 2.057∗ (0.536)
Yt−1 =SPD −0.585∗ (0.249) −0.556∗ (0.252) −0.554∗ (0.249)
Observations 1,445 1,445 1,445
Log Likelihood -1,656.827 -1,603.517 -1,664.832
Note: CSU is reference category. ∗p<0.05. Intercepts included, but not reported
Table 7.3: Dynamic discrete choice model estimates
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model only includes squared distances on the Left-Right as an independent vari-
able. Transition probabilities are also made dependent on squared EU integration
distances in the second model. In the third, distance measures are replaced with
distance measures calculated using lagged preferences, i.e., the EU and LR self
placements reported by the respondents at the time of the Federal election. Anal-
ogous to my bivariate analysis, lagged preferences help exclude the possibility that
the association between EU integration preferences and transition probabilities
merely reﬂects voters changing their positions between elections.
The coeﬃcients may be interpreted as follows. The coeﬃcient for Yt−1 captures
the state dependence for the reference party, the CSU. The coeﬃcient is strongly
positive. This was to be expected since the lagged choice indicator does not only
capture the causal eﬀect of the previous vote in the sense of a habit, but “sucks
up” the eﬀect of all unobserved or unspeciﬁed factors related to CSU vote choice in
the Federal and CSU vote choice in the EP election. The remaining party-speciﬁc
state dependence coeﬃcients have to be interpreted relative to the coeﬃcient for
Yt−1. One can therefore infer from the model estimates that former AfD and
Pirate Party voters exhibit a statistically signiﬁcantly higher state dependence,
while former SPD voters have a lower state dependence than CSU voters.3 The
PIDt−1 coeﬃcient can be best understood as a modiﬁcation to the utility to vote
for the party a voter identiﬁes with. As expected, party identiﬁcation has a strong
positive eﬀect throughout the models. Two situations may be distinguished. If
the party a voter identiﬁes with is also the party chosen in the Federal election,
the PID coeﬃcient may be counted as an addition to the state dependence term,
making the voter more loyal. However, if the party a voter identiﬁes with is not the
party chosen in the Federal election, it becomes more likely that the voter switches
to the party he identiﬁes with in the EP election. The dimensional weights, the
coeﬃcients of the squared distance terms, express the inﬂuence of spatial distance
considerations on the probability of transitioning to one party, given the party
chosen in the Federal election. The negative signs of the estimated weights indicate
that increases in the distance between a voter and a particular party on both
dimensions decreases the probability of transitioning to this party, keeping the
distances to all other parties constant.
Comparing the ﬁrst and second model speciﬁcation, the magnitude of the coef-
ﬁcient for distances on the Left-Right dimension remains virtually identical. The
coeﬃcient for EU distances is statistically signiﬁcant in the second model, indicat-
ing that voters factor in EU integration preferences when voting in EP elections.
Analogous to the previous chapters, the relative dimensional weight can be cal-
culated. For model 2 the (average) relative weight of EU integration preferences
in the spatial utility calculus is estimated at .4, with a 95% conﬁdence interval
3The large state dependence for Pirate Party voters might seem dubious at first sight, given
the low retention rates that are reported in Table 7.2. However, the high state dependence needs
to be interpreted relative to the Pirates low intercept estimate (-2.4), which then generates the
accurate retention rate.
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of [.33;.47]. This means, if one is comfortable with assuming that the distance
measures are on the same scale, that EU integration preferences make up between
a third and a half of the spatial considerations as they relate to transition prob-
abilities. Spatial considerations related to European integration seem to play a
noticeable role in determining voting transitions. However, they do not dominate
over Left-Right considerations. This ﬁnding is very much in line with the ﬁndings
for the general vote choice function presented in Chapter 5. The third model,
that tests the sensitivity of the ﬁndings to temporal changes in voter preferences,
come to a similar conclusion. Both distances between party positions and lagged
self placements on EU integration and Left-Right are found to have a statistically
signiﬁcant negative impact on transition probabilities. While the magnitude of
the coeﬃcients is slightly lower, arguably due to the increased measurement error
due to using lagged preferences, the estimated relative weight is almost the same:
.4 [.3;.5]. Model 3 can therefore be counted as empirical support that the associa-
tion between EU distances and transition probabilities is not due to voters having
changed their views on European issues between elections.
Robustness Testing
The analyses so far conducted has been based on a sparse model speciﬁcation that
built on the assumption that the eﬀect of policy distances is independent of the
party chosen in the Federal election. While this assumption seems plausible from
the view point of spatial theory, the assumption may obfuscate important patterns
in the data that might invalidate my inference. One way of getting rid of the
assumption is to incorporate additional interaction terms into the model. A simpler
alternative approach is to estimate separate models for each set of respondents that
voted for one speciﬁc party at the Federal election. While a joint model is certainly
preferable in most instances, for my analysis which is conducted in the spirit of
robustness testing, the latter shall suﬃce. Table 7.4 presents the obtained spatial
estimates of the eight separate models.
Overall, the ﬁndings from the separate models suggest that the homogeneity
assumption about the spatial eﬀects on transition probabilities is tenable. For all
sets of respondents who voted for the same party in the Federal election, the eﬀect
of both distances on the Left-Right and EU integration has a negative sign. More-
over, the spatial weights are conﬁdently distinguishable from zero for most parties
of origin. Since comparing coeﬃcient magnitudes across the separate models may
be reliable, I also calculate the relative weight of EU integration preferences, which
should be more robust. Comparing the relative weights across the separate mod-
els, one can see that these vary between the models, but are consistently estimated
as between roughly one third and three quarters, for the parties of origin with a
suﬃcient number of observations to make authoritative inferences. In contrast, the
joint model estimate (.4 [.3;.5]) was slightly more conservative about the weight
of EU integration distances relative to the weight of Left-Right distances. Taking
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EP Vote | Federal vote
CSU SPD Greens AfD
Distance EU2 −0.052∗ −0.086∗ −0.090∗ −0.075∗
(0.010) (0.015) (0.036) (0.030)
Distance LR2 −0.052∗ −0.040∗ −0.033 −0.035∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.012)
Relative Weight 0.49 0.68 0.73 0.69
[0.36; 0.61] [0.55; 0.79] [0.38; 1] [0.35; 0.88]
Observations 652 322 126 119
FDP Left Free Voters Pirates
Distance EU2 −0.073 −0.074∗ −0.055 −0.045
(0.043) (0.022) (0.042) (0.042)
Distance LR2 −0.091∗ −0.035∗ −0.034 −0.064
(0.026) (0.016) (0.029) (0.034)
Relative weight 0.45 0.67 0.61 0.43
[0.0; 0.69] [0.45; 0.93] [0.0; 1] [0.0; 1]
Observations 82 64 53 27
Note: ∗p<0.05. Intercepts and PID included, but not reported.
Table 7.4: Robustness Test: Spatial weight estimates from separate models for
subset of respondents with same party of origin.
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all this in the account, I think the separate model estimates have predominantly
shown that spatial weights are substantively similar across parties of origin, rather
than having shown that there is important variation in spatial weights. From this
perspective, the potential gain in predictive accuracy that could be realized by
allowing spatial weights to vary according to the party of origin is outweighed by
the analytical value of a more parsimonious description of the data involving a
homogeneous spatial weight. Accordingly, I choose to stick with the joint LR &
EU model in the following.
EU preferences and vote switching: A simulation study
My analysis has so far established that EU integration preferences of voters inﬂu-
ence transition probabilities. However, it has not become clear how these prefer-
ences are related to the phenomenon of vote switching. How strongly, and under
what circumstances does policy disagreement on EU integration preferences lead
to vote switching in EP elections? The model estimates can tell us only very little
about that. This is because the interpretation of the spatial coeﬃcient in terms
of “a one unit change in distance leads to. . . ” does not reﬂect how voting works
in the real world. From the perspective of a real-world voter, distances can not
be varied, e.g., in the sense that the voter moves one party’s position to the left
by one unit. For the voter, party positions are simply given. Alternatively, if the
policy positions of the parties are given, and the voter’s ideal point changes by one
unit, obviously this aﬀects the distance not only to one party, but the distance to
all the other parties as well. Therefore, to determine the consequences of “moving
the voter’s ideal point” for vote switching, or comparing the likelihood of two vot-
ers to vote switch whose ideal points diﬀer, requires an evaluation of the utility
diﬀerential between all available parties of destination. This can not be inferred
from the regression table.
Eﬀectively this means that a speciﬁc choice situation needs to be considered in
order to gauge the eﬀect of distances on the EU integration dimension on vote
switching behavior. To calculate the probability of a vote switch based on my
model estimates, I need to know the party a voter voted for in the Federal elec-
tion, the voter’s ideal point on both dimensions, and the position of all available
parties on both dimensions, and whether the voter has a party identiﬁcation. Fur-
thermore, the estimation uncertainty I have about the estimated parameters, that
relate the above mentioned factors to the utility calculation of voters, needs to
be incorporated. Simulation techniques (King et al., 2000) are an ideal way to
accomplish all of this. Given a speciﬁc choice situation, the probability of tran-
sitions to all available parties of destination is calculated based on the estimates
for the LR & EU model. If the party of destination is the party that was chosen
in the previous election, one minus that transition probability is the probability
of switching. By dividing the transition probability of the parties that are not
the party of origin by the switching probability, the probability of the destination
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probability for extreme anti-EU voters slightly overestimated, which might hint at
calibration issues.4 However, there is a clear substantive similarity between the
patterns in the raw data and the model predictions, which suggests that the model
captures important features of the vote choice dynamics between the Federal and
the EP election that are not explained by alternative theoretical explanations.
Moreover, it is to be kept in mind that the model is extremely parsimonious. Of
course there are quite a number of parameters - J-1 intercepts, the PID eﬀect and
J state dependence parameters, but these merely calibrate the model. The pat-
terns in the association between the quantities of interest and spatial preferences
are solely governed by two parameters that express the spatial weight of policy
distances, and not the result of any bells and whistles.
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter of the dissertation has presented a study of the impact of policy
preferences on European integration on vote switching between the Federal and
EP elections in the German state of Bavaria. The main ﬁnding is that, contrary
to the classical second-order interpretation of voting behavior, preferences speciﬁc
to the context of the second-order election, namely preferences about European
Integration, seem to play a substantial role in explaining patterns of vote switching
between the Federal and the EP election. The patterns I ﬁnd are consistent with
a model of multi-dimensional spatial voting in which voter adjust the saliency of
arena-speciﬁc policy dimensions. Moreover, the analysis in this chapter suggests
that, in line with the theoretical model, whether EU integration preferences in-
crease the likelihood of vote switching is fundamentally contingent on the existence
of viable party alternatives on the dominant ﬁrst-order dimension of political con-
ﬂict, the Left-Right dimension. For example, while euroskeptic rightist former CSU
voters are more likely to switch to the euroskeptic rightist AfD in EP elections,
rightist CSU voters who are more pro-European than their party are less likely
to switch because the pro-European parties SPD and Greens are leftist parties.
The likelihood of switching intimately depends on the constellation of parties in
the political space, relative to voter ideal points. In consequence, this means that
vote switching due to EU preferences might play out very diﬀerently not only in
diﬀerent party systems, but also for diﬀerent voters within the same electorate.
This ﬁnding calls into question the way in which vote switching has been studied
so far. Research designs that rely on coarse categorizations of voting behavior and
do not account for the characteristics of the parties that stand for election run the
risk of missing crucial parts of the story. The research design and model presented
in this chapter may help future research to surmount many of the diﬃculties of
4These are to be expected, as one should keep in mind that the simulation controls for
Left-Right position and party identification. Of course this is not the case in the bivariate
investigation.
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studying voting behavior in consecutive elections across diﬀerent electoral arenas.
The simple transition model used in this paper can be easily extended to include
other aspects of dynamic voting, and to rule out alternative explanations of why
some voters vote for diﬀerent parties in diﬀerent elections. While my model has ac-
counted for second-order factors by party-speciﬁc intercepts and state dependence,
these factors may also be modeled explicitly. Most promising seems extending the
model to include non-voting, which has so far been studied separately from switch-
ing.
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Conclusion
Modern democracies are almost exclusively polities that are organized in multiple
levels of government. In multi-level democracies, citizens are not only called to the
polls in presidential or national legislative elections, but also at the local, regional,
subnational or transnational level. Following normative democratic theory, sepa-
rate elections are necessary to legitimize policy-making at each speciﬁc level and
to hold the elected accountable. Importantly, separate, level-speciﬁc legitimation
is needed because policy-making at each level is concerned with diﬀerent political
issues. Separate elections allow citizens to express their preferences on precisely
the issues that are at stake at a speciﬁc level: While a voter trusts one party on
national-level issues, she may choose a diﬀerent party at local elections if it better
represents her views on local issues. However, whether voters act in this way is
theoretically and empirically contested in political science research. While on the
one hand it is cited as the reason why institutions are designed as they are and
seen as a necessary prerequisite for true democratic legitimation, political science
is highly skeptical whether voters are able and/or willing to distinguish between
the levels of government on the other. So far, political science research has not
satisfactorily addressed this discrepancy theoretically and has failed to develop
convincing empirical strategies to arrive at more deﬁnite empirical answers to this
important question: Do citizens actually make use of the possibilities that multi-
level electoral democracy oﬀers, and vote based on the speciﬁc political issues that
are at stake at elections at the diﬀerent levels of government?
The fundamental question whether voters pursue a “one-size-ﬁts-all” approach
to voting or whether they adjust their voting behavior calculus because they per-
ceive that diﬀerent issues are at stake at diﬀerent levels has come to a head in
research on European Parliamentary (EP) elections. It is here that the question
whether voters diﬀerentiate between the diﬀerent levels of government has cul-
minated in a long-lasting academic debate about the role of genuinely European
issues in EP elections. The traditional theoretical paradigm that has guided the
analysis of electoral outcomes in EP elections, and by extension also dominates
the study of multi-level electoral outcomes in general, the second-order elections
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model, portrays elections at all other levels as subordinate to the national level.
These second-order elections are conceptualized as following a nationalized logic
that crowds out all factors that are speciﬁc to the second-order arena, such as
the speciﬁc political issues or candidates at stake. Accordingly, EP elections are
not about European issues, but about national-level issues. Second-order theory
therefore by design sees multi-level democracy as fundamentally defunct. If it is
indeed the case that citizens are unable to distinguish between the diﬀerent lev-
els of government, multi-level elections cannot fulﬁll their function of legitimizing
policy-making or even hold the elected accountable.
Academic opposition to this pessimistic interpretation of how voters behave in
multi-level elections has formed in the recent decades. Collected under the um-
brella term “Europe Matters argument”, a diverse set of contributions has argued,
and presented empirical evidence that EP elections are not only less important
national elections as stipulated by the second-order elections model, but have over
the years become “more European”. The European character of EP elections means
that European citizens increasingly integrate genuinely European issues, such as
their preferences over EU policy and their attitudes towards the European project
into their decision making process at EP elections. Importantly, the literature
implies that citizens do not only integrate European aspects in their overall “one-
size-ﬁts-all” voting decision calculus, but that these aspects play a heightened role
only in EP elections. This would mean that voters possess a level-speciﬁc voting
decision calculus and adjust their decision making calculus to account for the spe-
ciﬁc issues that are at stake in EP elections. In the grand scheme of things, this
would mean that there is a democratic beneﬁt to holding EP elections, as it allows
EU citizens to express their level-speciﬁc preferences and to hold the politicians
accountable that are elected at the European level.
The Europe Matters literature has laid important ground-work in working out
the ﬂaws and limitations of the second-order elections model, yet has so far fallen
short of proposing a convincing alternative theoretical framework that is grounded
in a general theory of voting behavior. To be fair, this is not a shortcoming of the
literature on European elections, but of the political science discipline as a whole.
As it stands, political science lacks an analytical model to analyze individual-level
policy voting behavior across multiple or multi-level elections that would enable
researchers to study the determinants of changes in individual voting behavior
across elections or electoral levels. This is where this dissertation sets in. In
Chapter 2, I propose a generalization of the multidimensional model of spatial
competition to multiple elections that take place at diﬀerent points in time and/or
on diﬀerent levels of government. The model distinguishes two mechanisms for
policy-based change in voting behavior across elections: First, voter ideal points
and party positions may simply change between elections, and lead to diﬀerent
electoral outcomes. Secondly, the weights that voters assign to the multiple rele-
vant issue dimensions may vary across elections. Variation in weights encapsulates
the idea that voters might care more about speciﬁc policy dimensions at speciﬁc
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levels of government, which will incentivize them to change their voting behav-
ior across elections. Following the second mechanism, electoral change is not a
consequence of change in ideal points and party positions, but the consequence
of a recalibration of the policy space across electoral levels. I employ this general
model to study voting behavior in a typical multi-level elections setting, consist-
ing of general national, subnational and EP elections. I place a particular focus
on the role of European integration preferences in explaining electoral behavior
in EP elections, and change in electoral behavior between subnational and na-
tional elections and EP elections. The relevant European policy space is deﬁned
as two-dimensional, with voter preferences being structured by an EU integration
dimension and a Left-Right dimension. Based on this model, the conditions un-
der which changes in relative dimensional weights impact electoral outcomes in
multi-level elections are worked out. Three types of electoral outcomes are exam-
ined: Diﬀerential electoral participation, level-speciﬁc party vote choice and vote
switching between elections. Accordingly, three substantive research hypotheses
are investigated: Firstly, that voter preferences on EU integration can explain
diﬀerential turnout in EP elections, secondly, that voters care more about EU
integration preferences when choosing parties in EP elections than in national
or subnational elections, and thirdly, that the views EU integration preferences
motivate vote switching between national and EP elections. Additionally, the dis-
sertation reﬂects on a critical assumption that governs the relationship between
preference dimensions in the multidimensional model of spatial competition, the
assumption of non-separable preferences. Accordingly, a fourth research question
that this dissertation seeks to answer is whether Left-Right and EU integration
preferences are separable.
Before empirical investigations into these four research questions are launched,
Chapter 3 takes a step back and reﬂects on the fundamental inferential prob-
lems that empirical research on multi-election voting behavior faces. I clarify the
identifying assumptions researchers need to make, why panel data is categorically
needed and what the particular task is that panel data can fulﬁll in coming closer
to reliably answering my research questions. At the core of my reﬂexions is the
elimination of potential confounding due to unobserved heterogeneity. An over-
all research design that guides the empirical investigations of this dissertation is
developed, which allows to eliminate heterogeneity bias even with the data limi-
tations that multi-election voting behavior research is usually confronted with. I
ﬁnd that the proposed conditional likelihood approach to ﬁxed eﬀects models for
discrete data is the most promising avenue for empirical research in the foresee-
able future. Advantages and shortcomings of the conditional likelihood framework
are discussed. Finally, the speciﬁc empirical case and panel data set that this
dissertation employs is introduced.
Chapter 4 analyzes whether the EU integration preferences of voters can ex-
plain diﬀerential electoral participation in EP elections. It is the ﬁrst study that
seeks to uncover the causal mechanism that connects EU integration preferences
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and electoral participation in EP election with panel data. A research design is
developed that leverages available panel data to the fullest to overcome some of
the gravest inferential problems that studies of individual-level turnout on observa-
tional data face. My empirical ﬁndings suggest that pro-EU integration preferences
make electoral participation in EP elections more likely in the empirical case of
investigation, but only for voters who locate themselves left of the center on the
traditional dimension of party conﬂict - the Left-Right dimension. The relation-
ship is non-existent for voters located to the right of center, and might even be
negative for right-wing voters. The established conditionality of the relationship
on the Left-Right placement of voters is an important ﬁnding that gives a valuable
insight into the mechanism that links EU preferences and EP election turnout.
While the ﬁnding is clearly not consistent with conventional theoretical explana-
tions put forward by the second-order elections model or the legitimacy argument,
it meets the predictions derived from a multidimensional model of spatial com-
petition that explains diﬀerential abstention in EP elections by increased policy
alienation arising from the recalibration of the policy space.
Chapter 5 analyzes the role of EU integration preferences in the voters’ party
choice calculus at multi-level elections. The diverging hypotheses brought forward
by the second-order elections model and the Europe Matters argument are pre-
cisely formulated in the multidimensional model of spatial competition. To do
so, I introduce the novel theoretical concept of relative dimensional weight. The
second-order model’s transfer hypothesis predicts a constant relative weight of
EU integration preferences across the electoral levels, while the Europe Matters
argument’s recalibration hypothesis predicts the relative weight to be higher in
EP elections than in national or subnational election. A research design is de-
veloped that allows for the consistent estimation of relative dimensional weights
from individual-level panel survey data. The empirical results indicate that there
is systematic variation in the spatial voting calculus of Bavarian voters between
the elections. Although there is substantial uncertainty that is associated with the
estimates, the evidence is more consistent with the recalibration hypothesis than
the transfer hypothesis: Voters seem to put a larger emphasis on EU integration
preferences when they cast their vote in EP elections than in other elections. This
ﬁnding may be counted as evidence that voters are likely able and/or willing to
distinguish the diﬀerent levels of government, and to adjust their voting behav-
ior in the level-speciﬁc elections accordingly. However, the evidence also indicates
that the extent to which voters recalibrate is moderate at best. European issues do
not play a dominant role in EP elections, as the traditional dimension of political
conﬂict, Left-Right, maintains its role across multi-level elections.
Chapter 6 sheds light on a far-reaching and often neglected assumption on which
the multidimensional model of spatial competition relies - that policy preferences
on multiple dimensions are separable. The chapter consists of an article published
in Political Analysis (Stoetzer and Zittlau, 2015) that works out the theoretical
implications and statistical consequences of omitted non-separability, and pro-
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poses a model to estimate non-separability. In the second part of the Chapter,
I employ the developed methodology to test the robustness of the analysis con-
ducted in Chapter 5 to potential non-separability. The analysis constitutes the
ﬁrst study that investigates whether Left-Right and EU integration preferences
are separable in the spatial voting calculus of European voters. Moreover, the
analysis implements the methodology developed in Stoetzer and Zittlau (2015) in
the panel ﬁxed-eﬀects model of Chapter 5, and therefore constitutes the ﬁrst study
of non-separability with panel data. The empirical evidence suggests that policy
preferences on Left-Right and EU integration are separable, lending additional
credibility to the ﬁndings presented in Chapter 5.
Chapter 7 investigates the incidence of vote switching in EP elections as a con-
sequence of a recalibration of the policy space. Complementing the ﬁxed eﬀect
discrete choice approach used in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, this chapter proposes an
alternative methodology to analyze changing voting behavior that centers on the
modeling of transition probabilities. In a descriptive analysis of voting sequences in
my panel data on national and EP election vote choice, I show that vote switching
rates systematically covary with voter preferences on EU integration and distinc-
tive party-speciﬁc vote switching patterns can be observed. In a next step, I
translate my descriptive approach into a more formalized statistical model of mul-
tidimensional spatial voting. I ﬁnd clear empirical evidence that EU integration
preferences have a substantial impact on transition probabilities. Making use of
simulation techniques to interpret my model results, I ﬁnd that the vote switching
patterns that my model predicts are very much consistent with the party-speciﬁc
vote switching patterns observed in the data. This would suggest that some voters
choose diﬀerent parties in EP elections than in national elections because these
better represent voter preferences on European integration issues, on which voters
place a larger weight in EP elections than in national elections.
8.1 Summary and discussion of findings
Putting together the empirical evidence that was presented in the Chapters 4 to
7, a consistent picture of the role of EU -related preferences in Bavarian multi-
level elections emerges. The EU integration preferences of citizens seem to play a
distinctive role in explaining electoral participation and vote choice in the EP elec-
tion, and change in individual voting behavior across national and EP elections.
The general theoretical framework that consistently explains these empirical phe-
nomena is a two-dimensional model of spatial competition in the European policy
space. At the heart of the explanation is the idea that voters recalibrate their issue
priorities between elections, which is expressed in the theoretical concept of chang-
ing relative dimensional weights. While Bavarian voters base their policy-based
decision making calculus in national and subnational elections almost exclusively
on considerations that fall onto the traditional dimension of political conﬂict, the
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Left-Right dimension, they systematically integrate considerations related to EU
integration issues into their decision making in EP elections. The consequences of
this reweighing of the policy dimensions for voting behavior can be clearly deﬁned
by the model: Voters that are not aligned on EU integration issues with the parties
they usually vote for in national and subnational elections will experience more
policy alienation in the recalibrated policy space in EP elections - if there is no
attractive alternative party that better reﬂects their recalibrated preferences. This
makes certain ideological subsets of the Bavarian electorate more likely to abstain
from participating in EP elections than in national elections. The non-alignment
on EU integration with the parties voters prefer on Left-Right may also translate
into a diﬀerential party vote choice in EP elections: When EU integration pref-
erences gain importance in EP elections, some Bavarian voters are motivated to
vote for alternative parties that better reﬂect their recalibrated preferences.
While my ﬁndings show that EU integration preferences clearly matter for Bavar-
ian multi-level electoral behavior, they also indicate that the relationship is more
complex than previously thought. I ﬁnd no evidence that EU integration prefer-
ences have a direct and unconditional eﬀect on voting behavior. In line with my
theoretical reasoning it is rather how EU integration preferences work in conjunc-
tion with voters’ ideological dispositions on the Left-Right dimension of political
conﬂict that proves decisive. Throughout the dissertation, I ﬁnd that Left-Right
preferences remain the dominant guideline for the policy-based decision making of
Bavarian voters, even in EP elections. Yes, EU integration preferences clearly mat-
ter when voters make up their mind in EP elections, but whether they translate
into diﬀerential voting behavior such as level-speciﬁc abstention or vote switching
is conditional on voters’ Left-Right preferences. My ﬁndings not only highlight the
continuous importance of Left-Right ideology, but also underline the importance
of party system factors. The structure of party competition in the European pol-
icy space is a decisive contextual factor that governs if and how EU integration
preferences translate into outcomes. Even in multi-party systems with a substan-
tial number of parties such as the Bavarian one, voters’ opportunities to express
their preferences at the ballot box are limited by the party system. Party posi-
tions on Left-Right and EU integration are not randomly distributed in the policy
space, but are arranged in distinctive patterns. In Bavaria, Euroskeptic parties
are located at the fringes of the left-right spectrum, center-right parties hold mod-
erately Euroskeptic positions, and center-left parties are pro-integrationist. This
constellation of parties in the policy space creates opportunities for some voters
to express their EU integration preferences at the ballot box, and limits those of
others. This is because of the policy trade-oﬀs that particular ideological subsets
of the electorate face. For example, rightist voters with Euroskeptic preferences
ﬁnd ample opportunity to update their voting behavior in EP elections by casting
a vote for the Euroskeptic far-right, as they have to trade away relatively little in
term of Left-Right proximity to get their closest match on EU integration. Rightist
voters with pro-integration preferences are less fortunate, as they would have to
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trade away too much proximity on Left-Right in order to get a closer match on EU
integration. These voters are likely to stick with their usual party - EU integration
preferences are eﬀectively rendered ineﬀective in this case -, or abstain in EP elec-
tions because they feel more alienated. The relationship between EU integration
preferences and political outcomes is therefore conditional on the constellation of
parties in the policy space. This implies that if the party system changes, over
time or in a cross-country comparativist sense, so does the relationship between
integration preferences and voting behavior.
In summary, my analysis of Bavarian multi-level elections suggests two important
lessons for our understanding of the role of EU integration preferences in national
and supranational elections: Firstly, EU integration preferences matter, and voters
put a larger emphasis on them in EP elections than in national elections. Secondly,
whether and how they translate into electoral outcomes is fundamentally contin-
gent upon voter preferences on Left-Right, and the spatial conﬁguration of party
competition. But what are the broader implications of my ﬁndings? Two aspects
of this question may be distinguished: First of all, how do my conclusions travel
beyond the empirical case of investigation, to other EU member states and other
time periods? And secondly, what can my conclusions tell us about the overall
research question about the functioning of multi-level democracy in general?
As the research designs presented in this dissertation have purposely focused
on guaranteeing the internal validity of inferences, generalizability was necessarily
neglected. It might therefore be argued that my conclusions do not travel beyond
the particular case under study, the Bavarian multi-elections 2013-2014. I think
this is an extreme and unhelpful view. To arrive at a more nuanced evaluation, two
aspects may be distinguished. Firstly, it is clear that the narrower conclusions,
the estimated eﬀect sizes and speciﬁc behavioral patterns, are unlikely to repli-
cate precisely in other electoral contexts. Indeed my theoretical work pressingly
indicates that this should not be the case: Variation in the party system should
indeed change the relationship between EU integration preferences and electoral
outcomes. EU integration preferences can be muted if parties form an “issue cartel”
on EU integration, or activated by issue entrepreneur parties that exploit repre-
sentational gaps in the party system. Moreover, it seems plausible that the degree
of politicization of EU issues varies substantially between electoral contexts, and
is inﬂuenced by event shocks and electoral campaigns. This should modulate the
relative weight of EU integration preferences, and the magnitude of recalibration
between national and EP elections. In the end it is an empirical question how
heterogeneous eﬀect sizes are across diﬀerent electoral contexts, about which this
dissertation needs to remain largely silent and which is to be left to future research
to explore. The second aspect of the generalizability question concern the broader
conclusions this dissertation draws concerning the existence and nature of the re-
lationship between EU integration preferences and multi-level voting behavior and
its underlying mechanism. I think the work presented in this dissertation provides
ample reason to be comfortable with transferring the broader lessons learned to
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other electoral contexts as well. Employing research designs that produce reliable
inferences by eﬀectively eliminating potential confounding, I ﬁnd consistent evi-
dence that EU integration preferences matter to Bavarian voters. It is therefore
convincingly shown that voters have the ability to adjust their EP election voting
behavior to the EP election-speciﬁc issues that are at stake, which motivates them
to abstain and vote for diﬀerent parties in EP elections than in national elections.
If Bavarian voters can do it, why shouldn’t voters in other EU member states?
Given that I see no reason that is grounded in solid theory, I think it is implausi-
ble to suggest that the Bavarian electorate in the 2013-2014 multi-level elections
is fundamentally diﬀerent from other electorates or time-periods. Accordingly, the
basic mechanism that relates EU integration preferences to European multi-level
election behavior should exist in other electoral contexts as well. Nevertheless,
it is clear that this dissertation is not the ﬁnal word on this research hypothesis.
Further empirical analyses of European multi-election voting behavior in other
electoral contexts that pays close attention to the inferential challenges outlined in
this dissertation is imperatively needed to increase conﬁdence in the conclusions.
If one accepts the proposed conclusions about the EU integration-multi-level
election nexus, what are the implications for the broader research question con-
cerning the functioning of multi-level democracy? Does multi-level democracy
only guarantee procedural democracy, or does it fulﬁll its promise of improving
substantive democracy by enabling level-speciﬁc representation and holding the
elected accountable at each separate level? This vital question hinges upon the
empirical question whether real-world voters are able and willing to distinguish
what is a stake at the diﬀerent levels, and to act upon these level-speciﬁc evalu-
ations. I think this dissertation has convincingly worked out that the pessimistic
view on multi-level democracy, exempliﬁed by the second-order elections model’s
transfer hypothesis, is not tenable on both theoretical and empirical grounds. The
transfer hypothesis does not rest upon a convincing theoretical argument why
level-speciﬁc considerations should be systematically crowded out in second-order
elections. Empirically, voters indeed seem to be able to identify the speciﬁc issues
that are at stake in EP elections, and adjust their decision making calculus accord-
ingly. This dissertation therefore suggests that voters are able to ﬁll multi-level
electoral institutions with life by making use of the opportunities they provide.
In this light, multi-level electoral institutions do not only guarantee procedural
democracy, but are a necessary feature of modern substantive democracy.
While I do not see a convincing argument why my overall conclusion would not
be applicable to other multi-level second-order elections as well, it is clear that this
generalization necessarily remains uncertain. I am however conﬁdent: If voters are
willing and able to act upon level-speciﬁc policy preferences in European elections,
which are arguably cognitively challenging since EU-related issues often remain ab-
stract and the consequences of policy decisions opaque to the average voter, why
shouldn’t they do so in other multi-level elections as well? If level-speciﬁc issues
in other second-order elections, such as education policy in the German states,
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are much closer to the average voter, wouldn’t one expect even more level-speciﬁc
voting behavior? While this seems plausible at ﬁrst sight, one should be cautious
to draw this conclusion. Even though the cognitive challenge to voters may be
higher on the one hand, it may on the other hand be easier to detect these ef-
fects in the European arena, since level-speciﬁc policy preferences in the European
arena cross-cut the traditional policy dimension of national-level political conﬂict.
In other arenas, where party competition has to a large degree integrated level-
speciﬁc issues into the Left-Right policy dimension, such as education policy at
the subnational level, the observable consequences of level-speciﬁc voting might be
less pronounced, and diﬃcult to detect: Even if voters put a larger emphasis on
level-speciﬁc issues in such a situation, it will lead to the same result as if voters
were to base their vote only on Left-Right. Eﬀects might therefore be small and
diﬃcult to detect in these instances, given the data limitations and weak identi-
ﬁcation strategies that empirical research in this ﬁeld commonly faces. Failure to
detect these eﬀects in observational data may therefore not necessarily mean the
absence of level-speciﬁc policy voting.
8.2 Broader Research Contribution
This dissertation not only informs the narrower ﬁeld of research on EP and multi-
level democracy, but is relevant to the wider political science community, particu-
larly to ﬁelds that rely on a spatial model of politics in their theoretical work, be
that in the ﬁeld of Policy Analysis or International Relations. In particular, this
dissertation speaks to all scholars that employ multidimensional spatial models and
seek to better understand the relationship between individual policy dimensions
and the consequences of changes in how dimensions are related over time or in
diﬀerent situations. One key contribution of this dissertation is its re-appreciation
of the theoretical richness of the multidimensional model of spatial competition.
It picks up important aspects such as the notion of relative dimensional weights
and non-separability of preferences that used to be integral parts of the model
as it was originally conceived in the ’60s and ’70s, but have since fallen through
the cracks of the academic mainstream. The dissertation also oﬀers a number of
new ideas, which naturally integrate into the classical spatial model. First and
foremost, the application of spatial theory to a multi- or multi-level election con-
text necessarily requires a dynamic and longitudinal perspective on spatial voting.
Surprisingly, such an analytical framework has so far not been developed. This
dissertation is the ﬁrst contribution to do so by extending the spatial voting model
to multiple elections and multiple electoral arenas. As it turns out, the longitu-
dinal multidimensional spatial voting model that is proposed oﬀers a concise, yet
versatile framework to explain individual electoral change between elections as a
consequence of changing policy priorities. How policy priorities change can be
conveniently captured by the important theoretical concept of relative weight of
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the policy dimensions. While relative weights are important quantities of interest
in their own right, an interesting and important implication of spatial theory is
that changes in relative dimensional weights between elections or electoral arenas
have diﬀerent electoral consequences for diﬀerent individuals. Whether a voter
abstains from voting, votes for the same party as last time, or changes his vote to
another party fundamentally depends on the individual’s multidimensional pref-
erences relative to the multiple party alternatives in the multidimensional policy
space. When dimensional weights change between elections, multi-party competi-
tion can lead to relatively complex patterns of individual electoral behavior. This
insight is certainly not novel, but tends to be under-appreciated in many applica-
tions of spatial theory in my opinion. All too often, academic contributions rely
on oversimpliﬁed or even incomplete spatial models. To the contrary, I think that
acknowledging complexity reminds us of one of the major strengths of spatial the-
ory: Its ability to describe and explain seemingly complicated behavioral patterns
with a parsimonious model.
Furthermore, the dissertation provides novel insights into bridging the gap be-
tween spatial theory and their statistical investigation, and updates the statistical
models used to implement the theoretical models. One key idea is expressing the
relative dimensional weights that is deeply encoded in the spatial framework by
setting estimated coeﬃcient parameters into relation to each other. As this dis-
sertation demonstrates, the resulting statistic may be a quantity of interest for
many research questions. Additionally, by analyzing relative weights one arrives
at a more meaningful interpretation of coeﬃcient values that goes beyond the
very limited scope of the Null hypothesis testing framework that has traditionally
driven the interpretation of empirical results of statistical spatial models. This
allows for making more meaningful statements about the role that particular pol-
icy preference dimensions play when voters make up their mind whom to vote for
in an election. The dissertation also presents joint work with Dr. Lukas Stötzer
on a statistical framework to integrate the concept of non-separability of pref-
erences into statistical applications of the multidimensional spatial model. The
non-separability statistic constitutes an additional dimension of analysis that may
be relevant for a variety of research questions. Our research therefore opens up
additional interesting and relevant avenues for hypothesis development and test-
ing. Finally, the dissertation introduces transition models into the spatial analysis
of multidimensional spatial voting in multiple elections. Transition models oﬀer a
consistent framework to study individual-level behavioral change across multiple
elections, and readily translate into a statistical model. Surprisingly, this connec-
tion has not been made by existing research into policy-induced vote switching
so far, an omission that this dissertation corrects. Rather than analyzing binary
categorizations of voting behavior deﬁned as vote switching that are oftentimes
fundamentally at odds with the theory of spatial voting in multi-party systems,
transition models allow to analyze switching in terms of transition probabilities,
a notion that follows naturally from the spatial model. This framework allows to
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connect spatial models of electoral change to a vast state-of-the-art econometric
literature of consumer choice models that has remained largely unexplored by po-
litical science research. As I show in Chapter 7, such models are readily adapted
to study the determinants of vote switching. As I show, this empirical strategy can
be augmented with simulation techniques that greatly facilitate interpretation of
the complex spatial patterns of vote switching implied by a spatial multi-election
model of voting in multidimensional policy spaces. Additionally, I explore new
graphical options that enable comparisons of empirical and estimated patterns
of vote switching in order to determine model ﬁt and answer the substantive re-
search questions. In line with the overall theme of this dissertation, the transition
model research design constitutes an important step towards appreciating the non-
triviality and richness of spatial theory to describe and explain electoral choice.
Finally, the dissertation oﬀers a number of contributions of a more or less purely
statistical nature. First of all, the dissertation demonstrates how to harness the
analytical power of panel ﬁxed eﬀect models for categorical dependent variables,
in particular the class of panel conditional logit models. While panel random ef-
fect models have become popularized over the last decade, the political science
literature as a whole seems to be largely unaware of the ﬁxed eﬀect option and its
advantages. Panel ﬁxed eﬀect models can improve the identiﬁcation strategy since
they eﬀectively deal with unobserved heterogeneity. Unlike random eﬀects models,
unobserved heterogeneity might be related to the independent variables in ﬁxed
eﬀect models. Especially in electoral behavior research, unobserved heterogeneity
is a prime concern since unobserved characteristics are likely to explain a vast pro-
portion of behavior. Additionally, we have relatively little established knowledge of
the relation between unobserved and observed characteristics which are often also
measured very imprecisely. Assuming unobserved and observed characteristics to
be unrelated might be heroic in this instance, and how this relationship is speciﬁed
can have a great deal of inﬂuence on the substantive ﬁndings, and invalidate the
drawn inferences. Another more practical advantage of the conditional likelihood
framework is that it requires only a few panel waves - theoretically two panel
waves are suﬃcient. In electoral research, where most panels are short and ran-
dom eﬀects not feasible, panel ﬁxed eﬀect models are often the only way to address
unobserved heterogeneity. As I demonstrate in this dissertation, panel conditional
logit models are very ﬂexible and can be tailored to the speciﬁc research ques-
tion at hand. Models for binary, ordered, multinomial dependent variables are
available. Coeﬃcients can be speciﬁed as varying across panel waves to model
changes in the data generating process. Moreover, panel conditional multinomial
logit can be adapted to incorporate alternative-speciﬁc independent variable. This
option was not explored previously, making this dissertation the ﬁrst contribution
to propose what might be called a “double conditional” logit model, a version of
McFadden’s conditional logit model for panel data. This model promises to be-
come the new workhorse statistical model for spatial voting research conducted
on panel data. Combined with the research on non-separability, this dissertation
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therefore promises to push the methodology of empirical applications of the spatial
voting model to the next level.
8.3 Implications for future research
Given the various contributions that this dissertation makes, a number of open
questions and guidelines for future research projects can be deduced - related to
the narrower ﬁeld of EP election and multi-level election research, for empirical
applications of spatial voting models, and for electoral behavior research in general.
Firstly, research projects that launch more nuanced and broader, comparative
investigations into the relationship between EU integration preferences and multi-
level elections are called for. This dissertation has estimated average eﬀects. While
an average eﬀect is representative of the electorate as a whole, eﬀect sizes are
likely to vary a great deal across individuals. Since the consistent estimating
of individual-speciﬁc eﬀects will remain impossible with observational data, re-
searchers might seek to identify speciﬁc socio-demographic subsets or latent classes
of the electorate that are more ﬂexible in adjusting their voting behavior across
levels than other groups that follow a more “one-size-ﬁts-all” approach to multi-
level voting. Political sophistication or psychological traits seem likely candidates
for explaining individual-level variation in eﬀect sizes. Future research projects
addressing this research question will however have to address unobserved hetero-
geneity concerns, as unobserved factors are likely to be strongly related to these
variables. Moreover, I only analyzed multi-level electoral behavior in one speciﬁc
electoral context. Generalization to other contexts is therefore necessarily un-
certain, especially since my theoretical argument implies that multi-level election
behavior is contingent upon a context-dependent factor, the party system. A nat-
ural extension of the dissertation would therefore be a cross-country study that
exploits the variation of party systems across EU member states. By analyzing
whether country-speciﬁc relationships between level-speciﬁc preferences and voting
behavior are in line with model predictions, additional conﬁdence in the theoret-
ical framework proposed in this dissertation can be realized. The proposed panel
survey extension to the European Elections Studies Voter Survey component, that
may become available in the near future, will provide an excellent opportunity to
implement said research design. Not only cross-country variation, but also varia-
tion over time is of interest. An interesting research question might be whether
the extent of recalibration in EP elections has increased over time. However, it
is not clear to me how a convincing research design can be implemented with the
data that is available at the present date. Another important question concerns
the timing of second-order elections in the national electoral cycle. The second-
order election model predicts that the extent of second-order eﬀects varies over the
cycle, and so might the extent to which voters perceive level-speciﬁc policy con-
siderations to be relevant, and adjust their voting calculus accordingly. It seems
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plausible that the closer EP elections are held to national general elections, the
more EP electoral behavior is contaminated by national-level considerations. The
diﬀerent points in the electoral cycle on which an EP election falls in the EU
member states oﬀer a unique opportunity to study these potential crowding-out
eﬀects. A future study could for example estimate the magnitude of recalibra-
tion with the here proposed methodology, and investigate whether eﬀect sizes are
conditional on the timing of the elections. However, such a study would have to
disentangle cycle- and country-speciﬁc eﬀects, which may prove diﬃcult. Finally,
the dissertation only investigated the role of one kind of level-speciﬁc preferences,
EU integration preferences, in one speciﬁc combination of multi-level elections,
subnational-national-European. Evidence on the role of other level-speciﬁc pol-
icy dimensions or issues in other combinations of elections is needed to arrive at
a more general picture of the role of level-speciﬁc issues in multi-level elections.
The research design proposed here can be brought to bear on this question with
relative ease. The German federal system may provide potentially interesting
settings. States are responsible for education policy, and given suitable data, it
could be tested whether voters put a larger emphasis on education policy aspects
in State elections than in national-level elections. The comparison of local-level
with national-level voting behavior may provide additional leverage on the broader
research question about multi-level democracy. Survey data on the local level is
rare, but quasi-experimental approaches that exploit plausibly exogenous variation
between localities may prove viable here as well.
The second set of implications for future research concerns the empirical applica-
tion of multidimensional models of spatial competition in voting behavior research,
and potentially in other ﬁelds of the political science discipline as well. Spatial
theory has been criticized for treating preferences as separable and exogenous,
which is not logically consistent with the wider rational choice framework upon
which spatial theory is built (Milyo, 2000). The spatial methodology developed in
this dissertation addresses these important points of criticism, and therefore holds
important lessons for the future of spatial voting research that will held to make
models more realistic and empirical ﬁndings more reliable. Non-separability is an
interesting theoretical concept that may open up new perspectives on the multi-
dimensional preference structures that guide real-world voting behavior. Future
research projects may leverage non-separability to answer long-standing academic
debates, such as whether policy-based voting in US presidential elections is pri-
marily driven by economic or socio-cultural policy preferences, how these policy
preferences are related to each other and how this relationship has evolved over
time. It is also clear that non-separability should constitute a vital part of ro-
bustness testing in future empirical applications of spatial theory to improve the
validity of the drawn inferences. Non-separability may also prove to be of great
relevance outside of the narrower conﬁnes of the proximity voting model, e.g., for
the issue voting literature. Secondly, I would suggest that empirical applications of
spatial voting models need to pay much closer attention to the role of preferences in
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a causal model of electoral behavior. Policy preferences do not arise from nothing,
but are to a substantial proportion inﬂuenced by non-policy factors, such as an
individuals socio-demographic characteristics, income or religious beliefs. Conven-
tional attempts of statistical control are likely to fail in isolating the “true” eﬀect
of preferences, since researchers only have crude measurements of controls, and do
not know the correct model speciﬁcation. Moreover, important factors are likely
to always remain unobserved, such as voters’ cognitive ability, risk acceptance
or psychological inclinations. Due to the limitations of this strategy, the eﬀect
of non-policy factors on voting is likely to be wrongly attributed to the eﬀect of
policy preferences, which means that estimated parameters of the eﬀect of policy
distances are likely to be considerable overestimated in most settings. This leads
me to conclude that future spatial models need to be estimated with ﬁxed-eﬀect
models on panel data to successfully eliminate potential confounding, and improve
the credibility of empirical evidence derived from applications of spatial theory.
Finally, the implications of potential confounding due to unobserved heterogene-
ity are not only relevant for the spatial voting literature, but for the wider ﬁeld of
electoral behavior research. These implications are not of a “wonky”, purely statis-
tical nature, but raise deeper substantive issues that the political science discipline
faces. While panel analysis techniques belong to the standard repertoire of main-
stream academic research in economics, psychology and sociology, they remain
relatively infrequent in the political science discipline as a whole, and the narrower
ﬁeld of electoral behavior research in particular. The chief reason why the ﬁeld has
been so slow to adopt panel analysis is certainly the scarcity of panel designs in
traditional voter survey studies. However, advances in online survey methodology
have drastically reduced surveying costs, which means that more and more panel
studies are becoming available. In all too many instances, not only in the ﬁeld
of electoral research, but in the political science discipline as a whole, researchers
ﬁnally have access to long called-for panel data, yet continue to conduct their em-
pirical analysis of panel data using cross-sectional data analysis techniques. By
doing so, they fall short of making the best use of the panel structure of the data,
whose main advantage is that it allows for addressing heterogeneity bias. One
reason for this is certainly that statistical education has largely focused on cross-
sectional techniques, which are then reinforced by the incentive structure of the
discipline. Another, more practical reason is that the panel data analysis tech-
niques that are part of the econometrics and psychometrics mainstream are built
for panel data with a large number of waves and linear dependent variables, and
have only a limited scope of application for typical political science panel data
sets. Therefore the discipline needs to develop and popularize panel data analysis
techniques that are tailored to the particular structure of political science data,
i.e., for short panels with limited dependent variables. The conditional likelihood
framework has the potential to become an important part of the solution. With a
small number of panel waves, conditional likelihood is often the only game in town
in terms of panel data analysis techniques. By eﬀectively dealing with unobserved
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heterogeneity, conditional likelihood allows for more reliable estimates of the eﬀect
of time- or election-varying variables on political outcomes. As heterogeneity is
allowed to be related to the explanatory variables in any way possible, all potential
time-constant confounding factors are eﬀectively eliminated, which also facilitates
model speciﬁcation enormously. This makes the conditional likelihood framework
particularly powerful for all research questions that are at particularly high risk
of confounding, such as studies that seek to isolate the eﬀect of candidate, party,
coalition or policy evaluations on vote choice or turnout. Contrary to prevalent
beliefs, panel techniques also lend themselves to study the eﬀect of time-constant
factors as long as eﬀect parameters are speciﬁed as time-varying. For instance,
this is often the case in research that is interested in how changes in electoral
context lead to changes in the data generating process. Potential applications are
studies interested in estimating whether the eﬀect of socio-demographic factors on
electoral outcomes was stronger in one election than another, or how institutional
changes between elections aﬀect the vote choice mechanism. In these instances, the
employment of conditional likelihood techniques should at least become a required
step in robustness testing. Thereby they can help reduce spurious ﬁndings and re-
porting of overestimates, and help improve the hygiene of the discipline. However,
the clear analytical advantages that can be realized by the conditional likelihood
framework come at a cost: The conditional likelihood framework is by design in-
eﬃcient, i.e., more conservative statistical ﬁndings that are associated with larger
uncertainty are obtained. While I am aware that publication standards unfortu-
nately disincentivize conservative ﬁndings, I do not think that this should absolve
researchers of trying to address heterogeneity. Larger uncertainty is the necessary
cost researchers have to pay, but this uncertainty more accurately reﬂects how
comfortable researchers really should be with making their conclusions. Yes, con-
ditional likelihood techniques make research and its publication harder, but they
promise to produce more trustworthy results, of which the discipline is direly in
need.
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